Wednesday, May 13, 2020

A Not Optimally Honest Abortion Debate: A Response to Alexandra DeSanctis’s "An Honest Abortion Debate" in The National Review

Yesterday I ran across Alexandra DeSanctis’s November 14, 2019, National Review article “An Honest Abortion Debate: A response to Caitlin Flanagan’s essay in The Atlantic.”  I’m late to this discussion, but, since I found DeSanctis’s discussion to be not optimally “honest,” in a sense, I wrote up this post. 
 
First, DeSanctis says this:
  • no abortion method — no matter how supposedly modern, sanitary, or safe — is good for women”; 
  • no life challenges for women are ever “properly solved by extinguishing a life that has already come into being.”
It's worthwhile to notice that she doesn’t give any reasons to believe this though. I don’t suppose there’s a rule on the universe that if you say something controversial you must provide evidence, but there is a common idea that debatable claims should be supported: this is the "honest" and respectable thing to do. But maybe she just expects her readers will agree with her on these claims and so there's no need or this just isn’t the place to support these claims; I don't know.

DeSanctis’s most important discussion, however, is to a part of Flanagan’s “The Dishonesty of the Abortion Debate: Why we need to face the best arguments from the other side” where Flanagan discusses what she sees in images of 12 week (= 3 month) old fetuses: “Here is one of us; here is a baby.” 

She expresses concern about these abortions:
“. . these are human beings, the most vulnerable among us, and we have no care for them. How terrible to know that in the space of an hour, a baby could be alive—his heart beating, his kidneys creating the urine that becomes the amniotic fluid of his safe home—and then be dead, his heart stopped, his body soon to be discarded.”
She then responds to this with, among other things, the observation that abortions are going to happen anyway: “No matter what the law says, women will continue to get abortions.” 

This might not be a great reaction. In general, responding that something is going to continue happening in some way, no matter what, doesn’t much support or excuse doing that thing. A better response, from the concerns these images raise, might be to urge that abortions happen as early in pregnancy as possible, before the fetus much resembles what is seen in these images and that society is structured so this is so. 

DeSanctis concludes with this:
The chief strength of Flanagan’s essay is its nod to the power of ultrasound technology, which reveals what our abortion debate so often leaves out: These are human lives. The conflict over abortion is dishonest and unwinnable not because both sides make poor arguments, but because only one side is willing to admit that reality [that these are ‘human lives’].
As someone who teaches how to evaluate arguments and more productively debate, I have some responses.

First: thoughtful people who argue that abortion is generally not wrong do recognize that biologically human fetuses are, “human lives,” in one sense of that term (but not another, discussed below). Abortion involves taking something biologically human that’s alive and making it not alive, or killing it. To deny this is, well, I think just wrongheaded.

Second: however, it appears that most abortions occur far before 12 weeks or 3 months: around 2/3 occur before 8 weeks. So the fetal images that both DeSanctis and Flanagan focus on are not representative of most abortions. 

One could, and should, be very concerned about abortions affecting later fetuses, but the best reasons to be concerned there ‒ concerning fetal consciousness or pain (see this article by DeSanctis where she reviews some new research on this topic) ‒ just don’t apply to earlier fetuses without brains or nervous systems developed enough for any form of consciousness. It’s not “honest” to take concerns motivated by 3-month-old fetuses and extend them to all fetuses or all, or nearly all, abortions, which is what I suspect DeSanctis does (at least some people do this, and she doesn’t clarify that she’s only thinking about abortions of 3 month or older fetuses). 

Third: also, appearances can deceive: images can manipulate. Dolls can really closely resemble human babies, but dolls don’t have human rights. Fetuses, at “middle” stages, in some ways resemble babies, yet they might not have what arguably makes us have rights: consciousness, awareness, feelings, or sentience. 

So it’s not quite “honest” to overlook the possibility that these images might manipulate us away from what’s relevant. Although a lot of people don’t approach this issue this way, a core question here is what makes something have rights and whether (or when) fetuses have that something. As the doll example shows, “looking like a baby” isn’t what gives something rights: it’s something else ‒ again, consciousness and feelings ‒ which far later fetuses have, but early fetuses do not. 

