Tuesday, May 20, 2025

American Journal of Bioethics journal and blog

I recently have had three publications in the American Journal of Bioethics journal and blog. Here are the two blog posts, which are available at their blog; below is the journal article, which is paywalled, so I have reposted the text below.

Blog posts

Are Embryos “Babies” and “Children? October 25, 2024

Following All The Facts About Abortion: Scientific, Ethical, And Logical—Wherever They Lead (June 16, 2023

Response Article

Yes, all bioethicists should engage abortion ethics, but who would be interested in what they have to say?

Open peer commentary for the American Journal of Bioethics on a set of articles about abortion. 

Nathan Nobis (2022) Yes, All Bioethicists Should Engage Abortion Ethics, but Who Would Be Interested in What They Have to Say?, The American Journal of Bioethics, 22:8, 33-36, DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2022.2089274 [some number of free eprints here]

1500 words.





Katie Watson (2022) writes that “If the Supreme Court shifts the question of legality in whole or in part to state legislatures, the ethics of abortion will become an even more intense subject of debate in public, academic, and clinical realms. Therefore, this is the moment for all bioethicists to strengthen our teaching, thinking, and writing in abortion ethics” (emphasis added). 

While writing this commentary, the Supreme Court opinion draft to overturn Roe was leaked, which suggests this “if” is very likely a “when.” So this is the moment

Watson focuses on one way for bioethicists to engage abortion, as an issue affecting health disparities. 

Another way ethicists can engage is by helping people better understand and answer fundamental questions such as: is abortion immoral, indeed murder, and should be illegal, as anti-abortion advocates argue? Or is generally it not wrong, and so banning abortion is unjust? 

I am a bioethicist and for the past few years, I have been engaged in “public philosophy” about abortion ethics, presumably doing something that Professor Watson would encourage bioethicists to do. On the basis of my experience, I want to report this: few people, especially pro-choice people—including their leaders and organizations—seem to care about or have any interest in what ethicists have to say about abortion. 

Is this a problem? 

It’s hard to guess what, realistically, the best impact ethicists could have, and could have had, on political and legal debates about abortion. But a safe assessment is this: people, especially pro-choice people, not listening to ethicists and not seeking to better understand the ethical issues about abortion is not helping anyone. 

Persuading broader audiences that ethicists might be able to help advance pro-choice causes is thereby essential to implementing Watson’s suggestion that bioethicists get more engaged. What good ethicists might do depends on others taking advantage of what they have to offer: that this would need to happen is my focus here.

* * *

To say a bit about my experience, I have been engaging the public using a co-authored (with Kristina Grob) freely available, open-access introductory book, Thinking Critically About Abortion (2019) (available at AbortionArguments.com, reposted many other places, also a $5.38 paperback), blog posts on further questions and misunderstandings, articles in three ethics anthologies (2020), articles in publications like Salon (2021, 2022) and Areo (2019), videos on YouTube and TikTok, discussions on podcasts and in public forums, and more. 

These materials are not “pro-choice cheerleading” or any form of partisan hackery. They support a pro-choice perspective, but they critique bad arguments and misunderstandings from both anti-abortion and pro-choice perspectives and acknowledge insights from both “sides”: abortion critics are correct in some of their claims, even if their overall position is not supported by good arguments. 

My basic motivation for this ethics-educational outreach is this:

  • legal attempts to ban and restrict abortion are primarily motivated by the moral outlook that abortion is murder, a human-rights violation, and unjust; 

  • but, there are no good reasons to believe that, in general, abortion is wrong: the arguments that are given to think this, especially the simplistic arguments that most anti-abortion advocates actually appeal to, are demonstrably poor arguments; and good arguments can be given for a broadly pro-choice position;

  • so, more people knowing this and understanding why this is so this might do some good in helping to undercut legal efforts against abortion: some anti-abortion advocates might lose confidence in their views; pro-choice people would be better able to explain and justify their own views; there would be positive effects for the moderate middle majority.

None of these educational efforts would, in themselves, “solve” the tangible legal and political challenges against abortion. But they could do some good and so are worth trying, especially since not doing this does not appear to be working out well, from pro-choice perspectives. 

