Abortion might seem to prevent a fetus from experiencing its valuable future, just like killing us does, even if it is not yet a person.6 But our futures might be valuable, in part, because we can, presently, look forward to them. Fetuses have no awareness of their futures whatsoever, and this is one important difference between their futures and our futures.
Further, an egg-and-a-sperm-that-would-fertilize-it arguably has a future akin to that of a fetus. Contraception (even by abstinence!) keeps this future from materializing.7 But contraception and abstinence aren’t wrong. Thus, it is not wrong to perform some action that prevents such a future from materializing.
5.1.5 Abortion prevents fetuses from experiencing their valuable futures
The argument against abortion that is likely most-discussed by philosophers comes from philosopher Don Marquis.[14] He argues that it is wrong to kill us, typical adults and children, because it deprives us from experiencing our (expected to be) valuable futures, which is a great loss to us. He argues that since fetuses also have valuable futures (“futures like ours” he calls them), they are also wrong to kill. His argument has much to recommend it, but there are reasons to doubt it as well.
First, fetuses don’t seem to have futures like our futures, since—as they are pre-conscious—they are entirely psychologically disconnected from any future experiences: there is no (even broken) chain of experiences from the fetus to that future person’s experiences. Babies are, at least, aware of the current moment, which leads to the next moment; children and adults think about and plan for their futures, but fetuses cannot do these things, being completely unconscious and without a mind.
Second, this fact might even mean that the early fetus doesn’t literally have a future: if your future couldn’t include you being a merely physical, non-conscious object (e.g., you couldn’t be a corpse: if there’s a corpse, you are gone), then non-conscious physical objects, like a fetus, couldn’t literally be a future person.[15] If this is correct, early fetuses don’t even have futures, much less futures like ours. Something would have a future, like ours, only when there is someone there to be psychologically connected to that future: that someone arrives later in pregnancy, after when most abortions occur.
A third objection is more abstract and depends on the “metaphysics” of objects. It begins with the observation that there are single objects with parts with space between them. Indeed almost every objectis like this, if you could look close enough: it’s not just single dinette sets, since there is literally some space between the parts of most physical objects. From this, it follows that there seem to be single objects such as an-egg-and-the-sperm-that-would-fertilize-it. And these would also seem to have a future of value, given how Marquis describes this concept. (It should be made clear that sperm and eggs alone do not have futures of value, and Marquis does not claim they do: this is not the objection here). The problem is that contraception, even by abstinence, prevents that thing’s future of value from materializing, and so seems to be wrong when we use Marquis’s reasoning. Since contraception is not wrong, but his general premise suggests that it is, it seems that preventing something from experiencing its valuable future isn’t always wrong and so Marquis’s argument appears to be unsound.[16]
Marquis wrote in 2008 that embryos did not possess a future of value until 14 days after conception, and his reasoning seems to rule out the 'sperm and egg as a single object' having a future of value. See here: https://philpapers.org/rec/DMAAAH
Here is another argument to exclude the sperm-egg and the single-celled zygote. Bob is an amoeba in a petri dish. Bob divides into two new amoebas. Bob can't be identical to both because they aren't identical to each other, so the most sensible conclusion is that division produced two new amoebas. If those two amoebas split into 4, then 8 amoebas, and if one of those 8 new amoebas was moved into a pond, we'd say Bob's descendant, not Bob, was moved into the pond.
A sperm merges with an egg, and they undergo significant cellular changes during fusion into a totipotent human cell. This cell then divides into two new cells which are qualitatively identical to each other and are held together only loosely by a thin membrane. These two cells then divide into 4, then 8, then 16 still qualitatively identical new cells (or clones). After 14 days, a primitive streak is formed, and the cells begin to specialise and form a unified organism (Eric Olson also argues that an animal only exists after 14 days).
In the same way that we wouldn't say Bob was moved into a pond, we can't sensibly say that the sperm-egg object or the initial single celled zygote, went on to experience conscious experiences, and maybe we can't say that the embryo in its first 14 days went on to experience conscious experiences either.
