Abortion and Soundbites: Why Pro-Choice Arguments Are Harder to Make

"Abortion and Soundbites: Why Pro-Choice Arguments Are Harder to Make" at Areo Magazine. 

Areo has unfortunately closed; the text of this article is below. 

"Soundbites," argue @NathanNobis and Kristina Grob, "make many pro-life arguments seem stronger than they really are, while the complexities of pro-choice arguments can't be readily reduced to soundbites."https://t.co/cry2DlKtyt

— Areo (@AreoMagazine) July 23, 2019

Abortion and Soundbites: Why Pro-Choice Arguments Are Harder to Make

https://areomagazine.com/2019/07/23/abortion-and-soundbites-why-pro-choice-arguments-are-harder-to-make/

Posted on July 23, 2019
7 minute read
By Nathan Nobis and Kristina Grob

Arguments are nowadays often presented as soundbites: as slogans, tweets, memes and even gifs. Arguments developed in detail often meet the response TL;DR (Too Long, Didn’t Read). This is unfortunate—especially when tackling the topic of abortion. Soundbites make many pro-life arguments seem stronger than they really are, while the complexities of pro-choice arguments can’t be readily reduced to soundbites.

Pro-Life Soundbites

Abortion is wrong because:

• fetuses are human or human beings.
• human beings have rights.
• human rights protect all humans.
• we should advocate for equality, including equality for unborn human beings.
• abortion ends a life.
• abortion is killing.

These soundbites can sound good because human beings are generally wrong to kill; human rights do protect human beings; human rights apply to all humans; equality is a good thing; and ending lives and killing are often wrong. Denying these things often results in silly assertions: that fetuses in human women aren’t human or aren’t alive, or that abortion doesn’t involve killing, etc.

That these soundbites are based on what seems to be common sense can make these simple cases against abortion seem strong.

Pro-Choice Presentations

Presentations of pro-choice perspectives often begin with abstractions:

• What does human mean? Does everything human have rights?
• Why do human beings have rights? What makes humans have rights?
• Do human rights really protect everything and everyone that is human, or all human beings?
• Do basic human rights include a right to someone else’s body? How could someone gain that right? What kind of rights to assistance do human rights entail?
• Denying equality among human beings is very bad, but is equality sometimes inappropriate or even wrong? What does equality mean?
• When is killing not wrong? Does killing ever raise few, if any, moral issues whatsoever?

Since pro-choice positions depend on more precise and complex theoretical thinking, they are harder to effectively communicate—especially when audiences and discussion partners will not—or cannot—seek to understand more deeply and carefully.

Pro-Choice Soundbites

Consider some common pro-choice soundbites:

• My body, my choice.
• A woman can do whatever she wants with her own body.
• People who oppose abortion just want to control women.
• If you’re against abortion, don’t have one.
• Abortion is just a medical procedure.
• Abortion is a personal choice.
• Every child a wanted child.
• Abortion is not up for debate.

The problems with these soundbites are obvious to anyone who doesn’t already accept them.

• No. You cannot choose to use your body to murder someone.
• No. You cannot do everything you want with your own body: you cannot murder someone.
• No. If women are doing something that should be illegal, they should be controlled, just as anyone else should.
• No. You wouldn’t say Against child abuse? Then don’t abuse children! so this response is foolish.
• No. If abortion is wrong, it’s not a mere medical procedure.
• No. We can’t or shouldn’t make certain personal choices, if those choices are profoundly wrong.
• No. That a child is unwanted wouldn’t entitle anyone to kill that child.
• No, abortion is up for debate. What do you think we are doing in talking about it?

Not every pro-choice soundbite generates these reactions, but many do. Pro-choice soundbites just don’t have the same initial plausibility as pro-life soundbites.

Critiques of Pro-Life Soundbites

Pro-choice critics don’t argue that pro-life soundbites are completely wrong. Pro-choicers argue that, if we look at the details, their initial plausibility fades: thinking them through reveals that the ideas don’t have the implications their advocates think they do.

• If human means biologically human, that means that random human cells and tissues have rights, which they don’t. So just because fetuses are biologically human doesn’t mean they have rights.
• We can ask why human beings have rights: why do rocks and vegetables not have rights? A long-influential family of theories of rights proposes that we have rights because we are conscious and feeling beings. This theory suggests that pre-conscious embryos and early fetuses don’t have rights.
• While people say that all human beings have rights, they don’t. Human corpses don’t have rights. Brain-dead human beings do not have the rights we have: letting their bodies die would be wrong if they had, say, the right to life. Babies born missing most of their brains seem to not have the rights that regular babies have: it’s hard to see why letting them die, even when they could be kept alive, would be wrong, since being alive does them no good. Not all human beings have features that rights are supposed to protect, so it seems that not all human beings have rights. So just because fetuses are human beings doesn’t, in itself, mean they have rights.
• The right to life is not a right to everything someone needs to live—especially someone else’s body. Explaining if, how and why a fetus would have a right to a pregnant woman’s body is a challenge.
• Denying equality among humans is very bad. But advocating for equality between human beings and, say, isolated human cells or organs (or plants or bacteria) would be wrong. And what does equal mean? Not everything is equal: there is such a thing as justified, reasonable discrimination: there might be good reasons to deny that human embryos and early fetuses are equal to us.
• Killing random cells, bacteria, plants, etc. is often not wrong at all. There is killing that’s wrong and killing that isn’t wrong: just because abortion is killing doesn’t mean it’s wrong.

Identifying these problems requires showing that things are more complicated than they seem. It requires seeing that some common ways of understanding aren’t quite correct and might even be harmful.