Since a root of anti-abortion legal efforts are the moral claims of murder and injustice, it makes sense to explain why these claims are not supported by strong arguments and why a broadly pro-choice view is supported by better arguments. At least 80% of trained philosophers (PhilPapers survey 2020) seem to agree with these judgments, but few ethicists—even those who are recognized experts on the topic—are engaged in public discussions of abortion: in contrast, there are many highly visible anti-abortion intellectuals who regularly engage the public on the issues. This might give a false impression that the anti-abortion case is stronger when, in fact, it is weaker: ethicists working to correct anyone’s mistaken impressions here might help.

* * *

To share the reactions to my ethics-educational activities, I have gotten many encouraging and appreciative responses from people from all around the world who report learning a lot from these educational materials. I have also gotten a lot of appreciation for my (usually!?) calm, fair, respectful, and friendly ways of engaging these issues since insults, anger, and hate seem to be common in discussions of abortion. 

[Engaging abortion debates has steered my interests toward understanding the impact of various cognitive biases, like confirmation bias and motivated reasoning, tribalism, cults, groupthink, echo chambers, epistemic bubbles, the denial of expertise, and other social and personal influences that usually preclude and distort understanding and responsible inquiry. Abortion is a useful topic to study how we can better think about controversial issues in general, and help identify what our parts can be to enable and encourage better dialogue and discussion of all issues. (Note: I cut this paragraph from the final version)].

I have, however, gotten a lot of negative reactions, including from pro-choice people, which leads me to my observation that most vocal pro-choice people do not care about engaging abortion ethics: they believe that abortion is obviously not wrong and that anyone who thinks otherwise is ignorant, ill-motivated, or evil. Some pro-choicers argue it’s offensive to engage people who disagree, claiming that’s like arguing with slaveholders, but forgetting that arguments were given against slavery, which contributed to positive change.

Abortion-advocacy organizations also appear to have zero interest in engaging in anything about ethics: indeed, they actively avoid the issues. Mary Ziegler (2020) reports in a The Atlantic article that, since the 1990s, pro-choice advocates have deliberately avoided engaging ethical questions about abortion; they have focused solely on the legal freedom to choose abortion. 

We don’t know what would have happened if pro-choice organizations had attempted to duplicate the types of ethics-education efforts that anti-abortion advocates have engaged in for decades (e.g., trainings, books, “apologetics”): perhaps we’d be in the same place we are now. 

If the “let’s avoid ethics” strategy was based on the assumption that the legal right to abortion could not be lost, that is turning out to be a mistaken assumption. Some pro-choice people appear to have this sort of outlook: “We don’t care about ethics, or your ethics; we have the legal right to have abortions and that’s all that matters!” This attitude can work, until that legal right is challenged and, perhaps, lost.

In sum, enthusiastic pro-choice advocates tend to think it’s simply and obviously not wrong and should be legal, and so so have little interest in insights from ethicists on how to better understand, present and, perhaps, move their ethical message. But it does not appear that not attempting to undermine the, or a, root cause of the legal attacks—the belief that abortion is a great evil—has helped: the pro-choice cause is not better off for not engaging in ethics education. 

* * *

I will conclude with some observations of common misunderstandings of the issues, which might help ethicists better engage abortion in a variety of forums. 

Of course, both sides often offer “bumper sticker” slogans in favor of their position that are just question-begging assumptions of their own views. Beyond that: 

anti-abortion advocates:

  • tend to accept a naive “scientism” that contributes to their thinking that the scientific facts that fetuses are biologically alive, biologically human, and biologically human organisms simply entails that abortion is wrong; 

  • tend to not realize, and actively deny, that people sometimes mean different things by “human beings” and “when life begins”; 

  • tend to be ignorant of the fact that what makes anyone (or anything) have moral rights, or be otherwise wrong to kill, is a hard, theoretical question, and the best candidates for better explanations here do not include simply that the being is biologically human or even that the being is a biologically human organism

  • tend to not think about whether or how the right to life could be a right to someone else’s body, and related issues; and:

pro-choice advocates:

  • often mistakenly assume that the case against abortion is merely religious: they do not know abortion foes often see abortion as a “human rights” violation, which is a misunderstanding that results, in part, from human rights advocates poorly stating their views;

  • too often deny that fetuses are “alive” or “life” and “human” and so appear ignorant since fetuses clearly are that in a biological sense;

  • often mistakenly assume that anyone’s lacking a (moral or legal) right to anyone else’s body simply settles the issue;

  • often assume that abortion restrictions are motivated by the goal of controlling women and not motivated by the belief that abortion is murder: even if this is true, the ethical task of undercutting their arguments and giving better arguments might do more good than not (Jolly 2022). 