Finally, there is an ambiguity in the idea of a “human life” that DeSanctis overlooks when she says of 3-month-old fetuses, “These are human lives.” It’s this: suppose someone was in a major car crash 10 years ago, they were in a coma for 10 years and today their body died. When did their “life” end? Their biological life ended today, but their biographically life ended 10 years ago. Which type of life is what matters? That question has to be answered to productively engage these issues. 

In sum, both these articles had the words ‘debate’ and ‘argument’ in their titles, but really there wasn’t much in the way of arguments or debating or supporting claims with reasons. Attention to clear and carefully-made arguments would only help future debates on this topic; hopefully, this response will contribute to that. 

All other blog posts are available here; here are some:

Tuesday, May 12, 2020

"Early and Later Abortions" PowerPoint

A PowerPoint of a Prezi by Dan Lowe that reviews Nathan Nobis's "Early and Later Abortions" from Bob Fischer, ed., Ethics, Left and Right: The Moral Issues That Divide Us (Oxford University Press, 2019).


All other blog posts are available here

Sunday, May 10, 2020

A Law School Syllabus on Abortion

Abortion: A Syllabus A low-key reading group on a controversial topic.
Reposted from Reason.com 
This past year, my wife Amanda Schwoerke and I co-taught a reading group on "Abortion: Law, Policy, Ethics." We taught the course primarily to learn the subject ourselves. Abortion may be central to Supreme Court politics, but it's outside our academic specialties, and usually too sensitive a topic for the faculty lounge. So, except with family or close friends, we hadn't had many serious conversations about the ethics of abortion since college.

Law schools generally cover abortion in one of two ways. First, everyone has a few awkward and uncomfortable days on the topic in an introductory Con Law class, where the only people willing to talk about it are those who already have strong views. Neither of us were inclined to discuss the issue much in our own 1L class (where we happened to sit next to each other, something I remind my students whenever they fill out the seating charts). Second, there may be upper-level classes on Reproductive Rights, which often tend—at least from the syllabi we reviewed—to focus on policy and implementation rather than first principles.

