Suppose it was argued that, say, it's generally not wrong to kill human embryos and beginning fetuses because, well, no major ethical theory condemns it:
- utilitarianism focuses on sentience, and embryos and beginning fetuses aren't sentient;
- Kantianism focuses on, among other things, being autonomous—being able to make your own choices, which depends on having preferences, will, and reason, all of which embryos and beginning fetuses lack and have never had—and:
- Rawls's theory of justice depends on empathy—being able to see things from others' points of view—but embryos and beginning fetuses lack a point of view and have never had one.
The argument doesn't depend on any particular ethical theory, to which people can respond, "Well, I don't accept that theory!" Rather it depends on a common "pluralistic" approach that attempts to identity a number of plausible fundamental features that make wrong actions wrong—without any fighting to the death over which one really is fundamental—then applying that general approaches to cases.
Three critical responses here to this approach are these:
- argue that at least one of these theories does indeed condemn the killing of embryos, and explain why; or:
- argue that there is (or are) all-things considered better ethical theories, or sets of ethical theories,; explain why; and argue that they do indeed condemn killing embryos and beginning fetuses; or:
- argue that these particular ethical issues about embryos and fetuses are better addressed not in the context of engaging more general theories about what makes wrong actions wrong.
Two other objections to the general argument are this:
- If sentience is the morally relevant feature of living beings, we can't distinguish between non-human animals and humans.
- If it is moral autonomy, then we must accept that infants and very young children don't have moral status (or lesser moral status).
These two objections, however, are weak.
Concerning objection (1), this is an issue that's been engaged for a at least 40-50 years in the ethics and animals philosophical literature: various versions of "What if you were in a situation were you had to kill—or even save—a human being, including a baby, or an animal??! Who would you save??!" have been asked and answered for a very long time.
ATYPICAL RESPONSES
Before reviewing the more typical answers from philosophers, it is worth knowing that some people have argued for, basically, "flipping a coin," in such cases, on the grounds that, in both cases, the animal and the human being have the same to lose, namely, their future lives: all the life they have left to live. So, by their accounting, it's the same loss and so the fair, impartial response would be to flip a coin about who to not kill, or who to save, or whatever. I think philosopher Mark Bernstein has developed a view like this: see his book The Moral Equality of Humans and Animals. and an article "Evaluating the Value of Humans and Animals."
Other have argued that insofar as most (perhaps all) human beings are not "innocent"—they have done wrong and/or have a (sinful) "nature" that predisposes them to wrongdoing—they should not have have moral priority over "innocent" animals, who can't or don't do wrong. Philosophy Lisa Kemmerer develops such an argument in her article "Innocent Threats."
Finally, it's worthwhile to notice that many people with no serious moral commitments to animals—they don't identity as "animal rights" advocates, aren't vegetarian, etc.—quite often express moral solidarity with animals over select especially morally odious humans: e.g., many people say about "big game" hunters and other animal abusers that they would be perfectly willing to do to these humans what they do to animals; one person saying they would save one dog's life over the life of a right-wing MAGA commentator got a huge positive response. So, giving serious, extreme moral priority to animals is not that "extreme," even among ordinary people, at least in terms of how they talk.
TYPICAL RESPONSES
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