The Animal Rights, "Domination" and "Comatose Newborn Baby" Objections to an Argument for Abortion

One type of argument in general defense of abortion—an argument that abortion usually isn't wrong—depends on the fact that early fetuses are not conscious, aware, or feeling at all, since their brains and nervous systems aren't developed enough to support any type of mental life. 

Combine these emprical claims with the moral observation that consciousness and awareness are what ultimately make our lives have value and fundamentally what gives us, say, the right to life, and we can conclude that at least abortions of pre-conscious fetuses are typically not wrong. Since most abortions are of fetuses like this, we can conclude that most abortions aren't wrong. 

The argument involves a moral principle like this:

• If a being is not conscious, and has never been conscious, then it's typically permissible to kill that being. 

This type of principle relates to personhood—since any being like this wouldn't be a person—and harm: to harm someone is make someone worse off compared to how they were, and that can't happen to a being like this. 

Really understanding the argument require thinking through a number of challenging issues: it's not a soundbite or bumper sticker argument. This type of argument is developed in Thinking Critically About Abortion and this earlier chapter. There are many objections to the argument though, and I will review three of them here.  

1. Babies and Animals

First, some seem to assume that the "consciousness" referred to in this argument is some kind of what I'll call "fancy consciousness"—thinking about calculus, baba ganoush and reflecting on how to live your best life—and so think this argument implies that babies don't have rights. 

But the argument doesn't require any such higher-level, "fancy" thinking—all it requires is awareness, feelings, and a perspective: there's a way it is to be that being, for that being.

Some then are concerned that if this type of consciousness is enough for a right to life, then that means that raising and killing animals to eat them would often be wrong. They then react that that's a good reason to reject the reasoning. 

This is a curious response though. Almost anyone who gives that objection doesn't have to eat animals: they could eat plant-based foods. And, of course, raising and killing animals is very bad for those animals. 

So, on initial appearances, the reaction—"this argument suggests it's wrong to kill animals and so it must be flawed"—seems to be a selfish reaction: "This reasoning means that I need to change my views in ways I don't want and, more importantly, do something that I don't want to do, all for the benefit of someone else that I find to be not very much like me, namely animals." This is selfishness. 

Now, what's interesting is that many critics of abortion claim that women who have abortions, and abortion advocates generally, are selfish, because they—critics claim—just want to live their own lives and do what they want to do, but without any concern for fetuses and by rejecting their obligations. "It's just selfishness," they sometimes really say. 

Now, isn't this objection to this argument—in light of its implications for animals—just selfish also? 

If it is, let's recognize that: most people who call themselves "pro-life" are selfish in that they are not concerned about the lives, and brutal deaths, of conscious, feeling, living beings who aren't human: at least, they are not concerned enough to do anything about it. Now, that's true of most pro-choice people too, and that should be recognized: an honest assessment of the situation is needed to begin making some progress in thinking and doing. 

Now, if people, especially "pro-life" people, are not selfish in lacking any serious concern for sentient animal life, we need to hear why: let's see the strong moral reasoning to show that, in circumstances like our's, it's actually generally OK to raise animals to eat them. That's gonna be hard. 

If someone shows that they lack the skills and attitudes to responsibly and productively engage ethics and animals issues, we might reasonably doubt that they lack the abilities to responsibly engage the issue of abortion and so doubt the reliability of their judgments on that topic: vice in thinking about one topic tends to spill over to vice in thinking about other topics, since it's the same thinker.  

2. Domination

A second objection to the argument above goes something like this: 

If having moral rights ultimately depends on being conscious, or having been conscious, as many theories of rights propose, then beings that are more conscious have more or stronger rights than being that a less conscious. Alternatively, those who have a higher "degree" or level of consciousness have stronger rights than those with a lower level or degree, and so the "higher" are entitled to dominate those who are "lower" or at least have moral priority.

This type of objection, however, is very weak, since there is just no reason to believe the suggested implication. 

Advocates of the argument above propose that if a being is conscious at all, especially in a way that those conscious experiences are connected and inter-related, then that being has a right to life, or is otherwise typically wrong to kill, in a manner that's equal to anyone else who has that right. They don't claim or suggest anything along the lines of super-smart humans are entitled to dominate simple-minded humans.

So their view is comparable to this: you can pass usually a class with a 70% overall grade, and you can also pass with any higher grade. But any passing grade is equally a passing grade: it's not like a 89% is "more" of a passing grade than a 71% or "A" grades have some claim over "C" students in terms of whether they've passed or not. So whether someone pass a class is determined by a variable characteristic (grades), but anyone who passes a class "equally" passes the class. So, something similar applies with a mind-based theory of rights: if you meet the minimal threshold, you are "in the club," so to speak, and fully and equally in the club.  