This is a problem. Abortion poses important and difficult ethical questions, which lawyers (and others!) should be ready to think through seriously. And with the Court's membership changing, it's not enough to just assume the existing doctrinal framework. So we decided to put together our own course—and, below, to share our syllabus and some advice.
The class was intended as a lesson in "how the other half thinks." We have our own views, of course; but we wanted the students to wrestle with each other's views. So we taught the course pass/fail, so there wouldn't be any incentive to agree with us.
To keep the temperature low, class was mostly held in our living room, with coffee and dessert. We tried to balance the readings between pro-choice and pro-life perspectives. The students were roughly even (say, 60-40 pro-choice), helped by informal recruitment efforts on their part. This helped avoid some of the dogpiling one might see in an 80-20 or 90-10 class.
As to how well we did, we'll have to wait for the student evaluations! Two quick reactions:
  • At the end of the class, a substantial number of students, though not all, found "the personhood question" inescapable. There's an affectation in modern abortion discourse that we can somehow transcend the hard ethical questions by focusing on policy questions instead. This turned out not to be true, at least for a large group of our students.
  • Covering the constitutional law of abortion is very difficult. As you can see on the syllabus, there's not enough space to cover everything relevant. Whatever one thinks of Griswold or Roe or Casey on their own terms, there are also deep questions to be asked about Fourteenth Amendment fundamental-rights jurisprudence—about the Slaughterhouse Cases, privileges and immunities, incorporation of the bill of rights, etc. It's hard for any subject-specific seminar to address all of these at once.
In any case, here's the syllabus (also available as a pdf). Comments and questions welcome!
The questions raised by abortion are both highly abstract and deeply personal. While they are the subject of intense and heartfelt commitment on both sides, this course is offered in the belief that they are also a proper subject for intellectual inquiry. We will insist that discussions be conducted in a civil and respectful manner, and that you address and listen to your fellow students, whatever their views, with an open mind. Within each unit, the assigned readings are roughly balanced as to viewpoint; they take deeply conflicting positions, and you will certainly disagree with some of them. The course is offered on a credit/no-credit basis partly to ensure that you are neither penalized nor rewarded for sharing the views of either of the instructors.
Two-page response papers are due 24 hours before each meeting. They may be uploaded to the 'Forum' section of the course website, so that you can read your classmates' papers in advance. Response papers should address some issue raised in your mind by that session's readings; they needn't discuss every reading, and they should respond to the readings rather than summarize them. Each student is expected to participate fully in the discussions.
There is one required text, What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005). Other required readings are available online or in the coursepack. (Because the course focuses on basic principles rather than the details of current doctrine, it leaves out such decisions as Gonzales v. CarhartWhole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, or Azar v. Garza, as well as a number of important cases in state or circuit courts.)
  1. Persons
    1. Guttmacher Institute, Fact Sheet: Induced Abortion in the United States (Jan. 2018)
    2. John T. Noonan, Jr., An Almost An Almost Absolute Value in History, in The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives 51, 51–59 (John T. Noonan ed. 1970)
    3. Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, 57 Monist 43 (1973)
    4. Peter Singer, Germ of a New Debate on the Ethics of Life, The Australian (Canberra), Dec. 23, 2005, at 10
    5. Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, Human-Embryo Liberation, Nat'l Rev. (Jan. 25, 2006 1:29 p.m.)
    6. Sherry F. Colb & Michael C. Dorf, Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights 13–44 (2016)
  2. Futures
    1. Don Marquis, Why Abortion Is Immoral, 86 J. Phil. 183 (1989)
    2. Colb & Dorf, Beating Hearts 96–115
    3. J Savulescu, Abortion, Embryo Destruction and the Future of Value Argument, 28 J. Med. Ethics 133 (2002)
    4. D Marquis, Savulescu's Objections to the Future of Value Argument, 31 J. Med. Ethics 119 (2005)
  3. Autonomy
    1. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 47 (1971)
    2. John Finnis, The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thomson, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 117 (1973)
    3. Don Marquis, Manninen's Defense of Abortion Rights Is Unsuccessful, 10 Am. J. Bioethics 56 (2010)
    4. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Rights and Deaths, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 146 (1973)
    5. I. Glenn Cohen, Artificial Wombs and Abortion Rights, Hastings Ctr. Rep., July 1, 2017
  4. Equality
    1. Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions, 37 Persp. on Sexual & Reprod. Health 110 (2005)
    2. Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Population Group Abortion Rates and Lifetime Incidence of Abortion: United States, 2008–2014, 107 Am. J. Pub. Health 1904 (2017)
    3. Sally Markowitz, Abortion and Feminism, in The Problem of Abortion 194 (Susan Dwyer & Joel Feinberg eds., 3d ed. 1997)
    4. Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality Right, in Mothers in Law (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995)
    5. Robin West, Liberalism and Abortion, 87 Geo. L.J. 2117 (1999)
    6. George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen & Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United States, 109 Q.J. Econ. 277 (1996)
  5. Society
    1. Gallup, Abortion: Gallup Historical Trends (viewed July 25, 2019) (skim)
    2. Judith Jarvis Thomson & Peter de Marneffe, Abortion: Whose Right?, Boston Review, Summer–Fall 1995 (12)
    3. The Pollitt-Douthat Debate (12345)
    4. Michelle Alexander, My Rapist Apologized, N.Y. Times, May 26, 2019, at SR1
    5. Ariana Eunjung Cha, Babies with Down Syndrome Are Put on Center Stage in the U.S. Abortion Fight, Wash. Post, March 4, 2018
  6. Roe
    1. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
    2. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
    3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
    4. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
    5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
  7. Responses
    1. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973)
    2. What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Most Controversial Decision (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (read as much as seems relevant)
  8. Casey
    1. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
    2. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 995 (2003)
    3. Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars, 118 Yale L.J. 1318 (2009)
All other blog posts are available here

Wednesday, May 6, 2020

Yes, "a person is a person, no matter how small," but . .


It's sometimes claimed that people who think that is abortion is generally not wrong think this because of fetuses’ Size, Level of development, Location or Environment, and Dependency (the “SLED” test). 

The suggestion is that pro-choice people think that anything small, dependent, and undeveloped that is located in someone else’s body is permissible to kill. 

The objection is that this principle, and related principles, are false, so this principle fails to support thinking that abortion is permissible.

The problem here is that no thoughtful abortion advocate accepts such a principle: nobody should think personhood is defeated or eliminated by SLED factors. 

