Saturday, August 31, 2024

On the standard argument against abortion & why it fails.

On the standard argument against abortion & why it fails. 

1. Intentionally killing an innocent human being is wrong 
2. A fetus is an innocent human being 
3. Abortion is the intentional killing of a fetus 
C. Therefore, abortion is wrong. 


 #abortion #prochoice #prolife #ethics #philosophy #bioethics #criticalthinking
@nathan.nobis On the standard argument against abortion & why it fails. 1. Intentionally killing an innocent human being is wrong 2. A fetus is an innocent human being 3. Abortion is the intentional killing of a fetus C. Therefore, abortion is wrong. #abortion #prochoice #prolife #ethics #philosophy #bioethics #criticalthinking ♬ original sound - Philosophy 101 - Prof. Nobis
An alternative version of the argument: is it better? Worse? How? Why?
@nathan.nobis Replying to @nathan.nobis #abortion #prochoice #prolife #ethics #philosophy #criticalthinking #logic ♬ original sound - Philosophy 101 - Prof. Nobis
@nathan.nobis Replying to @nathan.nobis ♬ original sound - Philosophy 101 - Prof. Nobis

Tuesday, August 27, 2024

Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist Approach by David S. Oderberg



Someone sent me some pages from Moral Theory by Oderberg. Some of the pages might be missing: I am not sure.

This was, I think, meant to present a perspective on what human rights depend on that would be contrary to, say, most of views presented in the SEP's entry on human rights.

In reading through this, I am not finding much of value. Do you see anything plausible and worthwhile?

Xico

@SellarsFanatic
·
3h


Here in Chapter 4.4 of Moral Theory where Oderberg addresses the Human-Person distinction proposed by purveyors of your position. Your argument isn't novel and has been thoroughly addressed by the purveyors of the traditional account of human rights




Yes, saying that biologically human organisms have rights, are persons, etc. simply because they are biologically human organisms is uninformative. This guy agrees. 


missing page(s)?





I'll just mention that everyone, including Singer, can use the language of "kinds." For example, advocates of psychological theories of personal identity think that we are this "kind" of being: we are conscious beings: our essence relates to our mental lives. And such views can explain the very common idea that you before and after a nap are the same person. Do Oderverg's rhetorical questions here suggest that he too asks the "Whatabout sleeping people?? Why is it wrong to kill sleeping people?" question / "objection" to many common views? I hope not.





There are a lot of unanswered rhetorical questions here: that's not good. These questions have some pretty obvious answers too.






The objection seems to be that some have a too high "bar" for being a person. One response here to lower it: since it's good to consider objections and the best versions of views, that should have been discussed, perhaps.


I am also not seeing much in the way of an explanation for why, say, the potential of an embryo to become a person (or a "functioning" person or whatever) entails that it now has the rights of a person, or must be treated as a person, etc. In general, A being a potential X does not entitle A to being treated like an X now: this is well-known and this isn't addressed and the details addressed.






Why are "all humans" all biologically human organisms and not all biologically human organisms that are conscious, or "moral subjects" as Peter Markie suggests? No answer, since at least here there's no discussion of how we are all of many kinds and there's no discussion of how to try to figure out what kind(s) is (or are) the most relevant ones.


About luck, well, we do think that individuals should be treated as individuals: e.g., humans or human beings "in essence" have four limbs, but someone without any limbs should not be treated as if they have four: that would be wrong. So we need details of how this all works: if A is of some essence, then what?



What else was of interest here?

Wednesday, August 14, 2024

"A New Defense of Abortion" by Kurt Liebegott

Kurt Liebegott's PhD in philosophy dissertation A New Defense of Abortion is available for free download from Google Drive and from Dropbox

ABSTRACT

Liebegott, Kurt Charles. Ph.D., Purdue University, August, 2010. A New Defense of Abortion. Major Professor: Martin Curd.

This dissertation is a new defense of the moral permissibility of abortion. 

The first chapter gives definitions, methodology, and an overview of the current abortion debate. The first chapter also addresses the Benefit of the Doubt Argument, which says that abortion should be treated as morally wrong on the chance that the anti-abortion position is correct and abortion is murder. This argument fails because it assumes a counterintuitive standard of doubt and parallel arguments outside of the abortion debate fail. 