There are, of course, more sophisticated arguments against abortion. These often appeal to claims about human embryos and fetuses’ essence or essential properties, their rational natures and their being the same kind of beings that we are. These abstract claims and arguments are harder to evaluate. However, close critical examination reveals that these abstract arguments do not succeed: they raise more questions than they answer.

Critical Thinking and Abortion

Developing strong critical thinking skills requires training and practice.

In our recent short, introductory, open-access book on abortion, Thinking Critically About Abortion: Why Most Abortions Aren’t Wrong & Why All Abortions Should be Legal, we review a lot of bad arguments and ways of understanding abortion, from all sides. Our main positive arguments for pro-choice perspectives, briefly stated, are these.

• It is wrong to kill adults, children and babies because they are conscious, aware and have feelings. Since early fetuses entirely lack these characteristics, it is not inherently wrong to kill them, so most abortions are not morally wrong, since most abortions are done early in pregnancy, before consciousness and feeling develop in the fetus.
• Furthermore, since the right to life does not include the right to someone else’s body, a fetus might not have the right to the pregnant woman’s body—therefore she has the right to not allow the fetus use of her body. This further justifies abortion, at least until technology allows for the removal of fetuses to other wombs. Since morally permissible actions should be legal, abortions should be legal: it is an injustice to criminalize actions that are not wrong.

These arguments are not new, but they are new to most people, since most people are not familiar with the philosophical literature on abortion. Versions of these are likely to be the best arguments for pro-choice perspectives out there.

Soundbite-Free Advocacy

So, what can a pro-choice advocate do? Here are some ideas:

• Don’t provide soundbites. You’re better off saying nothing than giving what sounds like a bad argument—perhaps because it is a bad argument.
• Very clever and creative people could develop good pro-choice soundbites. These are likely to be based on abstract and theoretical considerations. But developing any such soundbites in an echo-chamber, with little reflection on how they would be received by the outside world, is a strategy for failure.
• Denying that the issues can be reduced to soundbites might do some good: acknowledging complexity can help.
• We’d all like to engage and persuade everyone, but it might be best to focus on people who are able and willing to engage complexity: judges and legal officials are generally able and willing to do that; elected politicians are less likely to. Focusing on audiences willing to listen and productively discuss would reduce discouragement and frustration. Many people are well-meaning and willing to engage the issues in serious, respectful and responsible ways. But these discussions aren’t likely to be fruitful if they appeal to soundbites.

This isn’t about persuasion in the sense of manipulation, public relations or anything that could be called sophistry. We want to move people towards reasonable, justified messages.

While pro-life soundbites often move people, they do not seem to move people towards views that are ultimately justified by strong evidence and arguments: we believe this can be demonstrated by reasoning rigorously, patiently and critically about those arguments. Our book’s subtitle is Why Most Abortions Aren’t Wrong & Why All Abortions Should be Legal because we believe that critical thinking reveals that this view is supported by better arguments than its opposite. Soundbites don’t help show that, to most people. We need to find out what will.

 

Nathan Nobis

Nathan Nobis is is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. He has authored and co-authored many articles, essays, reviews and a few books on topics in ethics and philosophy.

Kristina Grob

Kristina Grob is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of South Carolina Sumter. Each semester she shows students that philosophy can be a way of life, no matter their day jobs. 

Abortion "Zingers": What About That??

It's not uncommon for people to offer what could be called "zingers" about abortion. 

These often amount to rhetorical questions that, unfortunately, the person asking the question doesn't wait around for an answer to. 

This is unfortunate because oftentimes these questions do have answers, good answers. 

So the "zinger" attempt is to ask a question that's assumed to be a really hard question that can't be answered—and so get a "gotcha!" moment—except the question can be answered and answered effectively. 

Using "zingers" then reveals that either the person just doesn't know as much about the topic as they think they do, or that they lack integrity in engaging other people, or both (and more!). 

So, pro-choice people sometimes ask this whatabout "zinger":

What if there was a burning building with human embryos and a child in it? Would you save the embryos or a child???!

The charge is that if someone says that they would save the child, the "zinger" is the accusation that that must mean they think that embryos aren't valuable, or aren't people, and that, ultimately, their view can't support thinking that abortion isn't wrong. 

This, however, is just silly. To see this, change the question:

What if there was a burning building with strangers and your beloved spouse? Would you save the strangers or your beloved spouse???!

Most people would save their beloved spouse. 

Does that mean that the strangers are not valuable, or aren't people, and that it would be OK to push these strangers into a burning building? 

Not at all.

The zinger fails.  

Consider a whatabout "zinger" from some who oppose abortion:

Whatabout laws that make murdering pregnant women an especially heinous crime? 

Here the thought is that if murdering pregnant women is an especially awful crime (as it is) and should be classified a double-murder or murder-homicide, then fetuses must be persons and abortion must be wrong. 

This might be the case, but a little thinking gives reasons to doubt this conclusion.

First, it appears that the murder of pregnant women is, fortunately, rather rare. One source reports this: "the overall pregnancy-associated homicide ratio was 1.7 deaths per 100,000 live births." Another reports: "The pregnancy-associated homicide rate in Maryland was found to be 10.5 per 100000 live births." Whatever the numbers, that's always too many, but it still rather rare. So these cases get special attention, as they should. 

Second, although even though around half of pregnancies are not intended, many women who are pregnant do (or eventually do) want to have that baby. Even if they have mixed emotions, they and their families are usually excited for the baby to be born and for their future with that child. 

So, what happens when a pregnant woman, who usually wants to have a baby, is that she is murdered and her future with that baby and her family's hopes and dreams for the future for her and that child are wrongly taken away. That's profoundly wrong, what some would consider an even greater loss when there's a murder of a single person. (In this way, this is related to responses to questions about miscarriages). 