Consider a case inspired by Dr. Seuss’s “Horton Hears a Who”: if there were a baby Who, that baby would be tiny, undeveloped (at least not a developed adult Who and so, in a sense, undeveloped), and dependent; and we could even imagine that Baby Who somehow in someone else’s body (imagine the baby Who is on a speck eaten by someone, but not digested). 

This Baby Who would be prima facie wrong to kill since that baby is a person or conscious being: the SLED factors are irrelevant to that.

The lesson here is that if a being is prima facie wrong to kill, then it’s size, location, dependency, and development do not matter. (This simplification ignores relevant concerns raised by Judith Thomson). 

But if a being is not wrong to kill, those factors are irrelevant. Advocates of the SLED test might merely assume then that abortion is wrong, which is begging the question [which is assuming the conclusion that one is trying to argue for, which is a fallacy, and so it appears that SLED-related objections to abortion are a distraction from any serious issues since they merely assume, without arguments for support, that beginning fetuses are persons].

* This is from footnote 6 of Nathan Nobis's "Early and Later Abortions: Ethics and Law," in Bob Fischer's Ethics: Left and Right (Oxford University Press, 2019). 


P.S. I was inspired to post this in part by this recent, amazing, and but mostly unrelated (although there is an ethics-connection!), Dr. Suess-related video here: 




Saturday, April 25, 2020

"If abortion is not wrong, then it's OK to kill sleeping or comatose people??!"


Hello Dr. Nobis, 
 
I was alerted to the existence of your book "Thinking Critically About Abortion" via the Crusade Against Ignorance YouTube channel. When I found out that the book is free online, I instantly set out to read it, and I am very thankful that I did. 

Prior to this book, I would have considered myself strongly pro-life but now I realize the topic is much more complex than I previously imagined. For that I am very grateful. Since we are in a collective pursuit of truth, it does us no good to characterize opposing beliefs incorrectly. 
 
After finishing the book, I still have a question about the abortion debate: 
Many pro-life activists frequently resort to a reductio ad absurdum argument to address the consciousness standard similar to the one laid out in your book. For instance, one might say "if it is the case that it is not unethical to kill an unconscious fetus, would it be morally acceptable to kill other humans who lack consciousness (e.g. someone in a coma)?" 
What is your reaction to these popular reductio arguments?

Thanks in advance! 

Here is my response.

Thanks for reading and for your kind words! 

In too quick reply, while pre-conscious fetuses and unconscious people (sleepers, individuals in comas who eventually wake-up from those comas, etc.) both are not conscious, the latter have been conscious and, when they awake, there will be a psychological connection to that past consciousness: there will be memories to the past, and the beliefs, knowledge and relations from the past will extend into that present and future. 

That is relevant to concerns about harm and personhood, at least. To harm someone is to make them worse off compared to how they were. If a sleeping person or someone in a temporary coma were killed, that would make them worse off compared to how they were. 

What's key is that they were: they existed as a conscious being and so any and all of their desires, plans, expectations, hopes, and connections are thwarted if they are killed, which is bad for them (and usually others too). 

Beings that have never been conscious don't have any of that and so things cannot go worse for them, since there really is no "them" yet, since there is no person who experiences anything, and so there's no person that things could take a turn for the worse for. This was discussed in the section "5.2.2 Early fetuses aren’t conscious & feeling: personhood and harm," if you'd like to review that also.

So that's my quick response to the question. I want to observe that I have seen this objection or argument before, and from people who really should know better because they teach philosophy courses and know two of the rules from Philosophy 101: 

Consider objections: present and respond to objections to your views. 

Don't "strawperson" anyone: present views in their strongest form possible, especially when you might disagree with those views: don't "strawman" or "straw person" views. (The person who emailed me rightly characterized this goal this way: characterize opposing beliefs correctly.) 

So, to seriously argue that "If abortion is not wrong, then it's OK to kill sleeping people" or that "If abortion were not wrong because fetuses are not conscious, then it would also be OK to kill sleeping people and people in comas" is to violate these rules.

This fails to consider and engage obvious and well-known responses to this sort of claim, such as the above. (Of course, there's more to say about the above too, but it's not like nobody has thought about, "Wow, is it really true that arguments in support of abortion are also arguments in support of killing people who take naps??" and so this is some sort of new-found refutation of any thoughtful arguments in defense of abortion).