If you buy into animalism, you could say that the fetus after 14 days has a future of value. If you believe identity is tied to brain identity, you could say that the fetus after about 4 weeks has a future of value. Both theories are controversial, but both are held by some philosophers. The psychological identity theory is also controversial and has its own unlikely implications. I don't think you even need to settle on a particular theory of identity - it's enough to just think that self concern for my brain in the future is rational, even if my memories were wiped. Even if I believed philosophically that I'd be a different person, I would still anticipate future conscious experiences after the memory-wipe as things that 'I' would experience, so it would be rational to prefer survival to death and pleasure to pain for the future 'me'. Putting myself in the shoes of a fetus, I could thus have concern on their behalf for future conscious experiences their brain will have.
I don't have time to engage this much now, but here are some quick responses at ***.
Marquis wrote in 2008 that embryos did not possess a future of value until 14 days after conception, and his reasoning seems to rule out the 'sperm and egg as a single object' having a future of value. See here: https://philpapers.org/rec/DMAAAH
*** OK, so then early killing of embryos is fine on his view then, you say. About the more complex issues, here's this from yesterday: https://www.abortionarguments.com/2025/05/an-objection-to-marquis.html
Here is another argument to exclude the sperm-egg and the single-celled zygote. Bob is an amoeba in a petri dish. Bob divides into two new amoebas. Bob can't be identical to both because they aren't identical to each other, so the most sensible conclusion is that division produced two new amoebas. If those two amoebas split into 4, then 8 amoebas, and if one of those 8 new amoebas was moved into a pond, we'd say Bob's descendant, not Bob, was moved into the pond.
*** Yes, of course. This, however, may be because we are accustomed to thinking of some multi-part things as single objections but not others. But we rarely think about the metaphysics of objects in abstract ways, so this common language doesn't say much.
A sperm merges with an egg, and they undergo significant cellular changes during fusion into a totipotent human cell. This cell then divides into two new cells which are qualitatively identical to each other and are held together only loosely by a thin membrane. These two cells then divide into 4, then 8, then 16 still qualitatively identical new cells (or clones). After 14 days, a primitive streak is formed, and the cells begin to specialise and form a unified organism (Eric Olson also argues that an animal only exists after 14 days).
In the same way that we wouldn't say Bob was moved into a pond, we can't sensibly say that the sperm-egg object or the initial single celled zygote, went on to experience conscious experiences, and maybe we can't say that the embryo in its first 14 days went on to experience conscious experiences either.
*** OK.
If you buy into animalism
*** I don't. I think it's totally mistaken, as do or would most people: https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/animalism/
, you could say that the fetus after 14 days has a future of value. If you believe identity is tied to brain identity, you could say that the fetus after about 4 weeks has a future of value. Both theories are controversial, but both are held by some philosophers. The psychological identity theory is also controversial and has its own unlikely implications.
** Such as?
I don't think you even need to settle on a particular theory of identity - it's enough to just think that self concern for my brain
** To have self concern, there's gotta be something that has concerns. Just a brain doesn't have concerns: there needs to be a conscious brain.
in the future is rational, even if my memories were wiped. Even if I believed philosophically that I'd be a different person, I would still anticipate future conscious experiences after the memory-wipe as things that 'I' would experience, so it would be rational to prefer survival to death and pleasure to pain for the future 'me'. Putting myself in the shoes of a fetus, I could thus have concern on their behalf for future conscious experiences their brain will have.
*** Sounds like you are somehow trying to put yourself in the "shoes"-- or perspective--of a being that's never had a perspective since it's never been conscious. I don't think that's possible or makes any sense.
Abortion, Metaphysics and Morality: A Review of Francis Beckwith’s Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice Get access Arrow Nathan Nobis The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine, Volume 36, Issue 3, June 2011, Pages 261–273, https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhr015 Published: 19 May 2011
The contraception objection is one of the two most prominent objections to Marquis' FLO argument, and one that you have made yourself. The point is that it fails if the sperm-egg object will never have conscious experiences in the future. Marquis' 2008 article and the amoeba example in my previous comment suggest this is so, so that would remove one of the two main objections to Marquis' case. The amoeba/sperm-egg analogy is about the transitivity of identity, not about everyday language. The sperm-egg object and initial single celled zygote never experience anything, a conglomeration of clones of the clones of their clones does. Do you disagree?
If it's rational to have self concern for my future even after a memory wipe, that suggests that it's rational to view my brain now as the same one that will experience future experiences, so I'll experience the future pain or pleasure even if I'm a different 'person' philosophically - that's the basis for having self-concern. So it can be rational to view the fetus' brain as the same one that will experience future experiences despite the lack of psychological connections, even though the fetus as you say obviously doesn't have self concern. My point was about the underlying reason for self concern and how this applies to a fetus - I wasn't suggesting a fetus itself has self-concern, though my language was admittedly imprecise. If you believe objectively good things can benefit humans regardless of whether they desire them, then it's rational to say that the fetus (or the fetus' brain) will benefit from its future, in a similar way to how 'I' would benefit from 'my' future after a memory wipe.
