Monday, May 26, 2025

Scott Klusendorf on abortion

NN: someone asked me to respond to this. So I did. 

ChatGPT: Here is a short essay on abortion by Scott Klusendorf that presents some considerations against abortion. I wonder what you think of the arguments; please identify some of the basic concerns here and tell us what would need to be addressed to make this case stronger, please. 

First, the essay:

. . . 

It is a privilege to consider with you today how the crucial realms of philosophy and theology intersect, particularly as we are called to defend the precious gift of human life in a culture that increasingly challenges its fundamental value. Our aim, in considering these matters, is quite simple: to equip ourselves with powerful and persuasive pro-life arguments and to refine our tactics and strategies for engaging people who do not necessarily share a biblical worldview on this vital topic.

Reflecting on my own journey, I’ve learned that navigating the complexities of the abortion issue, especially when finding oneself on the “hot seat,” requires a different approach than I might have taken in my younger days, before becoming more adept at handling these arguments. Often, when faced with a rapid-fire assault of points – the unborn aren’t persons, consciousness is required for a right to life, objections based on rape or mental health, and so forth – the most helpful initial step is simply to slow down the pace of the exchange. This allows us to move out of an immediate defensive or “attack mode”.

Consider a recent discussion I had with a stranger. The issue of abortion arose, and his core assertion was this: until you have self-awareness, there is no right to life. [NN: I don't say this; many don't] My goal in such an exchange is no longer primarily to force the other person to admit I am right; frankly, that rarely happens, and it requires significant mental courage and processing time to shift one’s deeply held position. Instead, I sought to adopt a strategy of asking questions and striving to understand his perspective rather than merely refuting it.

Deconstructing the “Personhood” Argument

My colleague was quite willing to grant a point often debated elsewhere: that the unborn are, scientifically speaking, human beings. He acknowledged that combining sperm and egg results in a new living thing. However, for him, being human was insufficient; species membership meant nothing. What mattered was personhood, which he grounded in having self-awareness and the ability to value one’s existence over time. If these capacities were not immediately exercisable, he argued, one might be a potential person, but not an actual one.

In earlier days, I might have immediately launched into counter-examples to dismantle this position. And it is true that whenever one attempts to divorce the concept of “human being” from “human person,” a “train wreck of counter examples” inevitably follows, demonstrating the untenability of the view. [NN: no, most people agree on this: they don't think they are (=) a body]  But on this occasion, I chose to draw him out with a series of questions.

First, addressing his claim that species membership doesn’t matter, I asked: “Tell me why species membership does not matter. Why should we just say that being a member of the species homo sapien is irrelevant to the question of human value?“. This wasn’t something he had evidently given deep thought to. Yet, we intuitively recognize that species membership does matter. Consider the stark difference in our reaction to a hit-and-run involving a squirrel versus one involving a newborn infant, even a severely disabled one whose cognitive ability is minimal. Why the difference? Because we recognize, at a fundamental level, the inherent value tied to being human. As Christopher Kaser aptly puts it, there’s a profound difference between eating a hamburger and eating a Harold burger, regardless of Harold’s cognitive state.

Our understanding of pathology also underscores the significance of species nature. A dog unable to read is not a tragedy; a 16-year-old girl unable to read is one. Why? Because she is failing to flourish according to her nature as a human being. It is inherent to human nature to potentially read, think abstractly, and process complex ideas in a way that is simply not part of a dog’s nature. Thus, species membership – or more precisely, nature – is intrinsically linked to our understanding of potential, flourishing, and value.

Following this, I posed a second question to challenge the concept of a human non-person directly: “Have you ever met a human that wasn’t a person? Have you ever met a human being that was not a person?“. [NN: no, most people do not think that all living human bodies are persons] This question, asked gently to seek clarity rather than effect a “gotcha,” pressed him to describe what such an entity would look like. Would it be someone with Alzheimer’s? Someone with severe cognitive disabilities? He struggled to articulate a clear picture.