And it fails to consider whether the strongest version of this argument would be subject to this sort of objection anyway: e.g., compare these arguments:

(A) "early abortions aren't wrong because fetuses aren't conscious now

 versus

(B) "early abortions aren't wrong because fetuses aren't conscious now and have never been conscious." 

 So (A) here is what's considered is a "straw person", not the best or better version of the argument, which is (B).

So to seriously present this sort of argument, in the manner I have seen it presented, is intellectually and morally irresponsible: it's simply just sophistry and a dishonest attempt to persuade using bad arguments. And that's always bad, I hope everyone would agree and urge doing better. Let's do it!

Update: in light of some discussion of this post, I want to add these cases and questions for further discussion:

Imagine there's a sperm and an egg that, when united, a full-grown, pretty typical human person (or even a baby) would immediately "emerge" from the fusion. (Be imaginative, this type of thing is seen on TV quite often!). Questions: would it be wrong to not unite that sperm and egg? Is anyone obligated to unite this sperm and egg? Who, if anyone, is harmed if the egg and sperm are not brought together? What do answers here suggest for early abortions or the "moral status" of embryos and early fetuses?

Imagine there's a normal kitten which, if given an injection, would immediately transform into a cat who has the mental life (understanding, intelligence, knowledge, communication abilities, etc.) of a full-grown, fairly typical human person. (Again, be imaginative, this type of thing is seen on TV quite often!). Questions: would it be wrong to not give the kitten the injection? Is anyone obligated to give the injection? What do answers here suggest, if anything, for early abortions or the "moral status" of embryos and early fetuses? 

Imagine a baby is born who is totally unconscious and has never been conscious: no feelings or awareness at all. An easy procedure could be done, however, so that baby becomes conscious like a typical baby is. Questions: would it be wrong to not give that injection? Is anyone obligated to give the injection? Who, if anyone, is harmed if the injection is not given? What do answers here suggest for early abortions or the "moral status" of embryos and early fetuses, and the issue of abortion more generally? (Note: of course, parents, of course, generally want babies who are conscious, so that might impact the questions; and we might try to answer the questions as if this wasn't a concern.) 

See also this brief response to this type of question:

“If it’s morally acceptable to kill a fetus, why can’t we kill sleeping people?”

This argument is superficially appealing, but the comparison doesn’t hold up. A sleeping person has desires and interests just like we do, and therefore they can be harmed when those desires and interests are thwarted. Of course, when you are asleep, you aren’t consciously holding any desires in your attention. But this is also true of most of your desires even when you are awake. If you love your children, you don’t stop loving them the moment you focus your attention on something else, like a football game. Likewise, you may not be thinking, as you read this “I don’t want to be killed” or “I value my car.” Yet it would still be wrong to kill you or steal your car. 

Philosophically, these long term desires are known as dispositional desires. You have dispositional desires even when you aren’t consciously focused on them, including when you are unconscious or asleep. Those dispositional desires only go away when you die or when your brain is irrevocably destroyed. But for you or any other entity to have dispositional desires, you must first have some initial first person conscious experience. A being that has never experienced desire of any kind can’t have long term desires. 

Feel free to email or message any other questions!

Originally posted 4/17/2020 at another place on this webpage; moved here 4/25/2020.

Some videos on this issue:
@nathan.nobis Replying to @nathan.nobis #abortion #prochoice #prolife #benshapiro #sophist #ethics #philosophy #fasttalker #criticalthinking ♬ original sound - Philosophy 101 - Prof. Nobis
@nathan.nobis Replying to @nathan.nobis No, embryos are not like coma patients or sleeping people. #abortion #prochoice #prolife #bioethics #ethics #philosophy ♬ original sound - Philosophy 101 - Prof. Nobis
@nathan.nobis #stitch with @SPL No, embryos and beginning fetuses are not much like coma patients who are going to wake up: make a list of the differences. #abortion #prochoice #prolife #ethics #philosophy #criticalthinking #logic #bioethics #coma #comatose ♬ original sound - Philosophy 101 - Prof. Nobis
@nathan.nobis the case of the never conscious human organism: a person? An individual? Someone? Or just a body? #philosophy #ethics #abortion #prochoice #prolife #bioethics #person #personhood #consciousness #concscious ♬ original sound - Philosophy 101 - Prof. Nobis
Other blog posts are available here: here are some of them:

"When does life begin?" and "Are fetuses human?": Two bad 'scientific' questions to ask about abortion



A U Chicago PhD student, Steven Andrew Jacobs, did a dissertation on the topic of abortion that involved asking biology professors about "when life begins."

