Abortion, Personhood and Space Aliens

The topic of abortion often brings up the question of what it is to be a "person." And discussions of the concept of "personhood" can lead to a discussion of space aliens, believe it or not! Here I explain what the point of discussing space aliens is. 

(TL;DR: the point is that the example of space aliens shows that the concept or idea of "person" is not same as "human being": personhood is a psychological concept; discussing the possibility of space aliens does not suggest that space aliens actually exist). 

First, many people who think that abortion is wrong believe that embryos and fetuses are persons, and argue that since they are persons, they are typically wrong to kill and so abortion is typically wrong. 

There are problems, however, with this simple reasoning. 

A first, somewhat abstract problem is that just because something (or someone) is a person, that doesn't mean they have a right to everything they need to live. So, about abortion, even if fetuses were persons that wouldn't automatically mean they would have a right to their mother's body. This is Judith Thomson's point: the simple argument fails because the right to life isn't as simple as people often assume it is.

The second problem is that embryos and at least beginning fetuses just aren't persons, many thoughtful people argue. Why's that? Well, you need to figure out what persons are, or what it is to be a person.

Folks who haven't studied these issues, or have only interacted with people who they agree with on these issues and so have learned about these topics in contexts that encourage groupthink, often respond this way:

Persons are human beings.

Or, more carefully:

Persons are biologically human organisms. 

And maybe even more carefully, as an attempt at stating necessary and sufficient conditions for being a person:

All persons are biologically human organisms and any possible person would be a biologically human organism: so if something is a biologically human organism, then it's a person, and if something were a person, it'd be a biologically human organism. 

From all these, they can argue that since biologically human fetuses are biologically human, they are persons. 

Now, here's the question we need to ask people who say things like this:

We know that things that are biologically human are biologically human, but what makes them persons? What makes biologically human organisms persons?

Here's an answer:

Biologically human organisms are persons because persons are biologically human organisms. 

This answer though is entirely uninformative: we want to know why a type of thing is or would be a person, what makes (or would make) that type of thing a person, and we are just told that it's that type of thing. We aren't told what makes biologically human organisms are persons or why they are persons. 

This is a fair question though. To engage it, it can be helpful to reflect on our own personhood and think about why we are persons or what makes us persons. And this can lead to an understanding of personhood that implies that at least early fetuses, although biologically human organisms, are not persons. Briefly, this concept of personhood sees persons as psychological beings—beings with minds who are conscious and feeling and the like—and early fetuses are not like that. 

At this point though, critics will want to challenge this assumption also, mentioned above:

if something were a person, it'd be a biologically human organism.

They will point out there there could be friendly, intelligent space aliens who are, in all relevant ways, are just like us—they are persons—even though they aren't biologically human. Again, why would they be persons? Because they are like us in having minds and being conscious and feeling and the like.

Now, in saying there "could be" such space aliens, nobody is saying that such aliens actually exist or are even likely. They are just saying that the concept of being a person is one that isn't confined to human beings: personhood is a concept that's based on psychological or mental characteristics, and so if there were non-human space aliens who were mentally and emotionally like us, they would be persons: e.g., ET was a fictional "personified" being, meaning he had the traits of a person: he was a person. 

Nothing in the concept of "person" prevents this possibility. That we recognize that such beings could be—if they were to exist—our friends and co-workers shows (again) that we recognize that the concept of "person" is the not the same as "human being." 

That's the point of thinking about space aliens in the context of abortion. 

All blog posts are here!

Related: 

• Star Trek: "Human rights. Why, the very name is racist."

Section 5.1.3 of "Thinking Critically About Abortion," "Fetuses are persons"

 From Thinking Critically About Abortion:

5.1.3 Fetuses are persons

Finally, we get to what some see as the core issue here, namely whether fetuses are persons, and an argument like this:

Fetuses are persons, perhaps from conception.

Persons have the right to life and are wrong to kill.

So, abortion is wrong, as it involves killing persons.

The second premise seems very plausible, but there are some important complications about it that will be discussed later. So let’s focus on the idea of personhood and whether any fetuses are persons. What is it to be a person? One answer that everyone can agree on is that persons are beings with rights and value. That’s a fine answer, but it takes us back to the initial question: OK, who or what has the rights and value of persons? What makes someone or something a person?

Answers here are often merely asserted, but these answers need to be tested: definitions can be judged in terms of whether they fit how a word is used. We might begin by thinking about what makes us persons. Consider this:

We are persons now. Either we will always be persons or we will cease being persons. If we will cease to be persons, what can end our personhood? If we will always be persons, how could that be?

Both options yield insight into personhood. Many people think that their personhood ends at death or if they were to go into a permanent coma: their body is (biologically) alive but the person is gone: that is why other people are sad. And if we continue to exist after the death of our bodies, as some religions maintain, what continues to exist? The person, perhaps even without a body, some think! Both responses suggest that personhood is defined by a rough and vague set of psychological or mental, rational and emotional characteristics: consciousness, knowledge, memories, and ways of communicating, all psychologically unified by a unique personality.

A second activity supports this understanding:

Make a list of things that are definitely not persons. Make a list of individuals who definitely are persons. Make a list of imaginary or fictional personified beings which, if existed, would be persons: these beings that fit or display the concept of person, even if they don’t exist. What explains the patterns of the lists?

