Are Early Abortions Wrong? Ethical Theories, Consciousness, and the Moral Irrelevance of Biology

Are Early Abortions Wrong? Ethical Theories, Consciousness, and the Moral Irrelevance of Biology

Many people believe that abortion is wrong because it involves ending the life of a biologically human organism. However, philosophical investigation into the ethics of abortion suggests that this stance is mistaken, especially when we consider early abortions, which constitute the majority of abortion cases. 

This essay argues that early abortions are not wrong because major ethical theories—such as utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and Rawlsian justice theory—do not condemn early abortion. The reason is that early fetuses and embryos are not conscious or rational beings, and thus, these ethical theories do not regard them as possessing morally relevant features. Morally relevant features include capacities such as consciousness, sentience, rationality, and the ability to value one’s own existence (or anything, for that matter).

Insofar as what can reasonably be seen as the best explanations of what makes actions wrong do not condemn early abortion, we have good reason to think that early abortion is not wrong. Since actions that are not wrong should not be illegal, this helps justify the view that early abortions—indeed, most abortions—should be legal.

1. The common anti-abortion argument and its flaws

A central argument against abortion is that fetuses are biologically human and therefore abortion is morally wrong. This argument is typically expressed in a syllogism:

1. It is wrong to kill innocent human beings.

2. Fetuses are innocent human beings.

3. Therefore, it is wrong to kill fetuses.

This argument equivocates on the term “human being.” On one reading, “human being” refers to any biologically human organism. On another reading, it refers to a person—a being with moral rights. The conclusion of the argument follows only if we assume that all biologically human organisms are persons. But that is precisely what needs to be proven, not assumed. If early fetuses are not persons in the morally relevant sense—that is, if they do not have the properties that make killing wrong—then premise 2 does not support the conclusion.

2. Biological humanity is not morally relevant

Suppose someone argues that embryos and early fetuses are human because they are members of the species Homo sapiens. That is biologically correct. But does being biologically human entail having moral rights? According to major ethical theories, it does not. Consider utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and Rawlsian justice theory.

3. Utilitarianism and sentience

Utilitarianism, especially in its classical form as developed by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, holds that what matters morally is the ability to experience pleasure and pain. Sentience—the capacity to suffer or enjoy—is the key to moral relevance. Bentham famously wrote, “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”

Embryos and early fetuses, prior to the development of a functioning nervous system, cannot suffer or feel pleasure. They lack consciousness altogether. Thus, according to utilitarianism, they do not have interests, and therefore their lives do not have moral weight. Early abortion does not frustrate any interests or cause any suffering. Therefore, it is not morally wrong from a utilitarian perspective.

4. Kantian ethics and rational nature

Kantian ethics centers moral worth on rational nature. For Kant, persons are ends-in-themselves because they are rational agents capable of formulating and following moral laws. Respect for persons means respecting rational agency.

An embryo or early fetus lacks any capacity for rational thought or moral autonomy. It is not a subject of experience or reasoning. It cannot be treated as an end-in-itself because it is not a self at all. Therefore, under Kantian ethics, early fetuses are not beings toward whom we have moral obligations. It is not a violation of duty to terminate a pregnancy at this stage, since no rational being is being harmed or disrespected.

5. Rawlsian justice and the veil of ignorance

John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, constructs principles of justice from the standpoint of the “original position,” where rational agents choose fair principles of cooperation behind a “veil of ignorance.” Behind this veil, individuals do not know their place in society, their abilities, or their conceptions of the good. Importantly, they are rational agents choosing from a position of fairness.

We cannot imagine ourselves as embryos or early fetuses behind the veil of ignorance because such beings lack the rationality and sense of justice that define participants in the original position. The veil of ignorance is meant to exclude knowledge of our particular identity but presupposes that we are rational agents with moral capacities. Embryos and early fetuses do not meet this condition and therefore are not represented in the original position. As a result, principles of justice do not directly apply to them, and early abortion does not violate Rawlsian justice.