A report on his research and experiences is here: "I Asked Thousands of Biologists When Life Begins. The Answer Wasn’t Popular."

He shares many angry and hostile responses to his question. He proposed three possible motivations for these reactions:
  • "Motivated Reasoning: Respondents experience cognitive dissonance when they recognize that their view of a fetus as a human [note: human ≠ life!] complicates their political convictions in regard to abortion policy.
  • Cultural Cognition: Respondents fear that public recognition of the scientific views they are expressing could lead to other people supporting abortion restrictions.
  • Identity-Protective Cognition: Respondents fear that expressing their views may serve to estrange them from pro-choice liberals, on whom they might rely for social, emotional, or financial support."
I think there's a far simpler way to explain these angry reactions:

He was asking a bad question!

Some might even call it a "dumb question," but since some say that there are no dumb questions, if asked sincerely, I won't say that.

The question a bad one for two reasons.

First, are eggs alive? Are sperm alive? Generally "yes" to both. When they come together, and a sperm fertilizes an egg, is there a living thing? Is it alive, is it life?

Yes, yes and yes: the fertilized egg isn't dead and it's not neither dead nor alive. It's life. And you don't need to be a biologist to know that!

Second, is this argument a good argument?
  • 1. Anything alive, or life, or living is wrong to kill.
  • 2. Human embryos and early fetuses are alive, life, or living.
  • C. Therefore, human embryos and early fetuses are wrong to kill.
Put this way, premise 1 is obviously false: uncontroversial examples (mold, bacteria, plants, and more) confirm that. These things aren't even "prima facie" wrong to kill, meaning "you need a really good reason to kill these things."

So this is obviously a bad argument, even if premise 2 is true (and it is!).

However, most people don't seem to realize this: they are obsessed with whether fetuses are alive or not; whether they are life, and "when life begins."

They shouldn't be though, given that premise 1 is false, and obviously so. We see this just by defining the word.

Jacobs said he "led discussions between pro-choice and pro-life law students. Little progress was made because both sides were caught up with the factual question of when life begins." If they were caught up with this question, it's because they didn't define their terms and notice that at least if you mean "biological life," the question is very easy.

Given this, it makes sense for biologists to be annoyed at the question they were asked, to say the least. This is because, given the widespread belief that the above argument is a good argument, when it's really a bad argument (and it is easy to see that this is so), their answers would be used for the bad purpose of making a bad argument seem good. People should be annoyed about that, whatever conclusions they hold on this topic.

This is why they were annoyed; if it wasn't, it should have been.

They might have also been annoyed with the common question of whether fetuses are "human." If you mean biologically human, then of course fetuses are human! They aren't cats or dogs or anything else.

But, taken very literally, this also doesn't mean that abortion is wrong, as we explain in our book on abortion: arguments against abortion that begin with the observations that fetuses are biologically human, or biologically human organisms or even "human beings" aren't as simple as people often assume they are.

I do want to observe that there is confusion about these words because they have multiple plausible meanings, and people just don't often notice this or make the effort to clarify what they mean when they discuss "when life begins."

"Life" can mean biological life, but it also can mean something else. For example, suppose a 20-something was in a car crash 20 years ago, had been in a coma ever since, but her body finally died yesterday.

When did her life end? We might want to say that her biological life ended yesterday, but that her biographical life ended 20 years ago. So what kind of "life" are we thinking about when asking "when does life begin?"

Likewise, when people say that fetuses aren't "human," they don't mean that fetuses aren't biologically human (since they are!). Rather they mean that they don't have what are often considered "human" traits, like understanding and feeling and reason and the like.

