An objection to Marquis

Don Marquis argues that abortion is wrong. This is a question concerning an objection to his argument. 

This objection is abstract and depends on the “metaphysics” of objects. It begins with the observation that there are single objects with parts with space between them. Indeed almost every object is like this, if you could look close enough: it’s not just single dinette sets, since there is literally some space between the parts of most physical objects. From this, it follows that there seem to be single objects such as an-egg-and-the-sperm-that-would-fertilize-it. And these would also seem to have a future of value, given how Marquis describes this concept. (It should be made clear that sperm and eggs alone do not have futures of value, and Marquis does not claim they do: this is not the objection here). The problem is that contraception, even by abstinence, prevents that thing’s future of value from materializing, and so seems to be wrong when we use Marquis’s reasoning. Since contraception is not wrong, but his general premise suggests that it is, it seems that preventing something from experiencing its valuable future isn’t always wrong and so Marquis’s argument appears to be unsound. 

 A similar objection is developed in Alastair Norcross's "Killing, Abortion, and Contraception: A Reply to Marquis," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87, No. 5 (May, 1990), pp. 268-277. 

 My questions are: how does Marquis (and others) respond to this objection? And what's a stronger response, any of their responses or the objection?

ChatGPT said:

This is a well-known and important objection to Don Marquis’s "future like ours" argument against abortion, and you're right to connect it to metaphysical concerns about the identity and persistence of objects, especially in the context of contraception.

Marquis's Argument Recap

Marquis argues that abortion is wrong because it deprives the fetus of a "future like ours"—that is, a future full of experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments. His account hinges on the idea that what makes killing wrong, in general, is the loss of such a valuable future, and since fetuses have such futures, abortion is (prima facie) seriously wrong.

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The Objection from Contraception (and Metaphysics of Objects)

The objection you outlined essentially says:

• If a fetus has a future of value and it's wrong to prevent that future, then anything that prevents that future—such as contraception or even abstinence—should also be wrong.

• After all, there exists (or could be said to exist) some "composite entity" (the sperm-and-egg pair) that has a future of value if fertilization occurs.

• But contraception is not wrong, so something must be wrong with the reasoning that leads to that conclusion.

This is closely related to Norcross’s 1990 paper, where he argues that Marquis’s theory leads to counterintuitive results unless some ad hoc restrictions are added.

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Marquis’s Response

Marquis does respond to this objection, both in his original paper and elsewhere:

1. No identifiable subject:
   Marquis argues that in the case of contraception or abstinence, there is no identifiable individual (no determinate subject) that is being deprived of a valuable future. Until fertilization occurs, there is no being who can be said to have a future of value—there are only separate gametes. Only after conception do we have an entity that can be said to have its own future.

2. Metaphysical distinctions:
   He maintains that we are not obligated to count every possible combination of egg and sperm as a thing that already has a future. The fact that they could lead to a valuable future if combined does not imply that they currently possess one. This avoids the absurd consequence that every instance of contraception or even choosing not to have sex would be morally wrong.

3. Avoiding counterintuitive implications:
   He argues that abortion is different because in that case we do have an actual being (the fetus) who exists and has a determinate future. That’s very different from hypothetical futures that might occur if different combinations of gametes were united.

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Philosophical Evaluation

So, how strong is this response?

In favor of Marquis’s response:

• Ontological clarity: Many philosophers agree that there's a morally relevant difference between preventing a being from coming into existence and killing a being that already exists. Marquis leverages that distinction.

• Avoiding explosion: If the objection were correct, then it would lead to the absurd conclusion that nearly every sexual decision (including abstinence) is morally equivalent to killing—something most would reject.

In favor of the objection (Norcross and others):

• Question-begging metaphysics: Critics argue that Marquis’s reliance on identity after conception begs the question, assuming that "being an individual with a future" begins at conception. But this is a contentious metaphysical claim, not a moral principle.

• Arbitrariness: The objection presses Marquis on why fertilization should be the decisive moment that grants moral status. Why not earlier or later? If preventing a valuable future is what makes killing wrong, why does it only count after conception?

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Assessment

The objection is philosophically significant and hard to dismiss. It shows that Marquis's view depends on controversial metaphysical assumptions about when an entity comes to have a future of value. His response—that there's no identifiable subject prior to conception—is widely accepted by many, but it does not decisively refute the objection.

So, which is stronger? That depends on which metaphysical commitments you find more plausible:

• If you agree that only existing individuals can have rights or a future of value, then Marquis's reply is fairly strong.

• If you're suspicious of making deep metaphysical assumptions do so much moral work, and you see potential futures as morally relevant even before conception, then Norcross’s objection may seem stronger.