In sum, the basic questions are these: what do pro-choice efforts have to lose in engaging ethics, with ethicists? Nothing. What do they, we, have to gain? Potentially a lot, and so ethics demands engaging ethics, with ethicists.

Citations

Grob, Kristina and Nobis, Nathan. “Defining ‘Abortion’ and Critiquing Common Arguments about Abortion.” In Fischer, Bob. College Ethics: A Reader on Moral Issues that Affect You, 2nd Ed. Oxford University Press. 2020.

Jolly, K.S. “The Feminist Case for Debating Abortion Ethics.” DefendingFeminism.com. May 5, 2022. https://defendingfeminism.com/2022/05/05/the-feminist-case-for-debating-abortion-ethics/ 

Nobis, Nathan and Grob, Kristina. Thinking Critically About Abortion: Why Most Abortions Aren’t Wrong and Why All Abortions Should be Legal. Open Philosophy Press. 2019. http://www.AbortionArguments.com 

Nobis, Nathan and Grob, Kristina. “Abortion and Soundbites: Why Pro-Choice Arguments Are Harder to Make.” Areo Magazine. July 23, 2019. https://areomagazine.com/2019/07/23/abortion-and-soundbites-why-pro-choice-arguments-are-harder-to-make/ 

Nobis, Nathan and Dudley, Jonathan. “Why the case against abortion is weak, ethically speaking.” Salon. April 11, 2021. https://www.salon.com/2021/04/11/why-the-case-against-abortion-is-weak-ethically-speaking/  

Nobis, Nathan. “I’m a philosophy professor. The argument for making abortion illegal is illogical.” Salon. December 4, 2021. https://www.salon.com/2021/12/04/logic-arguments-abortion-rights/ 

Nobis, Nathan. “When does ‘life’ begin? When it comes to abortion, it depends on what you mean by ‘life.’” Salon. April 2, 2022. https://www.salon.com/2022/04/02/when-does-life-begin-when-it-comes-to-abortion-it-depends-on-what-you-mean-by-life/   

PhilPapers. “Survey Results: Abortion.” PhilPapers 2020 Survey. https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4974 

Watson, Katie. “The Ethics of Access: Reframing the Need for Abortion Care as a Health Disparity.” American Journal of Bioethics. 2022. 

Ziegler, Mary. “How Raphael Warnock Came to Be an Abortion-Rights Outlier.” The Atlantic. December 31, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/12/liberal-religion-abortion/617491/ 




 

Wednesday, May 14, 2025

The Ethics of Abortion in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Ethics of Abortion

First published Wed May 14, 2025

Abortion is the intentional termination of a pregnancy, either via surgery or via the taking of medication. Ordinary people disagree about abortion: many people think abortion is deeply morally wrong, while many others think abortion is morally permissible. Philosophy has much to contribute to this discussion, by distinguishing and clarifying different arguments against abortion, distinguishing and clarifying different responses to those arguments, offering novel arguments against abortion, offering novel defenses of abortion, and offering novel views about the relevant issues at stake.

This entry’s central question is: is abortion morally wrong? This question has important legal and political implications. If abortion is morally wrong, it is nevertheless an open and further question whether abortion should be outlawed or legally restricted in some way. It is also a substantive question how a society should decide whether to outlaw or restrict abortion. This entry focuses on the moral question and does not delve into these important legal and political questions.

The first six parts of this entry present six arguments against abortion. Subsections of those parts present responses to these arguments – that is, defenses of abortion. The seventh part discusses why the ethics of abortion matters.

Sunday, May 11, 2025

An objection to Marquis

Don Marquis argues that abortion is wrong. This is a question concerning an objection to his argument. 

This objection is abstract and depends on the “metaphysics” of objects. It begins with the observation that there are single objects with parts with space between them. Indeed almost every object is like this, if you could look close enough: it’s not just single dinette sets, since there is literally some space between the parts of most physical objects. From this, it follows that there seem to be single objects such as an-egg-and-the-sperm-that-would-fertilize-it. And these would also seem to have a future of value, given how Marquis describes this concept. (It should be made clear that sperm and eggs alone do not have futures of value, and Marquis does not claim they do: this is not the objection here). The problem is that contraception, even by abstinence, prevents that thing’s future of value from materializing, and so seems to be wrong when we use Marquis’s reasoning. Since contraception is not wrong, but his general premise suggests that it is, it seems that preventing something from experiencing its valuable future isn’t always wrong and so Marquis’s argument appears to be unsound. 