My third primary question went to the heart of his assertion: “You say that we must be self-aware to have a right to life. What do you mean by self-awareness?”. This is a crucial question we must consistently ask, as people often make claims without defining their terms. I explored the possibilities: Did he mean actual self-awareness? That would strip us of personhood when we sleep. Did he mean the immediately exercisable capacity for self-awareness? This would mean we lose personhood under anesthesia. Did he mean a natural capacity for self-awareness, even if not immediately exercisable? This standard, while protecting those asleep, under anesthesia, or in a reversible coma, would also protect the standard fetus and embryo, which possess this same natural capacity. Pressing for definition helps uncover the implications and potential inconsistencies of their position.

These questions are not merely tools for winning arguments; they are means to help people think more deeply and clearly about their own foundational assumptions. As Christian ambassadors, our role is to help others think within the framework of truth, not simply to “beat” them with logic.

My fourth and final question gently asked him to consider the implications of his view. If self-awareness is the sole determinant of the right to life, we must understand that this standard is failed not only by fetuses and embryos but also by newborns and even toddlers. Research suggests a meaningful sense of self-awareness doesn’t develop until close to age three. [NN: again, at least I don't propose anything like this, and many do not]  Philosophers who defend this view explicitly state that if self-awareness is the decisive trait, it logically permits infanticide and the killing of toddlers. The critic must grapple with the fact that their argument proves too much, opening the door to far more than just abortion. Furthermore, this view endangers cognitively impaired individuals.

Beyond proving too much, grounding human value and the right to life in cognitive ability has a devastating impact on the concept of human equality. Our culture is preoccupied with various forms of equality. But what is the fundamental basis of human equality in the first place? If it is cognitive ability, then those with more cognitive ability would logically have a greater right to life and be fundamentally more valuable than those with less. This leads to a hierarchical view where academics might have greater fundamental rights than blue-collar workers, which clearly contradicts our intuitive and societal understanding of equality. [No: this is is baseless: nobody argues that smart people have "stronger" rights than the not smart. There's no good reason to believe this.]

Moreover, relying on a trait like cognitive ability or self-awareness creates “episodic problems”. If having the immediately exercisable ability is what gives us value and a right to life, then we literally pop in and out of existence as persons whenever we temporarily lose that capacity – while sleeping deeply, under anesthesia, or in a coma. This is an untenable foundation for human dignity, equality, and the fundamental right to life. [No, this is foolish and shows that he doesn't understand the general view: taking a nap doesn't mean there's no longer a person there or the being has lost all rights.]

Grounding Value in Nature

There is a better, more solid way to ground human value: not in the traits that come and go and that none of us share equally, but in the one thing we all share in common as human beings – a human nature. When rights are grounded in nature rather than the immediately exercisable traits that stem from that nature, we establish a firmer basis for human dignity, equality, and the right to life. [No, this is foolish and shows that he doesn't understand the views: one view is that our "nature" is being a conscious being: it's not about what bodies we have.]

Consider the example of an amoeba and an early human embryo, borrowing an analogy from Stephanie Gay Connors. Neither is self-aware. An amoeba isn’t self-aware because it is simply not in its nature to be. A human embryo, however, is not yet self-aware because it needs time to grow and mature. It is in its nature, as a human being, to develop the capacity for self-awareness. By grounding human dignity and rights in this common human nature, we avoid the trap of declaring some humans more valuable than others based on the degree to which they possess certain traits. This approach bypasses the problem of “savage inequality”. [No: this is is baseless: nobody argues that smart people have "stronger" rights than the not smart. There's no good reason to believe this.]

ChatGPT said:

Thank you for sharing this essay. It presents a thoughtful and rhetorically engaging case against abortion, primarily by challenging the “personhood” argument often used to justify abortion rights. The approach is dialogical and gentle, aiming to ask clarifying questions rather than aggressively refute. That is an effective and often more persuasive rhetorical strategy. That said, for the argument to be strengthened philosophically and practically, there are several issues and assumptions that should be addressed or clarified. Here's a breakdown:

🔍 1. Conflating Species Membership with Moral Status

The central claim is that human beings have intrinsic moral value because of their human nature or species membership. But this is precisely the point that many critics challenge.