Eric Olson and others have written extensively on issues with psychological theories of personal identity, though obviously this is a controversial area of philosophy. Again, I don't think it's necessary to settle that. Do you think it would be irrational to have self concern for your future after a memory wipe? Your Beckwith review in large part complained about the difficulties of raising an incompetent adult and suggested there'd need to be large scale changes to the brain, so assume in this example that you're a small child. Small children aren't rational by nature of course, but that's nitpicking - it's a thought experiment.
"If it's rational to have self concern for my future even after a memory wipe,"
No, since that future individual is not you, even if there is bodily continuity, given the total lack of any psychological connection.
"that suggests that it's rational to view my brain now as the same one that will experience future experiences."
No, that will be an importantly (qualitatively) different brain--since there's a new person there--even if it's physically continuous with the earlier brain.
"Your Beckwith review in large part complained about the difficulties of raising an incompetent adult "
No, you are then focusing on the wrong case and/or missing important parts of the discussion: read again.
I have no idea why you would say that small children are not "rational by nature."
I say: No, that will be an importantly (qualitatively) different brain--since there's a new person there--even if it's physically continuous with the earlier brain.
You say: **** This strikes me as unscientific and lacking a plausible rationale, and I have a very hard time buying into it coming from a background in medicine and anatomy
I say: then you simply have no idea what the issues are here, if you think these are matters of science, medicine, or anatomy. That's not good.
I strongly suggest learning what the topic of personal identity is and the various options. Check 1000-Word Philosophy, the IEP, and then the SEP. It is not some topic that it somehow settled by science, medicine, or anatomy, and you should know this.
And I think you'd understand why if the person who "wakes up" tomorrow in what we might call your body has no memories of what you have ever done, what you have ever done, and has a personality totally "opposite" of yours, we can conclude that there's been a change in the brain. Anyone with a commonsense understanding of how the brain relates to consciousness, memories, etc. understands this.
Again, I strongly suggest learning what the topic of personal identity is and the various options. Check 1000-Word Philosophy, the IEP, and then the SEP. It is not some topic that it somehow settled by science, medicine, or anatomy, and you should know this.
In other words, you aren't giving me any justification. When patients wake up from frontal lobe strokes with a loss of motor function and changes in personality, we'd say there's been a qualitative change. We'd also say the brain and consciousness is numerically identical, and future self concern prior to/during the stroke was rational. That's why patients want thrombolysis and clot retrieval - future self concern. My question again is, if other large scale qualitative brain changes don't change numerical identity or make future self concern irrational, why does memory loss? What's your justification for that?
I am not your tutor on these topics. Again, I strongly suggest learning what the topic of personal identity is and the various options. Check 1000-Word Philosophy, the IEP, and then the SEP. It is not some topic that it somehow settled by science, medicine, or anatomy, and you should know this--the suggestion that they are is incredibly naïve. Once you learn the details of the basic options, you can then work out how the various theories apply to these various cases.
Marquis wrote in 2008 that embryos did not possess a future of value until 14 days after conception, and his reasoning seems to rule out the 'sperm and egg as a single object' having a future of value. See here: https://philpapers.org/rec/DMAAAH
ReplyDeleteHere is another argument to exclude the sperm-egg and the single-celled zygote. Bob is an amoeba in a petri dish. Bob divides into two new amoebas. Bob can't be identical to both because they aren't identical to each other, so the most sensible conclusion is that division produced two new amoebas. If those two amoebas split into 4, then 8 amoebas, and if one of those 8 new amoebas was moved into a pond, we'd say Bob's descendant, not Bob, was moved into the pond.
A sperm merges with an egg, and they undergo significant cellular changes during fusion into a totipotent human cell. This cell then divides into two new cells which are qualitatively identical to each other and are held together only loosely by a thin membrane. These two cells then divide into 4, then 8, then 16 still qualitatively identical new cells (or clones). After 14 days, a primitive streak is formed, and the cells begin to specialise and form a unified organism (Eric Olson also argues that an animal only exists after 14 days).