 A similar objection is developed in Alastair Norcross's "Killing, Abortion, and Contraception: A Reply to Marquis," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87, No. 5 (May, 1990), pp. 268-277. 

 My questions are: how does Marquis (and others) respond to this objection? And what's a stronger response, any of their responses or the objection?

ChatGPT said:

This is a well-known and important objection to Don Marquis’s "future like ours" argument against abortion, and you're right to connect it to metaphysical concerns about the identity and persistence of objects, especially in the context of contraception.

Marquis's Argument Recap

Marquis argues that abortion is wrong because it deprives the fetus of a "future like ours"—that is, a future full of experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments. His account hinges on the idea that what makes killing wrong, in general, is the loss of such a valuable future, and since fetuses have such futures, abortion is (prima facie) seriously wrong.


The Objection from Contraception (and Metaphysics of Objects)

The objection you outlined essentially says:

  • If a fetus has a future of value and it's wrong to prevent that future, then anything that prevents that future—such as contraception or even abstinence—should also be wrong.

  • After all, there exists (or could be said to exist) some "composite entity" (the sperm-and-egg pair) that has a future of value if fertilization occurs.

  • But contraception is not wrong, so something must be wrong with the reasoning that leads to that conclusion.

This is closely related to Norcross’s 1990 paper, where he argues that Marquis’s theory leads to counterintuitive results unless some ad hoc restrictions are added.


Marquis’s Response

Marquis does respond to this objection, both in his original paper and elsewhere:

  1. No identifiable subject:
    Marquis argues that in the case of contraception or abstinence, there is no identifiable individual (no determinate subject) that is being deprived of a valuable future. Until fertilization occurs, there is no being who can be said to have a future of value—there are only separate gametes. Only after conception do we have an entity that can be said to have its own future.

  2. Metaphysical distinctions:
    He maintains that we are not obligated to count every possible combination of egg and sperm as a thing that already has a future. The fact that they could lead to a valuable future if combined does not imply that they currently possess one. This avoids the absurd consequence that every instance of contraception or even choosing not to have sex would be morally wrong.

  3. Avoiding counterintuitive implications:
    He argues that abortion is different because in that case we do have an actual being (the fetus) who exists and has a determinate future. That’s very different from hypothetical futures that might occur if different combinations of gametes were united.


Philosophical Evaluation

So, how strong is this response?

In favor of Marquis’s response:

  • Ontological clarity: Many philosophers agree that there's a morally relevant difference between preventing a being from coming into existence and killing a being that already exists. Marquis leverages that distinction.

  • Avoiding explosion: If the objection were correct, then it would lead to the absurd conclusion that nearly every sexual decision (including abstinence) is morally equivalent to killing—something most would reject.

In favor of the objection (Norcross and others):

  • Question-begging metaphysics: Critics argue that Marquis’s reliance on identity after conception begs the question, assuming that "being an individual with a future" begins at conception. But this is a contentious metaphysical claim, not a moral principle.

  • Arbitrariness: The objection presses Marquis on why fertilization should be the decisive moment that grants moral status. Why not earlier or later? If preventing a valuable future is what makes killing wrong, why does it only count after conception?


Assessment

The objection is philosophically significant and hard to dismiss. It shows that Marquis's view depends on controversial metaphysical assumptions about when an entity comes to have a future of value. His response—that there's no identifiable subject prior to conception—is widely accepted by many, but it does not decisively refute the objection.

So, which is stronger? That depends on which metaphysical commitments you find more plausible:

  • If you agree that only existing individuals can have rights or a future of value, then Marquis's reply is fairly strong.

  • If you're suspicious of making deep metaphysical assumptions do so much moral work, and you see potential futures as morally relevant even before conception, then Norcross’s objection may seem stronger.

Sunday, May 4, 2025

Chat GPT: Please create a quiz to test people's basic competence on the ethical issues about abortion.

Please create a quiz to test people's basic competence on the ethical issues about abortion. [A follow up on this quiz!)

ChatGPT said:

Here's a Basic Ethics of Abortion Quiz designed to assess fundamental understanding of the main ethical issues and arguments surrounding abortion. It includes multiple-choice and short-answer questions.