If we want to make this type of wrong, however, a special crime, we'll have to have a law that makes this a special crime. And it's not going to work to have a law that says murdering pregnant women who want to have a baby is a specially bad crime but murdering pregnant women who do not want to have a baby is not an especially bad crime. For one, in many cases (of the few cases like these) we won't know what category the crime is, since we won't know how the woman feels about being pregnant and what her plans for the future are. Viable laws have to be workable laws. 

So if we are going to have a law, it's going to have to be a general law, applicable to murdering any pregnant woman. And, again, most pregnant women ultimately want to have a baby and their families are profoundly looking forward to that future also, and laws often have to be made to cover the majority of cases. 

Does this mean that fetuses are persons? 

No. The above explanation had nothing to do with whether fetuses are persons. (I will note that, as far as I can find so far, we don't have data on what percentage of murdered pregnant women are murdered late in pregnancy, when the fetus is conscious and feeling; that would be relevant to the status of the crime [see 5.2.4 “What ifs”: rape and later-term abortions]). 

Does this mean abortion is wrong?

No. Nothing in the explanation above suggests that abortion is generally wrong. 

Is this issue more complicated than many people think it is?

Yes.

Do "zingers" often fail in making good arguments? Should people seek to understand the complex details of a complex issue? Should people seek thoughtful answers to their questions, instead of assuming that there are no answers and that they have scored a "point"?

Yes, yes, and yes! Always yes!

** Are there other "Zingers" you'd like discussed? Let me know! **

All other blog posts are available here. 

"Fetuses are human beings; all human beings are equal in dignity & worth; so abortion is wrong." Good or bad argument?

At about 4:40 of this video (which someone sent along to me), Robert George - a professor and well-known critic of abortion - says something like this:

"Millennials want to hear reasons and arguments, and it's very clear that when the arguments are presented, it's clear who wins this 'battle' over abortion." 

He then gives a quick argument like this:

1. "The basic facts of science": (human) fetuses are human; they're human organisms.  
2. Every member of the human family is equal in worth and dignity. 
3. So, human fetuses are equal in worth and dignity. 
4. So, abortion is wrong (in most circumstances). 

Is any age-group generally more or less interested in having arguments and good reasons for their views, compared to any other age group? Are younger people really more critical thinkers than older people? My experience suggests this: not really. 

But more importantly, let's quickly look at this common argument to see if things are as "clear" as George says they are in this soundbite interview. 

THE FIRST PREMISE

About the first premise, (human) fetuses are clearly biologically human; they are clearly biologically human organisms; they are even clearly biologically human beings, at least on one understanding of that term: "human beings" are beings that are biologically human. 

That's all clearly true, right? Right. 

But isn't it also true that (human) corpses are all this? Yes. 

But what's meant is living human beings, right?

OK, but aren't "brain dead" but living human beings human beings? 

Aren't human beings in permanent comas also human beings? 

Yes and yes. 

We'll want to remember that in thinking about the second premise of the argument. 

But the first premise here is clearly true. The big question though is whether anything follows from this truth and, if anything does, if that's as "clear" and obvious as George and others claim it is. 

THE SECOND PREMISE

So, brain-dead and permanently comatose human beings are human beings. 

But these human beings get treated quite differently from more human beings, like adults, children, and babies, who we interact with most often. And the ways they are treated aren't wrong or illegal. 

For one, they are sometimes let die, and that's not wrong. 

But if it's generally wrong to let persons die when we can keep them alive, something must explain that difference between how we are treated and how brain-dead and permanently comatose human beings are treated: although they are also human beings, they are importantly different from human beings who are wrong to let die, like us. (What could that difference be? This is discussed below).

Second, they are sometimes not just let die but are activity killed. That's what happens in organ donation from brain-dead bodies. And that's not wrong. 

Again, although these are human beings, they are importantly different from human beings who are wrong to kill, which makes that killing OK. (What could that difference be? Again, this is discussed below).

So, here's the point: fetuses are human beings; we (anyone reading this) is a human being (unless there are space aliens, or spiritual beings, reading this??), but there are some human beings who are OK to let die and even kill. (And that's not even bringing in killing in self-defense). So, this is what people would be thinking about if they deny that all human organisms have the right to life. 

So here's an argument against premise 2:

A. If every member of the human family is equal in worth and dignity, then it's wrong to let brain-dead human beings die or actively kill them. 

B. But it's not wrong to let brain-dead human beings die or actively kill them.

C. So it's not true that every member of the human family is equal in worth and dignity.

So, just because something is a human being doesn't mean it's wrong to kill it: there are morally important and relevant differences among or between different types of human beings. 

So, yes, fetuses are human beings, but that fact, in itself, doesn't mean they are wrong to kill, any more than brain-dead or permanently comatose individuals being human beings means they are wrong to kill (or let die, or end their lives). 

So premise (2) is not true. This argument is pretty clearly unsound. All we need to do is think about a wider range of human beings than most of us ever think about. Most of us don't encounter brain dead human beings or human beings in permanent comas, and so we don't think about what a premise like (2) would imply for them. 

WHY DO HUMAN BEINGS HAVE DIGNITY AND WORTH?

Another reason why (2) is false comes from thinking about why human beings have dignity and worth. 

Again, this is a question that not many people think about: they know that human beings have worth, but don't think about why that is is so. They really have no reason to think about that.

This is actually a disputed topic: there are many different answers.

Everyone who thoughtfully engages the issue, however, realizes that saying human beings have dignity and worth just because they are human beings isn't an informative answer: it doesn't say why: it doesn't explain. 