Finally, the objection's claim that some individuals are "more" or "less" conscious than others is doubtful. A baby is not conscious of some things that we are conscious of, and babies are conscious of things that we are not conscious of (and the same is true of, e.g., dogs and other animals), but neither is "more conscious": we are both conscious and equally conscious, although conscious of different things. 

Overall, this objection is not well developed and is just implausible on its face. If it were rigorously developed and defended, there'd be more to say about it.

3. The "Comatose Newborn Baby" Objection

Finally, there's an objection that is based on a case like this:

A baby is born, in a coma. That baby has never been conscious. But that baby will become conscious . . eventually. 

The argument then is that if the "if a being is not conscious, and has never been conscious, then it's typically permissible to kill that being" principle is true, then it's not wrong to end the life of this baby. But since, they say, it would be wrong to end the life of this baby, the "if a being is not conscious, and has never been conscious, then it's typically permissible to kill that being" principle is false and so the original argument just isn't a good argument in defense of abortion.

I don't think this objection succeeds. 

First, the case is basically a unique baby that, for all practical purposes, is just like a beginning fetuses in all its relevant features: the claim is basically, "Killing fetuses that have never had minds is wrong because killing a born baby that has never had a mind would be wrong also" and so the reasoning is close to circular. In that way, the argument is question-begging, or assumes that the principle it is trying to argue against is false in making a case that it's false, if the reasoning amounts to something like this:

This "if a being is not conscious, and has never been conscious, then it's typically permissible to kill that being" principle is false because there could be this comotose "baby" and even though that baby is not conscious, and has never been conscious, that "baby" would be wrong to kill. 

If this is the reaction, it basically amounts to just assuming the principle is false.  

Next, the reactions to the case that it would be wrong to led this never-been-conscious baby die, or kill this baby, are, I think, emotion-driven: people picture in their minds a more normal baby—who would be wrong to kill, since that baby is conscious, aware and has feelings—and those feelings transfer to this "baby," which is nothing like a normal baby, even though they really shouldn't transfer. And this emotional distortion can lead people to overlook these important questions:

• Would anyone be harmed if the "baby" were killed? 
• No, there is no conscious individual here who would be made worse off, compared to how they were, if this body were killed: this case is very different from killing a normal baby since, again, this baby is just like an early fetus, just bigger and born.  
• Would any person be killed if the "baby" were killed? 
• No, there is no conscious individual here who would be killed, although killing this body would prevent the emergence of a future person. 

So, again, the case does not provide a good reason to reject this type of pro-choice argument: it seems to just assume that what it's arguing against is false, instead of giving a reason that the principle is false (and a reason which doesn't just assume it's false).   

Next, the case is very different from abortion, so one could agree that it'd be wrong to let the "baby" die but deny that anything follows about abortion.  

For one, the comatose newborn "baby" is no longer dependent on anyone in particular, and anyone's body in particular: anyone could take care of this baby. So, one could plausibly think that, all things considered, this matters and makes a difference: yes, someone, or someones, has to take care of this "baby," given the situation, but pregnant women are not obligated to "take care of" pre-conscious fetuses that are in their bodies and so only they can take care of them: that's too much of a burden which they don't have to take on if they don't want to. 

It is a fair question, however, to ask about details about the case: in particular, how long would it take for the baby to become conscious? What if it's 50 years? 80 years? Does that matter? Inquiring minds would want to know. Maybe there'd be a point where people would concede that the time is too much and so the lack of harm here really does matter and so it'd also matter with a shorter time period too. 

Next, I think it's important to observe that this "baby" is quite different from a beginning fetus in that it is, as the case is intended, very close to being conscious. And maybe that's an important difference. It's like this:

Suppose I've been studying to get into law school, and I'm doing well, but this is very much because of your help in keeping me on track, encouraging me, quizzing me, and more: I literally couldn't do it without you. You've been helping me for years now, and I've almost made it, since the LSAT (test to get into law school) is in a month and I will do well if, but only if, you keep helping me. 

Now, it's within your rights to stop helping me, even if I lose out on my dream of going to law school. But shouldn't you keep helping me, unless there's some real good reason why you shouldn't (like I become mean or ungrateful or ..)? I mean, we've come this far; let's finish this! If you had backed out on all this years ago, that'd be one thing, but we're almost to the end here! Let's finish this so I can make my dream come true!

If this case has a moral or a point (and maybe it doesn't!) then it might transfer to the comatose baby—since that baby body is almost conscious and so maybe there is some obligation at this point to make that happen. That intuition, however, won't transfer to a beginning fetus. 