6. Why biology alone is not enough

A common objection insists that the biological fact of being a human organism is sufficient for moral consideration. However, if we examine other biological humans, such as brain-dead patients or anencephalic infants (born without the parts of the brain responsible for consciousness), we find that they are often considered not to have full moral rights despite being biologically human. Moral consideration depends not just on species membership, but on the possession of morally relevant features such as consciousness, sentience, or rationality.

What makes killing us wrong is not that we are biological humans, but that we are conscious, feeling beings with interests. Embryos and early fetuses lack minds. Therefore, they lack the very features that make killing wrong in the paradigm cases.

7. Implications for the abortion debate

Given that the most widely accepted ethical theories do not regard embryos and early fetuses as beings with morally relevant characteristics, arguments against early abortion based on biological humanity alone are unconvincing. Instead, we must consider the rights, interests, and autonomy of the pregnant person. The pregnant person is a conscious being with a sense of self and a capacity to value her life and future. Her rights to bodily autonomy, health, and life plans outweigh any claims that might be attributed to a non-conscious embryo.

8. Considering potentiality

Some argue that even if embryos are not persons now, they have the potential to become persons and should be treated as if they already are. However, potentiality does not confer actual rights. A potential president does not have the rights of the actual president. A potential person is not a person.

Moreover, potentiality depends on circumstances. An embryo outside a womb or in a context where the pregnancy will not be carried to term has no realistic potential to become a person. Therefore, basing moral obligations on potentiality is vague and unreliable.

9. Considering continuity

Another objection is the continuity argument: the idea that since we were once embryos, and it would be wrong to kill us now, it was wrong to kill us then. But this argument confuses identity over time with moral relevance over time. Just because an adult was once an embryo does not mean the embryo had the same moral relevance. What matters is not who we were, but what we were like at the time. Moral relevance can develop. We don’t treat infants like adults in terms of rights and responsibilities; morally significant capacities matter.

10. What about late abortion?

This essay has focused on early abortions, which constitute the majority. As pregnancy progresses, the moral considerations change, especially once consciousness and sentience emerge. Even then, abortions later in pregnancy are rare and often performed for serious medical reasons. Philosophical arguments about early abortion do not necessarily apply to late abortion, and vice versa. Still, the ethical focus remains: what morally relevant characteristics are present?

11. Conclusion

Major ethical theories—utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and Rawlsian justice theory—agree on one key point: early fetuses and embryos do not possess the features that make killing wrong. They are not conscious, rational, or capable of experiencing suffering. Arguments against abortion that rely solely on biological humanity ignore what these moral frameworks teach us: morality depends on mental and experiential capacities, not mere species membership. Once we understand this, we see that early abortion is not morally wrong. The real moral concern lies in respecting the rights and autonomy of pregnant people, not in preserving the lives of unconscious biological organisms.

Understanding and accepting this conclusion not only clarifies the ethics of abortion but also encourages more respectful, thoughtful, and rational conversations about one of society’s most emotionally charged issues.

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A second version; again, a draft and subject to minor improvements.

Are Early Abortions Wrong? Ethical Theories, Consciousness, and the Moral Irrelevance of Biology

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1. Why Biology by Itself Doesn’t Settle Anything

Anti‑abortion arguments often start—and stop—with a biological fact: the embryo is a living human organism. True enough. But the moral question isn’t “What is it made of?” It is “Why, if at all, does that fact give it rights that override everyone else’s?” Calling something an “organism” just labels its level of biological organization; it does not explain why anyone owes it duties. If we said “It’s an organism, therefore it has a right to vote,” people would immediately ask for the missing premise. The same gap appears with life and personhood talk. Biology is morally silent until paired with a value‑adding principle, and that principle has to be argued for, not assumed.

Some worry that pointing this out equates an embryo with a skin cell. It doesn’t. A skin cell is also a living human cell, but no one thinks your dermatologist commits homicide by removing one. The contrast shows the point: mere biology doesn’t do the normative work. To get from “organism” or “DNA” to “has a right to life,” you need a moral bridge; otherwise the claim just re‑states the conclusion in different words—classic question‑begging.