Here's a better answer: human beings have dignity and worth because they are conscious and feeling beings, whose lives can go better and worse for us, from our own point of view. Philosopher Tom Regan describes us as being "subjects of lives":

we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others. We want and prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and expect things. And all these dimensions of our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our untimely death - all make a difference to the quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as individuals. 

Corpses, brain-dead individuals, and permanently comatose individuals are not like that at all. That is why it can be OK to let them die and sometimes even actively kill them. 

Human embryos and early fetuses also are like that, in that they are not conscious or feeling. And that contributes to why they are OK to kill, or so many argue. 

And this is another reason, or another way of seeing, why premise (2) is false. 

(This also suggests another way that people use the term "human being": when some people say that fetuses are not human beings, they might be saying that they are not conscious or recently conscious biologically human organisms and that that's what a "human being" is. I don't think this is the best way to think about this - "human person" is probably a better way to put this - but this seems to be what some people have in mind). 

HUMAN BEINGS

This discussion can take us back to defining "human beings."

Some might respond that, contrary to appearance, brain-dead or permanently comatose humans are not "human beings" and maybe not even "biologically human organisms" anymore. And this is for reasons other than the fact that they are permanently unconscious. 

Why's that? They'd likely say this because various "potentials", such as the potential for rational thought, are no longer there, given the brain damage.

Is this correct? If they could be repaired with (future) technology from somewhere like Wakanda, or if, say, God could repair this person, this is doubtful. So, perhaps "potential" is never lost. 

"Potential" is also sometimes understood in a vague manner as "the same kind of being." But isn't a brain-dead or permanently comatose human in some sense the "same kind of being" as you or me, just as they are also not the same kind of being? If the former is true, then these humans still are human beings or human organisms, which seems pretty clearly correct anyway. 

I suppose, however, that some would propose that to be a "human being" or a "human organism" requires various types of potential, and we'll just overlook the possibilities for "potential" that brain dead humans have. So the claim would be that fetuses are human beings or human organisms because they have these types of potentials. 

This then takes us back to the question of whether premise (2) might be true and the deeper question of what makes human beings have rights or why they have rights. We know fetuses have these potentials and can be described as this "kind" of being, but why does that make them usually wrong to kill?

What's clear is this issue isn't simple in the way George suggests it is. But it might very well be that better responses here have pro-choice implications. If so, George is just incorrect here in his suggestion who "wins" this "battle."

THE BIG PICTURE

Now, this is all responding to just one quick, off the cuff argument, although one given by a well-known person. (Here's some discussion from me of more complex versions of this argument, and here too).

However, this type of argument is common and many people think the above argument is a great argument, but it's not. (Indeed, most philosophers and ethicists - experts - think it's a bad argument, and so would think that George is mistaken and misleading in his claims about what's "clear.")

At least, it's an argument that needs a lot of explaining and engagement for it to be reasonable to hold, given all the concerns relevant to it. And that includes the question of whether women are obligated to provide assistance for fetuses, however the discussion above is resolved, which wasn't discussed here.

Hopefully, this post will help people - of all ages! - understand some of the complexity here and engage others on the issues with greater understanding. 

P.S. This post raises hard questions about simplifying complex issues. If an issue is complex, then over-simplifying the issues can be bad: e.g., on the basis of this video someone could come to believe that the initial simple argument here just proves that abortion is wrong when it really doesn't, and having that false belief (which is not uncommon) is bad in many ways. On another hand, declaring "look, these issues are complex and so I don't want to simplify for fear of misleading anyone!" is paralyzing. I suppose the best response is to simplify but also make it clear that there are complexities that really need to be engaged. Also, to be fair, I should also note that Robert George does engage many of these complexities at least in his book Embryo [here's a review of that book] and at least many of these articles from the philosophical literature: whether his responses are, and should be, convincing is something readers should investigate if they are interested. 

P.P.S. Here's another "popular" thinker, Frank Turek, giving a similar soundbite argument against abortion, which would be responded to in ways similar to what's above:

Many of the ideas above are also in this Salon article, 

Why the case against abortion is weak, ethically speaking
Many medical procedures are ethically similar to abortion — but without the outcry. Why?

By NATHAN NOBIS - JONATHAN DUDLEY

PUBLISHED APRIL 11, 2021 10:00AM (EDT)

Related: "When does life begin?" and "Are fetuses human?": Two bad 'scientific' questions to ask about abortion

All other blog posts are available here: here are some of them:

• Is abortion "healthcare"?

• "Fetuses are human beings; all human beings are equal in dignity & worth; so abortion is wrong." Good or bad argument?

• Pro-life virtues and vices? Pro-choice virtues and vices? On sex/gender and arguments

• "Force birther"-ism and Virtue Signaling

• Is the "bodily autonomy" argument for abortion *that* simple?

• Are you part of a cult about abortion, or anything else?

• Trent Horn on "The Problem of Personhood"

• 'Yes, "a person is a person, no matter how small," but . .'

• "If abortion is not wrong, then it's OK to kill sleeping people??!"

• "When does life begin?' and 'Are fetuses human?': Two bad questions to ask about abortion"

On an Abstract "Metaphysical" Argument Against Abortion

There are more simple, and simplistic, arguments against abortion and less simple and simplistic arguments against abortion that all appeal to the idea of fetuses being human. Here are some arguments, too briefly stated and not at all explained, ordered from more simple to less simple:

Abortion is wrong because:

1. Fetuses are biologically human.
2. Each fetus is a human; fetuses are humans. 
3. Fetuses are biologically human beings.
4. Fetuses are biologically human organisms.
5. Fetuses are a "kind" of being that's a rational being: fetuses' "essence" is that of a rational being. 