The second chapter defends Judith Jarvis Thomson’s pro-abortion violinist argument against the Responsibility Objection, which says that a woman who becomes pregnant due to voluntary intercourse is responsible for the need of the fetus for her body and so cannot have a morally permissible abortion. The Responsibility Objection is circular because abortion fails to meet this responsibility only if abortion is already morally wrong, so the Responsibility Objection fails. 

The third chapter addresses the arguments of Patrick Lee and Francis Beckwith that abortion is morally wrong because fetuses are human substances with an essential right to life. These arguments fail because they cannot handle cases involving stored IVF zygotes or creating or transferring consciousness. In these cases the human substance proposal either is shown to support the pro-abortion position rather than the anti-abortion position or has highly implausible ethical implications that make it almost certainly false. 

The final chapter addresses the argument of Don Marquis that abortion is morally wrong because it robs fetuses of their valuable futures. This argument fails because the nature of time limits the plausible interpretations of what it means to rob a fetus of its future. Either the future is real, or it is not. If the future is real, then this argument gives wrong answers when applied outside of the abortion debate. If the future is not real, then this argument reduces to the argument addressed in the third chapter that abortion is morally wrong because a fetus is a human substance. 

The overall conclusion is that the pro-abortion position is stronger and the anti-abortion position is much weaker than is usually believed.

Thursday, August 1, 2024

Comments on Abortion, Metaphysics and Morality: A Review of Francis Beckwith’s Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice.

Someone wrote some comments on my 2011 book review of an anti-abortion book by Francis Beckwith Abortion, Metaphysics and Morality: A Review of Francis Beckwith’s Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice.

I wrote comments on that person's comments in bold. Since I wrote these I am posting them below.


Original article: https://academic.oup.com/jmp/article/36/3/261/895026?login=false

Now available here: https://philpapers.org/archive/NOBAMA.pdf 


[My responses in brackets]

"suppose we accept the somewhat indeterminate claim that fetuses and adults are the same 'substance' or 'type,'"

[indeterminate? how so?]


See next paragraph


"...that fetuses and adults are the same 'substance' or 'type,' despite the fact that it seems they can also be described as being different substances and types as well: [e.g.] fetuses are pre- or never-been-conscious substances and adults are have-been-conscious substances"

[these differences are accidental differences that apply to the same substance;

This is missing the point that we can be accurately described as members of different types and different substances (or at least there are competing candidates for what substance(s) we are).

And most importantly you are assuming that the body is the relevant substance.

And, just because X is the same substance over time doesn't entail X has the same other properties at all times: things change. You can’t assume that moral properties are essential to that substance, or that the substance has those properties at all times it exists (and couldn’t exist without them).

The point, again:

https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/
1. Human Organisms?

Fetuses are not just biologically alive. And they aren’t just biologically human either, like skin cells or organs. They are biologically human organisms.

Some thinkers argue that our being human organisms physically continuous with fetuses that were human organisms makes abortion wrong.2 They seem to argue that since it is wrong to kill us now, i.e., we have properties that make it wrong to kill us now (prima facie wrong to kill: wrong unless extreme circumstances justify the killing), it was wrong to kill us at any stage of our development, since we’ve been the same organism, the same being, throughout our existence.

While this argument is influential in some circles, it is nevertheless dubious. You are likely over three feet tall now, but weren’t always. You can reason morally, but couldn’t always. You have the right to make autonomous decisions about your own life, but didn’t always. Many examples show that just because we have some characteristic, including a moral right now, that doesn’t entail that we (or our bodies?) have always had that characteristic or right. This argument’s advocates need to plausibly explain why that’d be different with, say, the right to life.3


even the same adult is sometimes conscious & sometimes not, but those don't change what he is; if they did, we wouldn't even be able to say the same adult is sometimes conscious and sometimes not", only "this adult is conscious" and then separately, seemingly about a different person "this adult is not conscious"]

no. That people sleep is not a good objection to the most common and popular explanation of what's called personal identity, namely psychological theories of personal identity:
https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/

We are still conscious beings even though we aren’t conscious at every moment: how is that? See what the view says.