“Just because something is biologically human, that doesn’t amount to much, or maybe even anything: again, random biologically human cells have no moral status whatsoever.”

2. Consciousness, Interests, and Harm

Rights protect beings who can be harmed. Harm requires interests, and interests require some form of consciousness or sentience. Contemporary neonatal neuroscience is clear: until roughly the 24‑week mark, there are no functioning thalamo‑cortical connections, so there is no feeling, awareness, or point of view. Early embryos therefore have no interests to frustrate, no welfare to damage, and—crucially—no subject who can lose anything by not continuing to exist.

We grasp this at the other end of life. When cortical activity is permanently gone, turning off the ventilator is permitted even though the body is still “alive.” If the permanent loss of consciousness ends direct moral standing, the permanent absence of consciousness cannot generate it.

3. Consequentialism: Weighing Real Consequences

Utilitarianism asks: which choice maximises overall well‑being? Because an early embryo feels nothing, terminating it produces no negative utility for it. The consequences that do matter are the pregnant person’s physical health, mental health, economic prospects, and the welfare of existing family members. In real‑world data, giving people safe early access to abortion reduces maternal injury, child poverty, and intimate‑partner violence. Setting aside speculative harms that lack evidence, the utilitarian verdict is straightforward: early abortion is usually the better act.

Rule‑utilitarians sometimes reply that permissive laws erode “respect for life.” Yet jurisdictions with liberal early‑abortion access show no rise in homicide or newborn abandonment—a rule allowing early abortion appears to increase net well‑being.

4. Kantian Ethics: Persons, Potentials, and Proofs

Kant holds that persons, understood as rational self‑legislators, are “ends in themselves” and must never be treated as mere means. Embryos are not rational agents; they cannot deliberate, set ends, or value anything. Some Kantians counter that embryos are potential rational beings, and so warrant respect now. But Kant is explicit that moral status follows actual capacities, not unrealised potentials. In the Metaphysics of Morals he denies that we have direct duties to “lifeless” things or non‑rational creatures; whatever indirect duties we have (e.g., not kicking a dog) are grounded in effects on persons, not in the dog’s own nature.

Moreover, treating someone according to their potential would commit us to odd conclusions. A twelve‑year‑old has the potential to vote; that potential does not give her the right to cast a ballot today. Potential alone is not enough. A sound Kantian principle must guide action in the here‑and‑now, and right now an embryo is not a bearer of rational agency.

What should a contemporary Kantian say? Two options:

1. Keep the personhood requirement. Then early embryos are not persons and have no direct rights.

2. Broaden the Formula of Humanity to include beings who can suffer. That route supports more abortion freedom, not less, because it grounds status in sentience—which embryos lack.

Either way, Kantian reasoning does not condemn early abortion.

5. Deontological Interest‑Rights Theories

On the more recent “interest‑rights” account (e.g., Joel Feinberg, Mary Anne Warren) a right exists only where an interest weighty enough to generate duties exists. Early embryos have no experiential interests; pregnant people plainly do. Where interests conflict in later pregnancy—when fetal sentience arises—we balance them. Before that point, the conflict is unilateral: only one party can be harmed, and it is not the embryo.

6. Virtue Ethics and an Ethic of Care

From an Aristotelian angle the question is: What would a practically wise and just person do, all things considered, in these circumstances? Pregnancy touches every aspect of a life project—health, relationships, economic security, future plans. A decision to end an early pregnancy can reflect responsibility, foresight, and concern for the flourishing of oneself and others. By contrast, forcing gestation on someone regardless of her considered judgment undermines both her agency and her chances of living well.

Care ethics complements this: moral agents exist in webs of dependency. A rule that forbids early abortion disproportionately burdens pregnant women and sustains systemic gender inequality. Exercising the option to end an early pregnancy can, in many cases, be the caring choice for existing children and partners—preventing needs the parent cannot meet.