This last claim is a way of describing (or attempting to describe) a difference between the biologically human fetus here and the other fetuses: the circled being is a "kind" of being that's a rational being; its "essence" is that of a rational being: 

While we discuss all these versions of these arguments in Thinking Critically About Abortion, and explain how they might build on each other (meaning, someone who says (1 or 2) might then appeal to (3) and (4), and then appeal to (5) to try to justify what they claim about (3) and (4), below is a different brief engagement with an abstract, "metaphysical" argument like (5). 

Reply to Christopher Tollefsen on Abortion, in Bob Fischer, ed., Ethics, Left and Right: The Moral Issues That Divide Us (Oxford University Press, 2019).

Abstract: Are you the same thing as your body? Did you begin at conception? Do you have a rational and free “nature” or “essence”? Some answer ‘yes’ to all and argue that this means that abortion is wrong: 

your "essence" is that of a free and rational being; that essence *makes* it wrong to kill you; you have always existed whenever your body existed; your body began at conception; and so you existed at conception and were wrong to kill; and the same is true for all other human fetuses. 

This argument is discussed here. 

Below is a response to Christopher Tollefsen’s essay on abortion, which is a perspective from “the Right.” Please see my contribution from a perspective from “the Left,” “Early and Later Abortions: Ethics and Law.”

Word count: 999

"Force birther"-ism and Virtue Signaling

There's seems to be an increasingly popular "move" online of calling people who think abortion is wrong and should be illegal "force birthers." 

The thought is that these are people who want to, and would, force women to give birth because they would force women to not have abortions if they could and that's their goal. 

Here I want to observe that calling someone a "forced birther" is just silly.

So, here's the dialogue:

A. "You're a 'forced birther'!"

B. "Why's that?"

A. "You would force women to not have abortions, and so force them to have birth!"

B. "Yes, I think abortion is wrong and should be illegal."

A. "So you are "forced birther"!"

B. "Well, yes, I think abortion is wrong and should be illegal. So, yeah, you are observing that I do indeed believe what you are accusing me of believing: that's what people who think abortion is wrong and should be illegal think: do you have any reason to think this position is mistaken?"

So, what's happening is that the pro-choice finds someone who they (correctly or incorrectly) believes abortion is wrong and should be illegal. They then angrily call them a "forced birther" which basically amounts to saying "They think abortion should be wrong and should be illegal!!" 

Now, isn't it just obvious to everyone that this person thinks abortion is wrong and should be illegal? 

Of course.

Is telling something who thinks that abortion is wrong and should be illegal that "You think abortion is wrong and should be illegal!!" giving them any new information or arguments to think about it? Might it in any way going to change their minds (for the better)? Does telling anyone this give them any reason to think that they are perhaps mistaken in their views?

No, not at all. 

So then why do people say things like this, since it's obviously not going to persuade anyone, give them any kind of reasons to consider that might lead to their changing their mind, or "shore up" any pro-choice persons' views on the issues?

Seems like the answer is this: saying this (and things like it) amounts to "virtue signaling," which is this:

virtue signaling

[ vur-choo sig-nl-ing ]

---

noun Sometimes Disparaging.

the sharing of one's point of view on a social or political issue, often on social media, in order to garner praise or acknowledgment of one’s righteousness from others who share that point of view, or to passively rebuke those who do not:The virtue signaling of solidarity with the victims can be a comforting affirmation of community.Their outraged virtue signaling comes across as contrived.

Why do people say things like this and other soundbites? 

On the theory of virtue signaling, they say this to try to fit in with their crowd. To try to show that they are true believers. To be part of a . . cult?

While there's maybe a time and a place for that, it's surely worth asking if this move is helpful in any way. 

Surely it isn't. 

And it isn't because it does nothing to engage any arguments or concerns of people who oppose abortion. All it says is "You oppose abortion! Boo to that!" which is not productive in any way. 

What would be productive, for pro-choice people and organizations?

One suggestion - beyond voting and engaging in relevant lawsuits - is to see all the types of things that anti-abortion people and organizations do, in terms of trainings and "educational" activities and think tanks, and matching those activities. 

Pro-choice people being more informed on the issues, and so better able to engage other people on these issues by not relying on unpersuasive slogans based on bad arguments, would be very good, indeed a true virtue. Given the urgency of these issues, that's what's needed, not virtue signaling. 

P.S. People who think abortion is wrong and should be illegal get called called "forced birthers," but sometimes people who observe that some reasons given to think abortion is not wrong and should be legal are bad arguments that will convince nobody also get called "force birthers." Anyone critical about any arguments in favor of abortion can get called this, even if they think abortions are generally not wrong, should be legal and even write books arguing that! (How do I know this??)

P.P.S. Sometimes observations of virtue signaling are themselves virtue signaling. Is that relevant to this post? If so, how? How is the group who shares the view expressed here best described?

Other blog posts are available here: here are some of them:

• Is abortion "healthcare"?

• "Fetuses are human beings; all human beings are equal in dignity & worth; so abortion is wrong." Good or bad argument?

• Pro-life virtues and vices? Pro-choice virtues and vices? On sex/gender and arguments

• "Force birther"-ism and Virtue Signaling

• Is the "bodily autonomy" argument for abortion *that* simple?

• Are you part of a cult about abortion, or anything else?

• Trent Horn on "The Problem of Personhood"

• 'Yes, "a person is a person, no matter how small," but . .'

• "If abortion is not wrong, then it's OK to kill sleeping people??!"

• "When does life begin?' and 'Are fetuses human?': Two bad questions to ask about abortion"

Is the "bodily autonomy" argument for abortion *that* simple?