"But adults and children have all sorts of physical, cognitive, and moral properties that fetuses lack. So just because normal adults are wrong to kill, it does not immediately follow that the fetuses they were would have been... wrong to kill even if there is numerical identity"

[assuming that Mentalism is thought to provide the salient difference, I'll address it below]

Mentalism- “a human being is intrinsically valuable if and only if she presently possesses certain properties and/or is able to exercise certain functions”

"Mentalists argue that beings that have never had mental lives or have lost their minds fully and permanently lack moral rights, are not persons, are not moral subjects, and/or are not morally valuable in their own right."

[is this a fair representation of your view?]

Yes.

Beckwith's 1st objection to mentalism: inequality

"prima facie implausible since virtually nobody argues, for example, that geniuses are morally entitled to, say, enslave the feeble-minded"

[see Peter Singer, Charles Murray, the rise of "low IQ" discourse online]

You will not find this in Peter Singer and other philosophers. I grant that you can find a rando saying just anything. I don't think you will find anyone many people saying this though: if not, prove it, re. Finding someone argue that we should be enslaving not so smart people.


"if an individual meets some minimum threshold of a mental life, then that individual has an equal right to consideration or rights as anyone else"

[What is the minimum threshold?

Common proposals involve being a sentient being, being a sentient being that exists over time–has connected mental states, being a sentient being that exists over time–has connected mental states that’s the “kind” of being that’s a rational being, and more.

Why is it valuable for moral analysis?

Would you mind taking a nap and never waking up (and not having any dreams, etc.) even if your body remained alive?


Why is any mental life beyond that not more valuable?]

You can think that anything that meets the threshold matters equally, or has equal basic rights. Similar to how anyone who meets a threshold passes a class equally. Both 72% and 98% have equally passed the class and are equally eligible to, say, move on to the next class in the sequence.

And, importantly, there is no good reason to deny this.

"if we focus on clear-cut... cases of exploitation (e.g., slavery, child abuse) in contrast with controversial questions about abortion, we can appeal to violations of interests, disrespect, using someone as a mere means, harms, & many other potentially morally relevant concerns"

[Whose interests? Disrespect of whom? Using whom as a mere means? Harming whom? Persons?]

You want me to explain who is the victim of slavery and child abuse? Or that the victims here are victims because they are conscious beings: their being that is a precondition for them being abused?

"He claims that all human beings, at all stages, are 'equal' because they are 'rational moral agents by nature from the moment they come into existence.' But it is not clear what reason Beckwith gives for this claim: As we have seen, numerical identity does not provide it"

[Where have we seen that? Refer back to my earlier point: these differences are accidental differences that apply to the same substance

No: even if if they are the same substance (they are! There's bodily continuity) that doesn't entail that that substance has the same other properties, e.g. moral properties, at all times: see section 1 here:

https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/

Not much of an argument is given for that; it's basically just assumed.

; even the same adult is sometimes conscious & sometimes not, but those don't change what he is; if they did, we wouldn't even be able to say the same adult is sometimes conscious and sometimes not", only "this adult is conscious" and then separately, seemingly about a different person "this adult is not conscious"]

Again, no, but you are assuming facts beyond physical continuity.

"if he thinks we must accept this or else we have no resources to condemn uncontroversial inequalities that is false"

[As long as we smuggle it back in and call it mentalism. Refer back to my earlier point: Whose interests? Disrespect of whom? Using whom as a mere means? Harming whom? Persons?]

Again, in all cases there is a conscious subject with interests, preferences, and so can be harmed, disrespected, etc.


"if he claims we must accept this or else we have no resources to argue against abortion that is both question-begging and false since there are alternative arguments against abortion"

[On that point, we agree]

"the objections to Mentalism do not succeed because it need not justify inequality"

[Yes it does, because it logically leads to the examples such as Peter Singer, Charles Murray, the rise of "low IQ" discourse online, even if well-intentioned Mentalists deploy a level of inconsistency to avoid those outcomes.]