Now, describing these as "human" traits isn't the best way to put it (since animals have some of these traits, in some ways, and friendly space aliens would also probably have them, if they exist, and some people believe that spiritual beings have these traits too), but that's roughly what some people mean by "human" here, at least.

In sum, the philosophical activities of clarifying the meanings of words and stating arguments in logically valid form (the above argument in the pattern 'syllogism' which Aristotle identified) is very helpful for avoiding confusion, gaining understanding and even avoiding angry emails!

Nathan

2/1/2021: Jacobs wrote a response to this post; here's a response to that response

P.S. Jacob's dissertation is here: https://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/1883?ln=en

Also, here is an earlier document - "Biologists' Consensus on 'When Life Begins'" - which suggests this:

"these findings [from surveys with biologists, based on the view that 'scientists that can use their biological expertise to determine when a human's life begins'] can help Americans move past the factual dispute on when life begins and focus on the operative question of when a fetus deserves legal consideration."

This suggestion, however, appears to be forgotten for the overall project, which doesn't seem to involve clarifying the meaning of these words and seeing what impact that has on debates about the issues: that is, that the "descriptive" fact, as he puts it, of fetuses being biologically alive or human doesn't settle the legal or moral issues. Science and ethics are different, and, as this discussion shows, people sometimes believe that ethical conclusions follow from scientific facts, when they don't. We need to attentive to that for all ethical issues (e.g., see this with the topics of drugs and animal research, at least), not just abortion.

PPS. This podcast apparently discusses this blog post, although I don't yet know what is said in it since I don't listen to postcasts. If there's a transcript or something in text, which is quicker and more efficient to access, please let me know. NN

PPPS. Someone observed that despite the headlines and the language he often uses, Jacobs was actually asking a more narrow question, not just when "life" begins, but when living human organisms begin. If that's correct, that doesn't change the points above about how answers to this question are apt to be misused due to ambiguities in "human life" and, more importantly, the serious need to justify a premise if something is a living human organism, then it is prima facie wrong to kill it in light of the fact that, plausibly, biographical life is more plausibly relevant to what makes something wrong to kill, not mere biological life, and so that unstated premise - linking claims about the biological facts to the moral conclusion about abortion - is false. 

Related:


Originally posted 12/12/2019 at another place on this webpage; moved here 4/25/2020.

Update:

In engaging Jacobs on these issues (on Twitter), it seems very common for him to observe that his survey results were these:
  • Many "average" people reported that biologists were the best candidates to determine "when life begins.
  • Of course, most biologists report that "life begins" at conception or, more literally, there is a living organism at or soon after conception
Now, about the first claim, is this, in general true?
  • If "average" people -- people who are untrained and inexperienced on an issue -- report that some group of practitioners are the best people to ask about that issue, then that group of practitioners is indeed the best group to ask. 
This is false. What are great examples to show this?

About the second claim, since many or most of the biologists surveyed are pro-choice, that just shows that they (like many or most people!) are informed enough about the ethics of abortion to understand that just because an embryo is a living organism, from or near conception, that does not mean, or even much suggest, that abortion is wrong or should be illegal. That, of course, is what led to the angry reactions: their biological claims were twisted to try to support an agenda that they, and their biological claims, don't support. 

All other blog posts are available here.

Monday, February 1, 2021

The Ambiguities of "Life" and "Human": Responding to Steve Jacobs at "Secular Pro-Life"

Steve Jacobs responded at "Secular Pro-Life" to this post of mine that was critical of his dissertation project, and I think his response misses the main issues.



So the issue here is that the question "When does life begin?" is ambiguous: it can mean different things. (The question "When does human life begin? is likewise ambiguous too, as we'll see). 

First, there's biological life, something being engaged in the biological processes that define life in a biological sense.

It is very, very obvious that biologically human zygotes and embryos and fetuses are biologically alive: they came from eggs and sperm which were biologically alive; they are engaged in the processes mentioned on page 1 of a biology textbook.

But this obvious fact that biologically human fetuses are biologically alive isn't very important because of this: just because something is biologically alive, that doesn't mean it's wrong to kill it. E.g., mold and plants are biologically alive, but they aren't wrong to kill. Other counterexamples make the point. (Now, the point is not that human fetuses are comparable to any living thing; the point is to engage the exact premise that completes the reasoning as given). 

