Are Early Abortions Wrong? Ethical Theories, Consciousness, and the Moral Irrelevance of Biology
Many people believe that abortion is wrong because it involves ending the life of a biologically human organism. However, philosophical investigation into the ethics of abortion suggests that this stance is mistaken, especially when we consider early abortions, which constitute the majority of abortion cases.
This essay argues that early abortions are not wrong because major ethical theories—such as utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and Rawlsian justice theory—do not condemn early abortion. The reason is that early fetuses and embryos are not conscious or rational beings, and thus, these ethical theories do not regard them as possessing morally relevant features. Morally relevant features include capacities such as consciousness, sentience, rationality, and the ability to value one’s own existence (or anything, for that matter).
Insofar as what can reasonably be seen as the best explanations of what makes actions wrong do not condemn early abortion, we have good reason to think that early abortion is not wrong. Since actions that are not wrong should not be illegal, this helps justify the view that early abortions—indeed, most abortions—should be legal.
1. The common anti-abortion argument and its flaws
A central argument against abortion is that fetuses are biologically human and therefore abortion is morally wrong. This argument is typically expressed in a syllogism:
It is wrong to kill innocent human beings.
Fetuses are innocent human beings.
Therefore, it is wrong to kill fetuses.
This argument equivocates on the term “human being.” On one reading, “human being” refers to any biologically human organism. On another reading, it refers to a person—a being with moral rights. The conclusion of the argument follows only if we assume that all biologically human organisms are persons. But that is precisely what needs to be proven, not assumed. If early fetuses are not persons in the morally relevant sense—that is, if they do not have the properties that make killing wrong—then premise 2 does not support the conclusion.
2. Biological humanity is not morally relevant
Suppose someone argues that embryos and early fetuses are human because they are members of the species Homo sapiens. That is biologically correct. But does being biologically human entail having moral rights? According to major ethical theories, it does not. Consider utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and Rawlsian justice theory.
3. Utilitarianism and sentience
Utilitarianism, especially in its classical form as developed by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, holds that what matters morally is the ability to experience pleasure and pain. Sentience—the capacity to suffer or enjoy—is the key to moral relevance. Bentham famously wrote, “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”
Embryos and early fetuses, prior to the development of a functioning nervous system, cannot suffer or feel pleasure. They lack consciousness altogether. Thus, according to utilitarianism, they do not have interests, and therefore their lives do not have moral weight. Early abortion does not frustrate any interests or cause any suffering. Therefore, it is not morally wrong from a utilitarian perspective.
4. Kantian ethics and rational nature
Kantian ethics centers moral worth on rational nature. For Kant, persons are ends-in-themselves because they are rational agents capable of formulating and following moral laws. Respect for persons means respecting rational agency.
An embryo or early fetus lacks any capacity for rational thought or moral autonomy. It is not a subject of experience or reasoning. It cannot be treated as an end-in-itself because it is not a self at all. Therefore, under Kantian ethics, early fetuses are not beings toward whom we have moral obligations. It is not a violation of duty to terminate a pregnancy at this stage, since no rational being is being harmed or disrespected.
5. Rawlsian justice and the veil of ignorance
John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, constructs principles of justice from the standpoint of the “original position,” where rational agents choose fair principles of cooperation behind a “veil of ignorance.” Behind this veil, individuals do not know their place in society, their abilities, or their conceptions of the good. Importantly, they are rational agents choosing from a position of fairness.
We cannot imagine ourselves as embryos or early fetuses behind the veil of ignorance because such beings lack the rationality and sense of justice that define participants in the original position. The veil of ignorance is meant to exclude knowledge of our particular identity but presupposes that we are rational agents with moral capacities. Embryos and early fetuses do not meet this condition and therefore are not represented in the original position. As a result, principles of justice do not directly apply to them, and early abortion does not violate Rawlsian justice.
6. Why biology alone is not enough
A common objection insists that the biological fact of being a human organism is sufficient for moral consideration. However, if we examine other biological humans, such as brain-dead patients or anencephalic infants (born without the parts of the brain responsible for consciousness), we find that they are often considered not to have full moral rights despite being biologically human. Moral consideration depends not just on species membership, but on the possession of morally relevant features such as consciousness, sentience, or rationality.
What makes killing us wrong is not that we are biological humans, but that we are conscious, feeling beings with interests. Embryos and early fetuses lack minds. Therefore, they lack the very features that make killing wrong in the paradigm cases.
7. Implications for the abortion debate
Given that the most widely accepted ethical theories do not regard embryos and early fetuses as beings with morally relevant characteristics, arguments against early abortion based on biological humanity alone are unconvincing. Instead, we must consider the rights, interests, and autonomy of the pregnant person. The pregnant person is a conscious being with a sense of self and a capacity to value her life and future. Her rights to bodily autonomy, health, and life plans outweigh any claims that might be attributed to a non-conscious embryo.
8. Considering potentiality
Some argue that even if embryos are not persons now, they have the potential to become persons and should be treated as if they already are. However, potentiality does not confer actual rights. A potential president does not have the rights of the actual president. A potential person is not a person.
Moreover, potentiality depends on circumstances. An embryo outside a womb or in a context where the pregnancy will not be carried to term has no realistic potential to become a person. Therefore, basing moral obligations on potentiality is vague and unreliable.
9. Considering continuity
Another objection is the continuity argument: the idea that since we were once embryos, and it would be wrong to kill us now, it was wrong to kill us then. But this argument confuses identity over time with moral relevance over time. Just because an adult was once an embryo does not mean the embryo had the same moral relevance. What matters is not who we were, but what we were like at the time. Moral relevance can develop. We don’t treat infants like adults in terms of rights and responsibilities; morally significant capacities matter.
10. What about late abortion?
This essay has focused on early abortions, which constitute the majority. As pregnancy progresses, the moral considerations change, especially once consciousness and sentience emerge. Even then, abortions later in pregnancy are rare and often performed for serious medical reasons. Philosophical arguments about early abortion do not necessarily apply to late abortion, and vice versa. Still, the ethical focus remains: what morally relevant characteristics are present?
11. Conclusion
Major ethical theories—utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and Rawlsian justice theory—agree on one key point: early fetuses and embryos do not possess the features that make killing wrong. They are not conscious, rational, or capable of experiencing suffering. Arguments against abortion that rely solely on biological humanity ignore what these moral frameworks teach us: morality depends on mental and experiential capacities, not mere species membership. Once we understand this, we see that early abortion is not morally wrong. The real moral concern lies in respecting the rights and autonomy of pregnant people, not in preserving the lives of unconscious biological organisms.
Understanding and accepting this conclusion not only clarifies the ethics of abortion but also encourages more respectful, thoughtful, and rational conversations about one of society’s most emotionally charged issues.
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