No: it does not “logically” lead to that. Someone might mistakenly think it does, but it doesn't, and doesn't have to. If someone were to claim, “The only reasonable way to think that we shouldn't enslave not smart people is agreeing with Beckwith,” then no. Stronger, “Everyone else who would oppose enslaving not smart people is wrong has a false explanation why that’s wrong, unless they have an explanation like Beckwith’s.” Again, no.


"the Substance View does not seem to do much to justify egalitarianism"

[Rational nature is equally present in every person, even if the actualization of that nature varies widely.]

That anything “follows” from having a “rational nature” would need to be demonstrated or shown, not just assumed. And even just explained, like how in general this is supposed to work, since it doesn’t appear to work about any other characteristics.

https://www.nathannobis.com/2018/09/reply-to-christopher-tollefson-on.html


2nd objection to mentalism: “it is prima facie wrong to destroy the physical structure necessary for the realization of a human being’s basic, natural capacity for the exercisability of a function that is a perfection of its nature"

[This is a moral claim like you say, but I actually think this is an interesting formulation of a point that everybody invokes at one time or another in a variety of settings. E.g. why is unlawful detainment wrong? Not because the place of detainment is absolutely bad (it might even be good in other contexts), but because it keeps the victim from going in search of the perfection of her nature (i.e. the pursuit of happiness

Yes, and note that to be happy, you have to be a conscious subject.

). Would be worth looking into.]

3rd objection: coma patients

Jed 1: " this individual is headed for a very troubled conscious existence, perhaps one that would be better not to start and may even be wrong to start"

[So we should kill him because it's too burdensome to consider his development?]

The main point here is that people sometimes come up with cases, but don’t think about the details and how things are apt to go.

"common theories of personal identity suggest that a new person would emerge from Jed 1 if that life were allowed to continue"

[Goodbye Nathan Nobis, welcome back John Locke. In all seriousness, these theories are so uncommon today that the average reader of this thread would balk at the idea that, if you don't remember a part of your past, that part literally happened to a different person, not you.]

I don’t think you know (a) which views here are most common anymore (what are some of the relevant surveys? What do they suggest?), or (b) know how such views respond to this type of concern. So how do they respond? Hint: no, you (now) do not have to remember everything you have done for that to have happened to you. (That’s asking for the impossible, since we can only remember so much). Given that, how does this type of view explain how we exist over time?

Another source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/


"Jed 1’s relatives would feel that he is gone and that the new individual who emerges from his body is not him"

[Earlier on you said that "feelings can be unreliable and first impressions mistaken", so perhaps this is one of those cases.]

Perhaps, yet consider the case applied to yourself: suppose tomorrow the person in your body remembers nothing of your life – remembers nobody you know, etc. – and claims to be Ronald Reagan (or whoever) and talks like Reagan, etc.. Your friends might reasonably eventually think that you are gone, not that you changed (as if you woke up and decided you were going to be more outgoing or whatever.)


Re: theories of continuous personal identity

[Assuming they must be either psychologically-based or bodily (presumably with Ship of Theseus problems) implies a kind of dualist choice

Property dualism, yes (not substance dualism). People often don’t know there there are two broad types of dualism about mind-body issues: The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds? by Jacob Berger

but the Substance View could reject both options in the name of one continuous actuality: life that has rational potential.]

Even if one goes with that, being a potential X doesn’t entail you must be treated like an actual X.


Herb: "To many, it might seem that obligations to, or concerning, individuals who we know will emerge from a coma in 7 days are stronger than those we (somehow) know will, or can, emerge in seven decades. Whether time can contribute to making it such that, all things considered, it is permissible to let someone die would need to be addressed. But this again leads us to controversial cases: whether we would be obligated to provide medical support for a coma patient for 70 years who will then wake up and regain his faculties would surely be a controversial issue."

[The question isn't yet "what are our obligations to Herb?" but rather "is Herb a person?". Put obligations aside for a moment, does time impact the metaphysical question? Is he a person if he'll wake up in 7 days but not a person if he'll wake up in 70 years?]