Rocks, carrots, cups and dead gnats are clearly not persons. We are persons. Science fiction gives us ideas of personified beings: to give something the traits of a person is to indicate what the traits of persons are, so personified beings give insights into what it is to be a person. Even though the non-human characters from, say, Star Wars don’t exist, they fit the concept of person: we could befriend them, work with them, and so on, and we could only do that with persons. A common idea of God is that of an immaterial person who has exceptional power, knowledge, and goodness: you couldn’t pray to a rock and hope that rock would respond: you could only pray to a person. Are conscious and feeling animals, like chimpanzees, dolphins, cats, dogs, chickens, pigs, and cows more relevantly like us, as persons, or are they more like rocks and cabbages, non-persons? Conscious and feeling animals seem to be closer to persons than not.^[13] So, this classificatory and explanatory activity further supports a psychological understanding of personhood: persons are, at root, conscious, aware and feeling beings.

Concerning abortion, early fetuses would not be persons on this account: they are not yet conscious or aware since their brains and nervous systems are either non-existent or insufficiently developed. Consciousness emerges in fetuses much later in pregnancy, likely after the first trimester or a bit beyond. This is after when most abortions occur. Most abortions, then, do not involve killing a person, since the fetus has not developed the characteristics for personhood. We will briefly discuss later abortions, that potentially affect fetuses who are persons or close to it, below.

It is perhaps worthwhile to notice though that if someone believed that fetuses are persons and thought this makes abortion wrong, it’s unclear how they could coherently believe that a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest could permissibly be ended by an abortion. Some who oppose abortion argue that, since you are a person, it would be wrong to kill you now even if you were conceived because of a rape, and so it’s wrong to kill any fetus who is a person, even if they exist because of a rape: whether someone is a person or not doesn’t depend on their origins: it would make no sense to think that, for two otherwise identical fetuses, one is a person but the other isn’t, because that one was conceived by rape. Therefore, those who accept a “personhood argument” against abortion, yet think that abortions in cases of rape are acceptable, seem to have an inconsistent view.

13. For a discussion of the nature of personhood, written by thirteen philosophers, see Kristen Andrews, et al, Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief  (Routledge, 2018). This book addresses the general question of what persons are and applies plausible answers to the question of whether any chimpanzees are persons, and its discussion is applicable to questions about fetal personhood. This book grew out of an amicus brief, written for judges to help them better understand the issues. For discussion of the relations between arguments about the “moral status” of non-human animals and the “moral status” of human fetuses, see Nathan Nobis’s (July 16, 2016) “Abortion and Animal Rights: Does Either Topic Lead to the Other?” at the University of Colorado’s Center for Values and Social Policy blog What’s Wrong?  

All other blog posts are available here. 

Is Herbie 'The Love Bug' a Person?

Recently I have watched a few of the old "Herbie the Love Bug" films. They are fun movies, and we can learn something from them about personhood, which is fun too.

So Herbie is a personified car: he (how is Herbie a "he"?) is a car that is given the traits of a person.

If something is given the traits of a person that, of course, tells us something about what persons are or what it is to be a person.

(That Herbie doesn't exist or is a fiction doesn't matter to this: whether something actually exists or not is not relevant to whether a concept or idea describes, or would describe, that thing: e.g., a fictional or made-up house still exemplifies the concept of "house" even though it doesn't really exist).

So why is Herbie a person, or what personifies Herbie? 

It seems like the more immediate answers are along these lines: Herbie is personified, and so displays the characteristics of a person, because:

• he is aware of things: he knows where things and people are, 
• he has beliefs, 
• he has desires, 
• he has preferences, 
• he has emotions, 
• he has a memory, 
• he has goals and the like: 
• in "Herbie Goes to Monte Carlo" he even has romantic interests! 

In short, this car is personified in having a mind.

This seems to be a good explanation of why Herbie is a person and so what personhood is. We discuss this explanatory theory of personhood here, and observe that this theory implies that early fetuses are not persons since they completely lack any of the above or anything like it: they are completely without minds. 

A different answer to what personifies Herbie is this: Herbie is personified in that Herbie is presented as having a rational nature or essence.

Here I am not going to discuss this proposal, but instead just ask three questions about it:

1. how is saying that "Herbie has a rational nature or essence" different from saying "Herbie is rational"?
2. how is saying that "Herbie has a rational nature or essence" related to Herbie being rational?
3. most importantly, is the explanation that Herbie is personified because of his rational nature or essence better or worse than the explanation that Herbie is personified because he is conscious, aware, has thoughts, feelings, beliefs, preferences, and so on? Whatever one's answer, why? And how does one decide these issues?

If you'd like, feel free to answer the questions below as a comment!

Some discussion relevant to evaluating the "rational nature or essence" proposal for personhood is here and here.

As a reminder, why are we talking about Herbie? Because thinking about Herbie (and other examples, especially ones from real life) can help us better understand what persons are, and what persons are is surely relevant to evaluating many arguments about abortion and other important ethical issues.

• All other blog posts are available here: here are some of them:

  • Is abortion "healthcare"?

  • "Fetuses are human beings; all human beings are equal in dignity & worth; so abortion is wrong." Good or bad argument?

  • Pro-life virtues and vices? Pro-choice virtues and vices? On sex/gender and arguments

  • "Force birther"-ism and Virtue Signaling

  • Is the "bodily autonomy" argument for abortion *that* simple?

  • Are you part of a cult about abortion, or anything else?

  • Trent Horn on "The Problem of Personhood"

  • 'Yes, "a person is a person, no matter how small," but . .'

  • "If abortion is not wrong, then it's OK to kill sleeping people??!"

  • "When does life begin?' and 'Are fetuses human?': Two bad questions to ask about abortion"