  • Concern: The argument assumes that simply being biologically human confers moral status, but this needs to be argued for, not just assumed or intuited. Many philosophers (e.g., Peter Singer, Mary Anne Warren) argue that moral status depends on certain capacities, not species membership.

  • Improvement: The essay could engage more deeply with the “speciesism” objection—i.e., the idea that privileging humans simply because they are human is akin to racism or sexism unless a morally relevant characteristic is identified. Why should “being human” matter morally, rather than being rational, sentient, or able to suffer?

🔍 2. Ambiguity Around “Nature”

The essay invokes “human nature” as the grounding for rights and value, but it does not fully define what that means.

  • Concern: What exactly is “human nature”? Is it a metaphysical essence? A biological kind? A set of typical developmental capacities? If not clearly defined, it risks begging the question or becoming too vague to be a useful foundation for moral rights.

  • Improvement: Clarify whether “nature” refers to a metaphysical soul (as in some theological traditions), a biological kind (species), or a teleological set of developmental potentials. Different meanings will carry different implications, and critics will need to know what they are being asked to accept.

🔍 3. Problem of Marginal Cases

The essay uses the “problem of marginal cases” (e.g., people with Alzheimer’s, those asleep or under anesthesia) to challenge cognitive criteria for personhood. While this is a common and potentially powerful objection, it can be turned around.

  • Concern: Critics can argue that being a person is a matter of having had, or being expected to regain, certain capacities—not having them right now. Fetuses that have never had them may still differ in morally relevant ways from sleeping or temporarily unconscious persons.

  • Improvement: Address the “actual vs. potential” personhood distinction more rigorously. Why should potential for rationality or self-awareness ground the same rights as actual possession of these traits? How do we draw moral distinctions between potential and actual capacities in other cases (e.g., a seed and a tree)?

🔍 4. Dismissal of the Consciousness Criterion

The essay critiques the idea that self-awareness is necessary for a right to life by noting it would justify infanticide or inequality. This is a fair rhetorical point, but more work is needed.

  • Concern: It assumes that a view is false or bad if it has uncomfortable implications (e.g., infanticide), but moral truth may not always align with intuitive comfort. The fact that a view has "disturbing" consequences doesn’t alone refute it.

  • Improvement: Engage with philosophers like Michael Tooley or Jeff McMahan, who openly accept the implications (e.g., that infanticide might sometimes be morally permissible). Simply pointing out these implications is not a philosophical refutation unless you argue they are actually false or morally abhorrent for non-question-begging reasons.

🔍 5. Neglect of Bodily Autonomy Arguments

The essay entirely ignores perhaps the most powerful and widespread defense of abortion: bodily autonomy.

  • Concern: Even if we accept that the fetus is a person with a right to life, this does not necessarily entail a right to use someone else’s body to survive. Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous “Violinist” argument makes this point forcefully.

  • Improvement: A stronger version of the essay would acknowledge and respond to bodily rights arguments. How does the fetus’s right to life interact with the pregnant person’s right to bodily integrity? Can you force someone to remain pregnant against their will even to save a life?

🔍 6. Reliance on Intuition-Based Moral Reasoning

Much of the essay relies on what “we all know,” “we intuitively believe,” or what seems obviously wrong (e.g., eating Harold). While intuitive appeals are rhetorically useful, they are philosophically fragile.

  • Concern: Intuitions vary across cultures, individuals, and time. Without independent justification, they cannot serve as firm foundations for moral conclusions.

  • Improvement: Support the intuitions with reasoned ethical principles or argue why these intuitions are especially reliable or universal.

🔍 7. Absence of Consideration for Women's Rights and Social Context

The essay focuses entirely on the moral status of the fetus and avoids discussing the complex social, economic, medical, and emotional realities surrounding pregnancy and abortion.