Another option is that Herb the person will return in 70 years now. But, no, an issue here is whether even if Herb is a person, what efforts anyone must put in (at potential costs to other persons) so that he returns: “whether we would be obligated to provide medical support for a coma patient for 70 years who will then wake up and regain his faculties would surely be a controversial issue."

Jed 2: never-actualized potential

"This is a dubious understanding of potential"

[The potential is what makes him different from a literal vegetable that lacks that potential. In the vocal cord sub-example, the woman still has an incomplete vocal system with lungs, larynx, palate, and articulate lips. She wouldn't actually possess those if she lacked even the potential to speak.]

Potential relates to possibility. There are different senses of possibility. You are focusing on physical possibility, but that needn’t be the only relevant sense of possibility (and impossibility) here. Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality by Andre Leo Rusavuk


[If Beckwith says it's acceptable to let Jed 2 die, I would disagree. The analogy though, should be about killing Jed 2, just as we are killing a fetus.]

This article has numerous problems that fail to disprove the Substance View and fail to justify Mentalism.

If so, the above doesn’t identify those problems.

My sense is that the main issue of the review was ignored: just because something is the "same being" over time doesn't mean it has the same moral properties at all times. The "substance view" seems to just assume that, yet no good reason is given to believe this. 


/end




Sunday, July 28, 2024

Abortion and Reasoning

@nathan.nobis Abortion and "top down" thinking. #abortion #ethics #philosophy #prochoice #prolife #theory #criticalthinking #reason #logic #rationality ♬ original sound - Philosophy 101 - Prof. Nobis

Should Evangelicals Support IVF?

Should Evangelicals Support IVF?

Reposted from the Practical Ethics blog. 

A summary: it turns out that natural miscarriage is *very* common. (Maybe half of all fertilized eggs are miscarried.) That fact should change how evangelicals and other pro-lifers think about IVF. Contrary to their recent calls for banning IVF, evangelicals may have especially strong reasons to support and invest in it.
It's a good reminder that the world is a surprising place. It's important to think carefully because the opinion of your in-group can easily be mistaken.

written by Christopher Register

Evangelicals and other pro-life advocates have underappreciated reasons to support in vitro fertilization (IVF) and funding for maternal health and reproductive technologies in general. 

These reasons stem from the surprisingly high rate of natural miscarriage. I suggest that advances in IVF technology may ultimately lead to fewer total embryos being miscarried or discarded than could be achieved without IVF. This fact should appeal to evangelicals or others who believe that a fertilized ovum has considerable intrinsic moral value.

Since the judicial overturn of Roe v. Wade in June of 2022, opposition to IVF in the U.S. has grown. Just last month, a prominent group of U.S. evangelicals, the Southern Baptist Convention, voted to condemn IVF, even advocating that the government ban the procedure. The central argument of this blog post is that they may be making a mistake, even on their own terms.

Embryo loss through IVF and miscarriage

To review the basics of IVF, it involves a human egg being fertilized outside the body. Over the next few days, the egg develops and divides until—having become a group of cells similar to the embryo depicted above—it is either frozen or implanted into someone’s uterus to continue gestating. Typically, the procedure produces about 5-10 embryos in total in case some are not viable, where the frozen embryos that go unused will ultimately be discarded.

For many evangelicals and other pro-life advocates, the main argument against IVF is the same or substantively similar to the argument traditionally levied against abortion: a fertilized human egg is a human being, a human person, or the morally weighty start of a human “life”, and therefore has the same or similar rights and worth as the rest of us. 

Noting that IVF usually involves “discarding” the unused embryos, which then die, those who argue against IVF often assert that it is wrong to destroy or neglect human life, and that it is therefore wrong to create an embryo only later to discard it. For example, speaking in favor of the SBC resolution to condemn IVF, Monica Hall asks, “Most embryos created through IVF die at some point in the process. How could it be considered ethical to create human life knowing death is a probability?” Her answer is that it cannot.