Basic Ethics of Abortion Quiz

Part 1: Multiple Choice (1 point each)

Choose the best answer for each question.

  1. Which of the following is a common pro-choice ethical argument?
    A. Life begins at conception
    B. Abortion is murder
    C. Women have a right to bodily autonomy
    D. Fetuses are sentient from the moment of conception

  2. Which philosopher is best known for the analogy of the unconscious violinist to argue for abortion rights?
    A. Judith Jarvis Thomson
    B. Don Marquis
    C. Peter Singer
    D. Rosalind Hursthouse

  3. Which of the following is an argument often used by anti-abortion advocates?
    A. Fetuses are not biologically human
    B. Abortion reduces overpopulation
    C. Abortion is morally wrong because it intentionally kills an innocent human being
    D. Women should not have to justify their decisions

  4. What is the primary claim of Don Marquis's "future like ours" argument against abortion?
    A. Fetuses are persons from conception
    B. Abortion is wrong because it deprives the fetus of a valuable future
    C. Only sentient beings have moral rights
    D. Abortion is a religious issue, not a philosophical one

  5. What does the term “personhood” typically refer to in debates about abortion?
    A. The biological development of a fetus
    B. The legal rights of women
    C. The moral status or value of a being
    D. A religious designation of life

Part 2: True/False (1 point each)

Indicate whether the statement is true or false.

  1. All pro-choice arguments depend on denying that fetuses are biologically human.

  2. Judith Jarvis Thomson accepts, for the sake of argument, that the fetus is a person in her famous essay.

  3. According to virtue ethics, the morality of abortion can depend on the character and motives of the person choosing it.

  4. Legal permissibility and moral permissibility are always the same.

  5. The principle of bodily autonomy means others may never override your choices about your body.

Part 3: Short Answer (2–3 sentences each; 5 points each)

  1. Briefly explain the difference between “biological humanity” and “moral personhood” in abortion ethics.

  2. What is the main point of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, and how does it relate to abortion?

  3. How might a virtue ethicist approach the question of whether abortion is morally acceptable?

  4. Why might someone argue that even if abortion is killing, it is not necessarily murder?

  5. What is one challenge or weakness of the “future like ours” argument against abortion?


Would you like a version with an answer key or formatted for classroom use (e.g., printable or online quiz)?

You said:
Yes, please create an answer key!
ChatGPT said:

Here's the Answer Key for the Basic Ethics of Abortion Quiz:


Answer Key: Basic Ethics of Abortion Quiz

Part 1: Multiple Choice

  1. C. Women have a right to bodily autonomy

  2. A. Judith Jarvis Thomson

  3. C. Abortion is morally wrong because it intentionally kills an innocent human being

  4. B. Abortion is wrong because it deprives the fetus of a valuable future

  5. C. The moral status or value of a being

Part 2: True/False

  1. False – Many pro-choice arguments acknowledge biological humanity but deny moral personhood or prioritize other moral considerations.

  2. True – Thomson grants, for the sake of argument, that the fetus is a person to focus on bodily rights.

  3. True – Virtue ethics evaluates the character and motives behind actions, not just the act itself.

  4. False – Something can be legal but morally wrong, or morally acceptable but illegal.

  5. False – Bodily autonomy is important, but in ethics and law, it can sometimes be overridden (e.g., quarantine, conscription).

Part 3: Short Answer (Sample answers below; variations acceptable as long as reasoning is sound)

  1. Biological humanity refers to whether a being is biologically human (e.g., has human DNA). Moral personhood concerns whether the being has moral rights, such as the right to life, often linked to consciousness, sentience, or other traits.

  2. Thomson's violinist analogy argues that even if the fetus is a person, a pregnant woman is not morally obligated to remain "plugged in" to sustain its life. It illustrates the idea that the right to life does not entail the right to use another person's body.

  3. A virtue ethicist would consider whether choosing an abortion reflects virtues like compassion, responsibility, or wisdom. They would assess the context and motivation, not just whether the act meets a rule.

  4. Someone might argue that while abortion ends a life, it is not murder because murder requires wrongful intent to kill a person with full moral status. If the fetus lacks personhood or the killing is justified, it may not be murder.

  5. One challenge is that it assumes fetuses have the same kind of valuable future as adult humans, but critics argue fetuses lack psychological connection to that future or that contraception would be wrong by the same logic.