Some claim that the abortion issue is simple: the right to bodily autonomy justifies the (legal and moral) right to abortion, and that's all that needed to justify abortion: it's as simple as that. 

Maybe "nobody has a right to use anyone else's body without their consent" will do it. Maybe. 

But it might not be so simple. 

At least, more than a few people don't think it's that simple. And this should motivate thoughtful people to understand why it might not be so simple. This will at least help people better engage the people who don't find it so simple, right?

Let's think about it a bit. 

1.

To begin, the backstory here comes from, or can come from, philosopher Judith Thompson. She's got a famous example, a thought experiment, involving a famous violinist who needs to use your kidneys for a while to stay alive: if you don't help him, he'll die.

Now, the violinist is a person, with the right to life as much as you or me. But does the violinist have a right to use your kidneys? If you don't let him, do you violate his rights? 

Most say "no" and "no." (However, they could be mistaken, right?).

The upshot is this: the right to life does not include the right to anyone else's body, even if that body is needed for someone's life to continue. 

So, at least, the very common, yet simplistic claim that if fetuses are persons with the right to life, then it immediately follows that abortion is wrong, is mistaken. For this argument to succeed, fetuses would have to have a right to the woman's body, which they don't have, since nobody has the right to anyone else's body. 

That's the point, which is often misunderstood. The point isn't a comparison of fetuses to violinists, since the situations are, in some ways, importantly different: the point isn't any analogy. Again, the violinist case is used to show that the right to life does not include the right to anyone else's body, and that insight then is applied to abortion. 

2.

So what are some concerns here that make the issues not as simple as it might seem?

A first is this: not all moral or legal obligations are due to rights. 

You are morally obligated to be kind and respectful to everyone you meet: if you are rude and mean, you have probably done wrong. But did you violate people's rights by being rude and mean? I'd say not. 

This is just one example, among many, to make the point that not all moral obligations are because of rights. Some moral theories or systems outright deny the existence of rights, so they think that no obligations depend on rights, and so all moral obligations are based on something else.

The same message seems to be true of the law: you can be legally required or legally obligated to do something, even though it's a stretch to say that anyone has a right that you'd be violating by not doing that thing.

So the point is this: just because the violinist doesn't have a right to use the person's body, that person could still be morally obligated to help him, using their body. Rights aren't the whole of morality, and other moral concerns could create a serious moral obligation here. As for the law, perhaps there could be laws that compel behavior to benefit others (in fact, there are not: "Good Samaritan" laws typically only protect people who have tried to help others from forms of retaliation for providing that assistance) so there could be legal obligations here also, and ones that don't really depend on rights, strictly speaking. 

Now, maybe there aren't any such non-rights-based obligations here, but there could be. And that contributes to the issue being not so simple.

3. 

A further concern is this: maybe people sometimes have rights to other people's bodies. Maybe, contrary to what seems to follow from Thompson's insights, the right to life does include the right to anyone else's body when that body is needed for someone's life to continue. 

This idea can be motivated by a simple case that's been around for a while:

There's a child drowning in a fountain, who you could easily and safely easily save from death. However, to save the child, you will have to either: 

(a) use your body, e.g., your hand, to hit a button to drain the fountain and save the child, 

(b) quickly sell some of your blood, from your body, to get $1 to put into a machine to gain access to that button (say there's a cover that will come off if you put $1 in it) or 

(c) you must cut off some of your own skin, from your body, to put into that machine to get access to that button (say there's a cover that will come off if you put some skin in in it): that will hurt, but the skin will grow back. 

Now here you are morally obligated to save the child, right? It would be wrong to let the child drown here. And some would say the child has a right to be saved: do they? 

Either way, you are morally obligated to use your body to save the child; and if the child has a right to be saved, then the child has a right to the use of your body. If the child drowns, at least someone is gonna say that it should be a crime to let that happen. And maybe they're right about that?

If this is all correct, then, again, the bodily autonomy argument is not so simple. Contrary to what the "my body, my choice!" chant, there can be situations where you are obligated to use your body in certain ways, and maybe others even have a right to your using your body in ways that benefit them, which seems to be a right to your body. And maybe this should even be a legal obligation, maybe. 

Now, of course, pregnancy and childbirth make very different bodily demands than the case above. (Some important differences: saving a drowning child is usually a one-time-thing, whereas pregnancy is 24-7 for 9 months; pregnancy obviously affects the woman's health and overall sense of well- or ill-being; pregnancy happens in and with her body and her life and changes her whole world and future: it is identity-changing; pregnancy can't be "outsourced" to someone else, whereas someone else can save the child; a woman can't take a break from pregnancy, whereas any drowning-child-savers can; childbirth is much harder than saving any drowning child, and much more!). And the violinist case is very different from the case above also. But if the case above refutes the simplistic understanding or presentation of the issues, then the details matter, which is my point. 

4. 

Are these situations similar to what's found in cases of abortion though?

Not at all. The clearest cases where someone might have a right to someone else's body are cases where a person needs the use of your body. 

To personify something is to give it person-like traits which include consciousness, awareness, feelings, beliefs, memories and the like: in short, a mind. 

The drowning child was a person in this clear sense of the term.

An early fetus, however, is not a person in this sense since they aren't developed enough for any kind of mental life necessary for personhood:

And most abortions are of early fetuses that lack any kind of consciousness or awareness, and haven't yet had anything like that. They aren't persons and so they are not like the best cases to motivate the thought that we sometimes have rights to others' bodies or, at least, others are obligated to use their bodies to help us.