  • Concern: A persuasive argument against abortion must address the pregnant person’s interests and rights. Ignoring these can make the view seem one-sided or abstractly moralistic.

  • Improvement: Include a recognition of the real burdens of pregnancy, the moral complexity of the situation, and how the proposed moral view addresses or justifies these burdens.

Summary of Main Suggestions to Strengthen the Argument:

WeaknessHow to Improve
Assumes species membership grounds rightsAddress speciesism directly; justify why being human matters morally
Vague use of “human nature”Define clearly—biological, metaphysical, developmental?
Dismisses rival views via uncomfortable implicationsAddress views like Tooley’s and Thomson’s directly, not just rhetorically
Ignores bodily autonomyEngage with arguments like Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “Violinist”
Relies on moral intuitions without groundingGround them in principles (e.g., rights, dignity) or metaethical reasoning
Omits consideration of women’s rights and burdensAcknowledge and grapple with the moral complexity for pregnant individuals

Would you like help rewriting parts of this essay to make it more philosophically robust while preserving its overall message and tone?

It seems like another issue is that it only addresses some idea that to be a person or wrong to kill, the being has to be self-conscious. Is that a fault?

ChatGPT said:

Yes, that's an important observation — and a genuine weakness in the argument as it currently stands.

❗ The Essay Attacks a Narrow Version of the Pro-Choice View

The pro-life essay focuses on refuting the claim that "self-awareness is required for a right to life" or that only self-conscious beings are persons. It then tries to show that this criterion leads to absurd or uncomfortable conclusions (e.g., that sleeping people aren’t persons, or that toddlers could be killed). But here’s the problem:

👉 Most contemporary defenses of abortion do not rely on self-awareness as the decisive criterion.

Instead, they often appeal to:

  • Sentience (the capacity to feel pain or pleasure)

  • Consciousness in general (not self-consciousness specifically)

  • Having interests or a point of view

  • The ability to experience harm or benefit

  • Future-oriented agency (e.g., plans, preferences)

  • Or, most importantly, bodily autonomy (Judith Jarvis Thomson, Elizabeth Harman, David Boonin)

🧠 Why Focusing Only on Self-Awareness is a Problem

  1. Straw man risk: By targeting an extreme or narrow version of the personhood view, the argument avoids engaging with more common and nuanced positions. It may appear persuasive while failing to refute the stronger pro-choice views.

  2. Ignores sentience-based accounts: Many ethicists (including those who oppose infanticide) ground moral status in sentience or the capacity for conscious experience — which begins around 24 weeks gestation, long after most abortions occur. This undermines the claim that the fetus is a rights-holder from conception.

  3. Overlooks broader harm-based reasoning: Even if a fetus isn't self-aware, many thinkers argue that what makes killing wrong is that it frustrates interests, not necessarily that the being has self-awareness at the moment.

  4. Fails to address autonomy-based arguments: The self-awareness criterion says nothing about whether someone may be morally required to use their body to support another life — which is often the real crux of the abortion debate.

✅ What Would Make the Argument Better?

To strengthen the essay, it would need to:

  • Acknowledge that many pro-choice arguments use broader criteria (sentience, interests, etc.) and don’t rely on self-awareness alone.

  • Respond to those broader views: Why is sentience not sufficient? Why aren't future interests enough?

  • Address bodily autonomy directly, explaining why the fetus’s right to life should override a pregnant person’s right to control their body.

  • Clarify why grounding rights in human nature is philosophically more compelling than grounding them in current cognitive or experiential capacities.

🧩 Bottom Line

Yes, the essay's focus on self-awareness is a fault. It critiques a narrow view and leaves more central, widely held arguments for abortion rights untouched. This limits its persuasive force for readers who are familiar with the broader landscape of ethical thought on abortion.



Here were some comments from me, along the way: the "embed" too wasn't working well at the time though.

"his core assertion was this: until you have self-awareness, there is no right to life." I don't say this.
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"his core assertion was this: until you have self-awareness, there is no right to life." I don't say this.
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