In the same way that we wouldn't say Bob was moved into a pond, we can't sensibly say that the sperm-egg object or the initial single celled zygote, went on to experience conscious experiences, and maybe we can't say that the embryo in its first 14 days went on to experience conscious experiences either.
If you buy into animalism, you could say that the fetus after 14 days has a future of value. If you believe identity is tied to brain identity, you could say that the fetus after about 4 weeks has a future of value. Both theories are controversial, but both are held by some philosophers. The psychological identity theory is also controversial and has its own unlikely implications. I don't think you even need to settle on a particular theory of identity - it's enough to just think that self concern for my brain in the future is rational, even if my memories were wiped. Even if I believed philosophically that I'd be a different person, I would still anticipate future conscious experiences after the memory-wipe as things that 'I' would experience, so it would be rational to prefer survival to death and pleasure to pain for the future 'me'. Putting myself in the shoes of a fetus, I could thus have concern on their behalf for future conscious experiences their brain will have.
I don't have time to engage this much now, but here are some quick responses at ***.
DeleteMarquis wrote in 2008 that embryos did not possess a future of value until 14 days after conception, and his reasoning seems to rule out the 'sperm and egg as a single object' having a future of value. See here: https://philpapers.org/rec/DMAAAH
*** OK, so then early killing of embryos is fine on his view then, you say. About the more complex issues, here's this from yesterday: https://www.abortionarguments.com/2025/05/an-objection-to-marquis.html
Here is another argument to exclude the sperm-egg and the single-celled zygote. Bob is an amoeba in a petri dish. Bob divides into two new amoebas. Bob can't be identical to both because they aren't identical to each other, so the most sensible conclusion is that division produced two new amoebas. If those two amoebas split into 4, then 8 amoebas, and if one of those 8 new amoebas was moved into a pond, we'd say Bob's descendant, not Bob, was moved into the pond.
*** Yes, of course. This, however, may be because we are accustomed to thinking of some multi-part things as single objections but not others. But we rarely think about the metaphysics of objects in abstract ways, so this common language doesn't say much.
A sperm merges with an egg, and they undergo significant cellular changes during fusion into a totipotent human cell. This cell then divides into two new cells which are qualitatively identical to each other and are held together only loosely by a thin membrane. These two cells then divide into 4, then 8, then 16 still qualitatively identical new cells (or clones). After 14 days, a primitive streak is formed, and the cells begin to specialise and form a unified organism (Eric Olson also argues that an animal only exists after 14 days).
In the same way that we wouldn't say Bob was moved into a pond, we can't sensibly say that the sperm-egg object or the initial single celled zygote, went on to experience conscious experiences, and maybe we can't say that the embryo in its first 14 days went on to experience conscious experiences either.
*** OK.
If you buy into animalism
*** I don't. I think it's totally mistaken, as do or would most people: https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/animalism/
, you could say that the fetus after 14 days has a future of value. If you believe identity is tied to brain identity, you could say that the fetus after about 4 weeks has a future of value. Both theories are controversial, but both are held by some philosophers. The psychological identity theory is also controversial and has its own unlikely implications.
** Such as?
I don't think you even need to settle on a particular theory of identity - it's enough to just think that self concern for my brain
** To have self concern, there's gotta be something that has concerns. Just a brain doesn't have concerns: there needs to be a conscious brain.
in the future is rational, even if my memories were wiped. Even if I believed philosophically that I'd be a different person, I would still anticipate future conscious experiences after the memory-wipe as things that 'I' would experience, so it would be rational to prefer survival to death and pleasure to pain for the future 'me'. Putting myself in the shoes of a fetus, I could thus have concern on their behalf for future conscious experiences their brain will have.
*** Sounds like you are somehow trying to put yourself in the "shoes"-- or perspective--of a being that's never had a perspective since it's never been conscious. I don't think that's possible or makes any sense.
Delete*** About "mind wipe" cases, see here:
Abortion, Metaphysics and Morality: A Review of Francis Beckwith’s Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice Get access Arrow
Nathan Nobis
The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine, Volume 36, Issue 3, June 2011, Pages 261–273, https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhr015
Published: 19 May 2011
https://academic.oup.com/jmp/article-abstract/36/3/261/895026?redirectedFrom=fulltext
This used to be open-access but that's unfortunately disappeared.
I hope this helps!