So the more accurate thoughts here seem to be this:

• if a person needs your body to live, you can be obligated to use your body in certain ways, and maybe others have a right to your using your body in ways that benefit them, which seems to be a right to your body;
• if something that is not a person needs your body to live, you are not obligated to use your body in certain ways, and that non-person does not have a right to your using your body, which seems to be a right to your body.

About the first principle, we'd have to address the details: when can you have such an obligation? When is asking too much? Again, the details matter; things aren't so simple. But, this suggests that someone, if they want to appeal to any arguments for bodily autonomy to justify abortion, they might wind up having to discuss the idea of personhood, so they should be prepared for that. 

A lot of these discussions and debates (at least with philosophers) involve assuming, for the sake of argument, that beginning fetuses are persons. While there's a time and a place for that, there's also a time and a place - like here and now - for not making that assumption and thinking about what's actually true regarding the personhood of embryos and early fetuses. Again, the more people are prepared to thoughtfully engage these discussions, the better. 

5.

To some, this might seem all quite obvious. Maybe they would say that they meant all this in saying things like "My body, my choice" and "Nobody has a right to anyone else's body." 

While I doubt they meant this, I am sure that almost nobody - especially any critics of abortion - heard them this way. They, and others, hear these phrases and perhaps think they would justify callous indifference to the needs of others; perhaps they imagine people appealing to these phrases to "justify" their not saving that drowning child: so they say these things to try to justify "a right to do wrong". (An ad hominem question: don't these same people usually routinely fail to help the many "drowning children" of the world and systematically encourage policies designed to not help such needy people? Hmm.) This is also important since what abortion critics often picture in their minds about abortions is likely not accurate to most abortions: they picture far more developed fetuses than, at least, what fetuses are like in most typical abortions, and these pictures don't convey any complex information about whether and which fetuses feel anything or are conscious. 

Recognizing that things are not so simple here and why the "My body, my choice" and "Nobody has a right to anyone else's body" slogans would not justify letting children drown but can justify abortion, given the relevant differences between early fetuses and born children, is important. Acknowledging complexity is often better than appealing to inaccurate and misleading simplicity, especially when those simple appeals are not working. So let's hope that happens since it can only help.

P.S. David Boonin has an excellent newish book on these issues: Beyond Roe: Why Abortion Should be Legal--Even if the Fetus is a Person. 

P.P.S. It's also worth pointing out that some claim that the fetus has a right to the woman's body because she did something that contributed to its existence and its "need" for her body. ("Need" is in quotes because it's unclear how this need should be understood: you and a plant both need water, but the needs of conscious, feeling beings are different from the needs of non-conscious entities). 

In response, it's a fair observation that almost nobody who says this tries to plausibly explains how or why this might be so: they just assert this, without explanation or defense. 

On one way of thinking it through, the claim appears question begging or circular: the fetus has a right to her body because she did something that lead to the existence of a fetus that has a right to her body. 

Some suggest that there's something like a "contract" that gives this right, although nothing resembling any contract or agreement is in place here: nobody can make an agreement with non-existent person and the fact that whether an egg is fertilized and a women becomes and stays pregnant is out of anyone's control is surely relevant also. In short, this "contract" would resemble no known valid contract that we are aware of.

Finally, there's the suggestion that since born children have rights to assistance (and so rights to someone's body?), early fetuses do also. An important difference here, however, is that born children are persons - conscious and feeling and more - whereas early fetuses are not.  

Are Pro-Choicers Irrational (for Only Encouraging Voting)?

What can people do to help ensure that women have the legal right to abortion and that abortion access is available?

By and large, the only suggestion that pro-choice organizations and people offer is this: vote!

Voting surely is a good idea and is a necessary part of an effective strategy, but it surely is not sufficient: it's not enough. 

Yet, pro-choice people tend to offer nothing else beyond voting to try to help advance their cause. Why is that?

I think it's this: pro-choice people tend to be irrational. 

Let me explain. 

There are a variety of ways that people can be irrational. 

One way is to use ineffective means toward your ends: e.g., if you rent a car to take a trip across the ocean, you are irrational. 

Another way is to have false beliefs that you would recognize as false if you thought about them carefully enough. 

Both of these are relevant here. 

First, I think pro-choicers often accept an assumption like this, at least as it relates to abortion: 

• if things have been a certain way, they will and must stay that way. 

This motivates thinking that since abortion has been legal it will remain legal, that since abortion has been broadly socially accepted it will remain so, and that if people have had access to abortion they will continue to have access, and so on. (In some ways, these assumptions can be seen as related to "status quo bias.")

But the general assumption - that things won't and can't change - is false. That's obvious. 

People and organizations who oppose abortion have recognized that change is possible and have been working hard to try to make it happen, from the ground up: they've got "educational" campaigns of many types, all kinds of "trainings" to get people involved and help them better engage the issues and advocate for their point of view, books and webpages geared towards general audiences, "think tanks" to advance their goals and influence policy, and more. They are working for change. 

Pro-choice advocates, however, seem to have been mostly "asleep at the wheel," assuming that things won't and can't change on these issues and making almost no efforts to prevent that change or lessen its chances. So:

• pro-choicers don't have much in the way of educational campaigns - at least nothing that has a chance of reaching those beyond people who are already enthusiastically pro-choice; 
• they offer almost no training to help people more effectively engage the issues and advocate for their point of view; 
• they have no think tanks or make any attempts to organize intellectuals or policy people to help advance their goals at different levels of society and culture, or almost anything else.

All and all, it seems like very little has been done to try to prevent where we are at or headed now. This is all despite the fact that there are really good ethical and legal arguments for a broadly pro-choice perspective. 

That's not smart, not effective, and not working.