It is understandable that, for people convinced of the value of even early human embryos, the discarding or destruction of such embryos as a part of the IVF process may be genuinely concerning. But, even accepting that concern, there is a surprising but largely unknown fact about human gestation that complicates the picture considerably: that there are many, many unnoticed miscarriages of pregnancy, resulting in the loss or “death” of a fertilized human egg.

Scientists and health professionals estimate that 20% to 80% of all pregnancies end in miscarriage, and the figure is often put at about 50% (for example, here). So, in the natural course of gestation, about half of all fertilized eggs do not survive. So, for every person you know, there was an embryo that was miscarried. As a consequence, if one accepts that a fertilized egg is a “human life” in some meaningful sense, miscarriage ends as many human lives as every other cause of death combined.*

How does this fact complicate the ethics of IVF? To begin, it shows that natural conception is disastrous for human embryos. If a high probability of premature death makes IVF ethically troublesome, then it can make attempts at natural conception problematic too. This is because there is no currently available mechanism for creating and gestating an embryo that doesn’t involve a rather high probability of premature death. If the probability argument–that it’s wrong to knowingly act in ways that have a good chance of bringing an embryo into existence that will soon die–were correct, then it might effectively require anti-natalism, roughly, the view that it is morally wrong to try to conceive and bear children. 

Needless to say, such a controversial view is likely not one that pro-life conservatives would seriously entertain, much less accept. So let us put the prohibition from the ‘probability of (premature) death’ against embryo creation aside: perhaps the continuation of humanity is worth repeatedly putting embryos in perilous situations. 

Still, the absence of a safe mechanism for creating human life doesn’t mean that a safe mechanism is impossible. And even if a completely safe mechanism is impossible, there may still be reason to pursue safer mechanisms—mechanisms of creating human life that reduce the probability of embryo death. Is a safer mechanism possible? I suspect that safer mechanisms will involve current or future IVF technology, along with improving maternal health in general.

How could IVF be safer than natural conception?

To be safer than natural conception, IVF must reduce net embryo loss. With current technology and practices, IVF almost always results in the loss of multiple embryos, and so it’s likely only a safer mechanism for a subset of the population—individuals who are likely to conceive more than about 5-10 times for each successful gestation. Given that many people try for years without a successful pregnancy, however, it’s not implausible that, even at the current level of technology, IVF is in some cases safer for embryos than technologically unassisted conception. (My own parents tried for about 4 years for me and then about 4 years for my sister.) 

Unfortunately, data about rates of embryo loss per attempt at conception is hard to come by, so it’s difficult to estimate how often IVF is safer. Another practical problem is that it’s difficult to identify the relevant cases in advance. Even so, it’s plausible that, if IVF were prohibited and couples were forced to continuing trying to conceive without the aid of reproductive technology, many people would lose more embryos than if IVF had been available to them.

If IVF technology can be improved in the future, the net benefits of IVF may be higher, expanding the proportion of cases in which it’s the safest available option. With increased funding for research into IVF and maternal health, more advanced IVF technology create fewer embryos, thereby ultimately reducing the loss of human embryos in the process. Just how this might work is complicated, as it depends on many factors to do with the genetics of sperm and egg, the health of human gametes, maternal health, and the process of IVF. As an example, I’ll consider just one factor and the potential net benefit that future IVF may provide over natural conception. 

One way to reduce the number of embryo deaths in IVF involves chromosomal screening. Some estimates suggest that about 50% of natural embryo deaths stem from chromosomal abnormalities known as aneuploidies (having a number of chromosomes that isn’t 46). That amounts to roughly 75 million embryo deaths per year. For comparison, the next highest cause of death worldwide is heart disease, which killed about 30 million people in 2019. If aneuploidies could be addressed during IVF, then IVF could prevent many of these embryonic deaths. 

To spell the argument out, then: at present a high proportion of embryo loss in IVF is likely due to aneuploidies, with a high proportion of aneuploidic embryos having an aneuploidy of meiotic origin (that is, at least one gamete did not have 23 chromosomes). The creation of these embryos could in principle be prevented by chromosomal screening prior to fertilization. If aneuploidies in IVF could be significantly reduced, then embryo loss during IVF could be reduced and (potentially) millions of embryo deaths could be prevented. This is simply not possible through natural conception. Thus, if non-aneuploidic (euploidic) embryo loss in IVF could be reduced to, say, 1 embryo per 3 successful gestations, then IVF would be safer than natural reproduction in general. 