So here's the problem: if someone thinks that proving the obviousthat biologically human fetuses (we aren't talking about kitten or puppy fetuses, right?) are biologically aliveproves that abortion is wrong, that is mistaken: it's a bad argument. 

Some people are really excited to "prove" that human fetuses are biologically alive, but they just shouldn't be: nothing interesting follows from that fact (or, to be more accurate, interesting moral conclusions about abortion follow from that fact only when conjoined with this false premise: 'all biologically alive things are wrong to kill' or even 'all biologically alive things are prima facie wrong to kill'.

I think this explains the negative reactions that Jacobs got: people thought, "Oh, he's going to take my answer and use it to argue for conclusions that it really doesn't support." And they were right about that. (Right?).

So what else can "When does life begin?" mean? In particular, what can "When does human life begin?" mean?

You can get at that by thinking about the question "When does a human's life end?"

Most people recognize that this is a complex question because of examples like a permanent coma or permanent vegetative states or major, major brain damage. In these cases, someone's body may be alive, but their brain is dead: so we often think that their life has ended, even though their body is biologically alive.

Why has their life ended (even though their body is biologically alive)? 

Because their consciousness has permanently ended: they exist no more: there is no individual or person there anymore, and nobody who can be harmed anymore. So, while there are different ways to put this, we’d say their “biographical life” ended even though their body remains biologically alive.

So back to the question: when does "life begin" for us, and “life” in the morally significant sense, or "biographically human life"? When consciousness begins. And this is a different answer than the biological answer, in part because it's a different question: it's not just about biology; it's about us and what we really are: although we are very much related to our bodies, we are not our bodies.

So, this problem all arises from asking an ambiguous question and not clarifying the options for what the question might mean: in other words, not engaging in a core task of critical thinking. Had that been done, the answers here, from biologists and anyone else, likely have been quite different, as would have been the tones of their reaction!

Especially related blog posts:
All blog posts are here.

Updates: 
  • Updating the question to "when does biologically human life begin?" or even "when does a biologically human organism begin?" doesn't change the discussion: the points above still apply. 
  • Further comment: Jacobs write this: 
If a fetus is not a human, then abortion restrictions stop women from having a basic, harmless medical procedure. 
If a fetus is a human, then each abortion kills a human and is a presumptively punishable crime without an affirmative legal defense.

About the second claim, each fetuses is obviously "a human" in the biological sense and abortion kills beings that are biologically human: every thoughtful pro-choice person recognizes that (any who are not are confused). What they deny is that fetuses are "human" in the sense of having what they consider human characteristics, like consciousness, feelings, awareness, and so on, and they think that those types of characteristics are what make killing someone wrong. So this statement suggests a misunderstanding of what people actually think about about these issues.

About the first claim, again, of course fetuses are biologically human, but they are not "human" in the sense of having what they consider human characteristics, like consciousness, feelings, awareness, and so on. But that doesn't automatically mean that abortion is not wrong either: e.g., the most famous and important philosophical argument against abortion, from Don Marquis, denies that fetuses are "human" in this sense. So this claim is false: even if fetuses aren't human in this sense, they could be wrong to kill nevertheless.  

  • While these issues about "what we are, in our essence" are abstract, Lynne Rudder Baker's Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge, 2000) is a great discussion of them. Here's part of the introduction to one of her articles on these issues:


 

Another update:

In engaging Jacobs on these issues (on Twitter), it seems very common for him to observe that his survey results were these:
  • Many "average" people reported that biologists were the best candidates to determine "when life begins.
  • Of course, most biologists report that "life begins" at conception or, more literally, there is a living organism at or soon after conception
Now, about the first claim, is this, in general true:
  • If "average" people -- people who are untrained and inexperienced on an issue -- report that some group of practitioners are the best people to ask about that issue, then that group of practitioners is indeed the best group to ask. 
This is false. What are great examples to show this?

About the second claim, since many or most of the biologists surveyed are pro-choice, that just shows that they (like many or most people!) are informed enough about the ethics of abortion to understand that just because an embryo is a living organism, from or near conception, that does not mean, or even much suggest, that abortion is wrong or should be illegal. That, of course, is what led to the angry reactions: their biological claims were twisted to try to support an agenda that they, and their biological claims, don't support.