7. Rawls: Justice Behind the Veil of Ignorance

Rawls asks what principles we would choose if we had to design society while ignorant of our personal lot. Importantly, we cannot imagine ourselves as blastocysts or six‑week embryos: those entities have no conscious point of view to imagine. We can vividly imagine being a pregnant adult suddenly denied control of her body for nine months. Rational contractors who fear ending up in that position will build in robust reproductive freedom early in pregnancy, combined with social support that makes avoiding unwanted pregnancy easier. Granting full rights to pre‑conscious embryos would hand a huge, predictable burden to people who become pregnant, a burden no one would rationally gamble on from behind the veil.

8. Potentiality, “Future Like Ours,” and Other Objections

Potential personhood. Potential to develop later traits does not itself confer current rights. We don’t give every acorn a right to become an oak. Rights respond to present capacities for harm or benefit.

The “future like ours” claim. Don Marquis argues that killing is wrong because it deprives someone of a valuable future. But a deprivation presupposes a subject who values, or can be harmed by losing, that future. Before consciousness, there is no subject to be deprived. The “future” belongs to whoever might later emerge, not to the embryo as it is now.

The identity reply. Some say: “That embryo is numerically the same individual as the later child.” Numerical identity alone does little ethical work. The cells in your fingernails are numerically identical parts of you, yet clipping them is permissible because they have no interests. Identity over time matters only once psychologically continuous interests appear.

9. So Why Is Biology Morally Irrelevant?

Rights track features that make harm possible—sentience, desires, plans—not the material housing those features. If future neuroscience allowed silicon‑based consciousness, we would recognise its moral status despite zero DNA. Conversely, random human cells have the right kind of DNA yet zero moral status. Species membership is therefore a crude and over‑inclusive proxy.

When biology does matter, it is because it enables or disables the capacities that ground interests. Early in gestation the relevant neural architecture simply isn’t there. Later in pregnancy, as sentience emerges, biology becomes morally important—but only because it realises consciousness, not because it is human per se.

10. Replies to Common Questions

“Isn’t this just speciesism in reverse?”
No. The view doesn’t exclude any being on the basis of species; it includes every being that can be harmed, whatever its species, and excludes every being that cannot, including biologically human ones such as permanently brain‑dead patients.

“You are smuggling in the conclusion by saying ‘only conscious life matters.’”
The premise isn’t arbitrary; it is justified by reflecting on why killing or harming is bad. Death is bad for beings who can experience goods or bads, not for entities with no experiences at all. That analysis explains both our ordinary moral judgments about comatose adults and our reluctance to mourn early miscarriages we never knew about.

“But the embryo is an organism, not ‘mere cells.’”
True, and the argument grants that. The claim is not “organism status is irrelevant”; it is that organism status is insufficient without further morally relevant properties.

11. Putting the Theories Together

Theory	Decisive Consideration	Verdict on ≤ 14‑week Abortion
Utilitarianism	Overall sentient welfare	Permissible, often morally better
Kantian (classic)	Actual rational agency	No duty owed; permissible
Kantian (potentialist variant)	Potential is not enough	Permissible
Interest‑Rights	Interests grounded in consciousness	Permissible
Virtue / Care	Practical wisdom; equitable care	Can be the virtuous choice
Rawlsian Justice	Fairness behind veil; cannot imagine embryo POV	Basic liberty right to early abortion

12. Conclusion

Across the main ethical frameworks—consequentialist, deontological, virtue‑based, care‑focused, and Rawlsian—the answer converges: early abortions are typically not wrong. Biology alone never guaranteed rights for skin cells, hair follicles, or anencephalic newborns; it does not guarantee them for a six‑week embryo either. What matters is the presence of a mind that can be harmed, and that arrives well after most abortions occur.

A just society will therefore:

• protect early reproductive choice as a basic liberty;

• invest in contraception, sex education, and social support so decisions are truly voluntary;

• regulate later abortions with an eye to emerging fetal interests, not mere species membership.

That approach is consistent, humane, and grounded in the very principles—respect for persons, concern for welfare, fairness—on which modern ethical theory rests.