That is, of course, a very tall order, as it would require other significant reductions in embryo loss during IVF. But with enough investment in IVF research and technology, it may well be achievable. And according to the argument I am making here, this is something that pro-life advocates should therefore welcome and support, rather than oppose, as many currently claim to do.

Other strategies for reducing embryo death may involve other kinds of genetic screening of gametes, improvements to paternal and maternal health, and the development of treatments to facilitate healthy gestation. All that is to say: for those who profess concern about the longevity and eventual welfare of human embryos, there are serious reasons to support investment in reproductive health research and technologies, including IVF, and to avoid prohibiting IVF for those who need it the most.

Other considerations

So far, my discussion has focused on reasons that flow from concern for embryos, while I’ve ignored some other considerations. Most significant among these is the objection that while natural gestation only involves the unintended death (i.e., cessation of development) of embryos, IVF involves deliberately bringing embryos that will die into existence. 

However, it’s not clear how morally significant the difference between the cases really is. With IVF, the loss of embryos is not intended, even if it’s foreseen. Just as with the perils of natural gestation, the loss of embryos during IVF is an unintended side-effect of an intention to bring a child into existence. 

A second objection is that, unlike with natural gestation, we know that embryos will be lost during IVF. Yet, on further inspection, this difference also turns out to be subtle. Even if we don’t know that there will be embryo loss for each and every conception, we do know know that embryos will be lost during natural gestation considered in the aggregate and that it’s not unlikely for any given conception.

Ultimately, the moral weight of these subtle issues must ultimately be compared to the value of embryo loss—a value that I think many pro-life advocates feel is paramount.


Thanks to Nathan Nobis for helpful comments on this post.


*See Ord 2008 and Berg 2017 for arguments about how pro-life advocates should respond to the high rate of natural miscarriage; see Miller 2023 for a critical discussion of those arguments that nevertheless agrees with my numbers. Ord 2008 and Berg 2017 argue roughly that if early embryos matter in the way that developed human people matter, then we should do a great deal to prevent miscarriages such as by investing billions of dollars in research and health technology development. Against this conclusion, Colgrove 2021 argues that because miscarriages have a variety of causes and are therefore hard to prevent, the demand to prevent them is not especially strong. Colgrove’s argument does not address the feasibility of preventing embryo death via IVF.

Friday, July 26, 2024

THE IMPLICATIONS OF REVISING THE TERMINOLOGY OF PREGNANCY LOSS - a comment

I have no idea if this comment on this article by Belinda Alievska -- 

THE IMPLICATIONS OF REVISING THE TERMINOLOGY OF PREGNANCY LOSS

got posted, so I am reposting it here:

A contrary perspective here is that teaching people that words often have different meanings--some of which are morally significant, and others not--would be more beneficial than a common suggestion to seek euphemisms for words and concepts for which euphemisms aren't needed.


"Current clinical practice avoids . . the morally and emotionally charged territories of “life” and “death”."

Yes, abortion involves the (biological) death of embryos and fetuses. Is causing death always wrong? No, not at all: people can think about obvious cases where that's so.

"Yeah, but it's the death of HUMANS!!" Uh, no: it's the death of beings that are *biologically* human, but at least early fetuses aren't "humans" *like us*, or human persons (conscious, feeling beings, etc.).

So perhaps teaching people a bit of critical thinking here would do more good than trying to evade obvious explanations of what's going on.

"When the term “death” is used in the context of pregnancy and pregnancy loss, there exists the risk of this shift in language potentially being used to strengthen the arguments of those who oppose abortion, providing them with the linguistic tools that frame the debate in terms of life and death from the earliest stages of pregnancy."

And when accurate scientific and common-sense descriptions are avoided, that makes the people who advocate for these language revisions look evasive and foolish. That doesn't help their cause.

Here's a free introductory book (and other materials) on these topics: Thinking Critically About Abortion at www.AbortionArguments.com