I'll add that a related assumption that may be motivating this do-nothing or do-nothing-effective approach is this:

• if you've got the dominant view, you'll always have it. 

In general, people with dominant views don't go out to defend their views or shore them up: they just take them for granted and assume the status quo will remain. Think about, say, meat-eaters: thinking there's nothing wrong with eating meat (and so eating meat) is the dominant view: the NY Times had to run a contest for people to try to come up with anything like a decent argument for the ethical acceptability of eating meat, given all the ethical arguments against it. People who hold socially-dominant views don't defend their views unless and until the time comes and they really have to, and then they are often caught off guard. And pro-choice people and organizations are indeed off guard, or so it seems. 

So, what can be done about this?

My general suggestions relate to education-related activities and outreach, although surely there are other responses. Knowledge is some power, so at least recognizing this deficiency in knowledge and understanding is a start. Pro-choicers should, at least, learn what types of educational activities critics of abortion offer, and seek to meet and match those activities.

Pro-choicers should increase their own knowledge and understand of the issues. IMHO, one of the best lines of our book is this:

. . people who believe that abortion is generally not morally wrong and should be legal are correct, [but] they sometimes don’t offer very good reasons to think this.

Too many pro-choice people give bad arguments for their views: what they say shows that their understanding is, well, not very deep: they rely on slogans and memes and foot-stomping, which won't do. Knowing more about the issues and arguments, especially the details and dialectic of the arguments, would help pro-choice advocates better engage other people - many of whom are, contrary to false assumptions, good-willed, interested to learn, and persuadable - and become more persuasive. 

Pro-choice advocates might not much engage people they disagree with in part because they don't know how to productively do that: they just don't know enough about the details of the issues, and they don't really know what people who disagree with them really think and how to engage in fruitful dialogue on the issues. But they can learn, and they really should: they need to better learn to get beyond their bubble. They should also recognize the potential for some plausible and reasonable compromises: those who oppose abortion do have some reasonable concerns that pro-choicers really should recognize. 

Pro-choice advocates not much engage people who disagree with them also contributes to a kind of groupthink among pro-choice advocates, which does no good: for one, it results in what few attempts at persuasion there are being acceptable only to those who are already pro-choice. It also contributes to a cult-like mentality, that anyone must agree with everything some person or organization says in order to be a broadly pro-choice person (and/or somehow agree with what each and every woman says on these issues, as if women don't sometimes disagree on some of the details): this doesn't allow for much, if any, diversity in viewpoints, which is bad. 

Engaging these few suggestions here would help increase the rationality of pro-choice advocates. They'd better identifying their goals and a range of potentially effective means to work towards those goals. Reflecting on their assumptions would reveal beliefs that they'd want to revise to improve their own understanding and to improve their abilities to positively engage with other people. It'd result in their understanding the issues in deeper ways, and so hold their views in more reasonable or rational ways, which would improve communication and persuasion. 

This final suggestion would also help in engaging with and revealing the irrationality of most opposition to most abortions. Our Thinking Critically About Abortion focuses on the common and philosophical arguments against abortion and, at least, makes a strong initial case that those arguments do not succeed: indeed many of them clearly and obviously fail (as many common pro-choice arguments fail also). Critics of abortion tend toward a more profound irrationality insofar as they accept bad arguments and hold their views for reasons that are just not good (and, unlike pro-choicers, there just aren't great arguments against most abortions): for one, too many of them are naively focused on "when life begins" and whether fetuses are "human." It would be rational for pro-choice advocates to be better able to show this and educate people on this: surely that would benefit their cause. 

In sum, current efforts aren't enough: they aren't working, given broadly pro-choice goals. People can do better - and they can do more than just vote on the issues - and they should: that's the rational response to these challenges. Will they? When and how, since people will want to get involved? If not, why not?

Finally, the themes here are relevant to many social movements that are seeking good change or seeking to preserve good progress. Groups and advocates can reflectively and thoughtfully try to seek their goals or not--or they can do that more or less--and surely the "not" and "less" options aren't the best and so they should do better. 

P.S. Another not uncommon response to these issues from some pro-choice people is to "stick their heads in the sand," so to speak, and declare things like "Abortion is not up for debate!" "Women's rights are not up for debate!" "There will be no compromise!" "We don't debate slavery and so we don't debate abortion!" and the like. 

There are some interesting things to think about concerning these sorts of responses: for example, are anti-abortion arguments really as bad as arguments for slavery? Arguments for slavery aren't taught in classes as "live arguments" potentially worthy of belief, but it is very common to review arguments against abortion, on the thought that there is at least something plausible about them and so they are worthy of review: is this mistaken? (For many reasons, I don't think so). 

But the big question about these head in the sand responses is this: how's this working? Is saying things like this making the issue go away? Does saying things like this help protect legal rights when they are under attack?

Clearly not. 

Does any other "progressive" movement think that it can "win" with these kinds of "we won't engage the issues" approaches? 

No. 

So, again, why do people say things like this? I develop an answer here.

All other blog posts are available here: here are some of them:

• Is abortion "healthcare"?

• "Fetuses are human beings; all human beings are equal in dignity & worth; so abortion is wrong." Good or bad argument?

• Pro-life virtues and vices? Pro-choice virtues and vices? On sex/gender and arguments

• "Force birther"-ism and Virtue Signaling

• Is the "bodily autonomy" argument for abortion *that* simple?

• Are you part of a cult about abortion, or anything else?

• Trent Horn on "The Problem of Personhood"

• 'Yes, "a person is a person, no matter how small," but . .'

• "If abortion is not wrong, then it's OK to kill sleeping people??!"

• "When does life begin?' and 'Are fetuses human?': Two bad questions to ask about abortion"