The contraception objection is one of the two most prominent objections to Marquis' FLO argument, and one that you have made yourself. The point is that it fails if the sperm-egg object will never have conscious experiences in the future. Marquis' 2008 article and the amoeba example in my previous comment suggest this is so, so that would remove one of the two main objections to Marquis' case. The amoeba/sperm-egg analogy is about the transitivity of identity, not about everyday language. The sperm-egg object and initial single celled zygote never experience anything, a conglomeration of clones of the clones of their clones does. Do you disagree?
ReplyDeleteIf it's rational to have self concern for my future even after a memory wipe, that suggests that it's rational to view my brain now as the same one that will experience future experiences, so I'll experience the future pain or pleasure even if I'm a different 'person' philosophically - that's the basis for having self-concern. So it can be rational to view the fetus' brain as the same one that will experience future experiences despite the lack of psychological connections, even though the fetus as you say obviously doesn't have self concern. My point was about the underlying reason for self concern and how this applies to a fetus - I wasn't suggesting a fetus itself has self-concern, though my language was admittedly imprecise. If you believe objectively good things can benefit humans regardless of whether they desire them, then it's rational to say that the fetus (or the fetus' brain) will benefit from its future, in a similar way to how 'I' would benefit from 'my' future after a memory wipe.
Eric Olson and others have written extensively on issues with psychological theories of personal identity, though obviously this is a controversial area of philosophy. Again, I don't think it's necessary to settle that. Do you think it would be irrational to have self concern for your future after a memory wipe? Your Beckwith review in large part complained about the difficulties of raising an incompetent adult and suggested there'd need to be large scale changes to the brain, so assume in this example that you're a small child. Small children aren't rational by nature of course, but that's nitpicking - it's a thought experiment.
"If it's rational to have self concern for my future even after a memory wipe,"
DeleteNo, since that future individual is not you, even if there is bodily continuity, given the total lack of any psychological connection.
"that suggests that it's rational to view my brain now as the same one that will experience future experiences."
No, that will be an importantly (qualitatively) different brain--since there's a new person there--even if it's physically continuous with the earlier brain.
"Your Beckwith review in large part complained about the difficulties of raising an incompetent adult "
No, you are then focusing on the wrong case and/or missing important parts of the discussion: read again.
I have no idea why you would say that small children are not "rational by nature."
About the first issue, this overcomplicates things. Here's the basic questions:
Deleteare there single objects with parts?
are there single object with parts that don't touch?
If yes to both, then the objection has some merit.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteI say: No, that will be an importantly (qualitatively) different brain--since there's a new person there--even if it's physically continuous with the earlier brain.
ReplyDeleteYou say: **** This strikes me as unscientific and lacking a plausible rationale, and I have a very hard time buying into it coming from a background in medicine and anatomy
I say: then you simply have no idea what the issues are here, if you think these are matters of science, medicine, or anatomy. That's not good.
I strongly suggest learning what the topic of personal identity is and the various options. Check 1000-Word Philosophy, the IEP, and then the SEP. It is not some topic that it somehow settled by science, medicine, or anatomy, and you should know this.
And I think you'd understand why if the person who "wakes up" tomorrow in what we might call your body has no memories of what you have ever done, what you have ever done, and has a personality totally "opposite" of yours, we can conclude that there's been a change in the brain. Anyone with a commonsense understanding of how the brain relates to consciousness, memories, etc. understands this.
Again, I strongly suggest learning what the topic of personal identity is and the various options. Check 1000-Word Philosophy, the IEP, and then the SEP. It is not some topic that it somehow settled by science, medicine, or anatomy, and you should know this.
In other words, you aren't giving me any justification. When patients wake up from frontal lobe strokes with a loss of motor function and changes in personality, we'd say there's been a qualitative change. We'd also say the brain and consciousness is numerically identical, and future self concern prior to/during the stroke was rational. That's why patients want thrombolysis and clot retrieval - future self concern. My question again is, if other large scale qualitative brain changes don't change numerical identity or make future self concern irrational, why does memory loss? What's your justification for that?
ReplyDeleteI am not your tutor on these topics. Again, I strongly suggest learning what the topic of personal identity is and the various options. Check 1000-Word Philosophy, the IEP, and then the SEP. It is not some topic that it somehow settled by science, medicine, or anatomy, and you should know this--the suggestion that they are is incredibly naïve. Once you learn the details of the basic options, you can then work out how the various theories apply to these various cases.
DeleteGood luck!