So, all and all, the "comatose newborn baby" objection is not a good one, given the differences and the similarities between this "baby" and beginning fetuses and pregnant women. 

4. Conclusion

Here I've briefly presented a particular type of argument in defense of abortion and three objections focussed on that specific argument. These objections appear to be weak, so they don't provide good reason to reject the argument. If there are better objections, we'll want to find them. 

UPDATE:

Some further thoughts about the comatose baby case, which is appealed to to argue against this principle:

'if a being is not conscious, and has never been conscious, then it's typically permissible to kill that being.'

Here's an argument:

1. If it's true that 'if a being is not conscious, and has never been conscious, then it's typically permissible to kill that being,' is true, then it'd (typically?) be OK to kill a baby born in a coma who was going to wake up soon enough.
2. But it'd (typically) be wrong to kill a baby born in a coma who was going to wake up soon enough.
3. Therefore, it's not true that 'if a being is not conscious, and has never been conscious, then it's typically permissible to kill that being.'

Here's how this can play out.

About 2, we can of course ask why we should believe this. One response is to insist that it's just not true that 'if a being is not conscious, and has never been conscious, then it's typically permissible to kill that being.' We can then ask why that is and see what answers are given. Those answers might be the reasons given to think that it's, say, wrong to kill embryos, or imply that. So that would basically be assuming a whole anti-abortion framework in engaging this argument, which is a fair point.

My thought is that this would be a pretty weird and uncommon case, and while I understand how people would have strong feelings about it, it'd be fair to ask if there's any individual, or person, or someone here "in" this body who would be worse off if the body died; is there any individual who would be disrespected if the body were allowed to die or killed? (We could also think about the case from behind the veil of ignorance, which might help). As the case goes, there really isn't anyone there. So this case is like an embryo is "dressed up" to look like a baby, but there's nothing like a normal baby here.

Finally, this premise has the imprecise "typically" clause. So if this baby were born to people who wanted a baby, of course they'd keep the baby alive, etc. since they want a baby -- a "real" baby though, not just a baby's body! So, in that way, this baby's body is like an embryo: you can't get a "real" baby without keeping this body alive.

OK, this is some of why I don't think this is a great case. 

Abortion: Arguments, not Circumstances

People sometimes begin discussing abortion by asking questions about abortion in particular circumstances: “What if it’s needed to save the mother’s life?” “What if the pregnancy is from rape?” “What if there are severe fetal abnormalities?” and so on. Or they begin by stating circumstances where they think abortion is wrong or not: “It’s wrong if used for ‘birth control’,” “It’s not wrong if the woman is too young to be an effective mother,” and so on.

These starting points are fine, if – but only if – these statements are supported, or questions answered, with reasons. Our concern is arguments, the reasons given for and against specific conclusions about abortion, such as that:

Abortion is:

●       (nearly) always morally wrong.

●       (nearly) always morally permissible, or not wrong.

●       wrong, except in these circumstances: ____.

●       permissible, except in these circumstances: ____.

●       sometimes morally obligatory, or wrong to not have, such as in these circumstances: ____.

People sometimes offer moral claims about abortion “in general,” without being precise about which abortions they have in mind. But the details matter: depending on the stage of fetal development and the woman’s circumstances, different moral conclusions may be appropriate.

Some people also want to focus on important, but comparatively rare, abortions: for example, of pregnancies from rape (perhaps 1% of abortions) or incest.^[5] Our initial focus will be on more common circumstances where for a variety of other reasons, a woman is pregnant but does not want to have a child (or another child, now). After this we will discuss other important, but less common, circumstances.

We can immediately set aside circumstances though where the woman would die if her pregnancy continues, and so the fetus will die also, or we must choose between the mother and fetus. Even people who generally oppose abortion typically argue that we should save one life instead of losing two lives and prioritize the mother, not the fetus. Their view then is not that abortion is always wrong, but that it is wrong in most circumstances, or prima facie wrong.

Whether this specific conclusion, and any other, can be supported with good arguments is {or should be!] our concern. 

From Early and Later Abortions: Ethics and Law: Early Abortions Are Not Wrong, Late Abortions Could Be Wrong, but probably All Abortions Should Be Legal

In Bob Fischer, ed., Ethics, Left and Right: The Moral Issues That Divide Us (Oxford University Press, 2019).

No, Being Pro-choice is Not Ablest: Abortion and Ableism

I've recently seen some abortion critics call a certain type of argument in defense of abortion—ones that appeal to the total lack of minds or consciousness in zygotes, embryos, and at least beginning fetuses—ablest. Arguments that deny that fetuses are persons tend to be arguments like this, since they usually understand "persons" in terms of psychological characteristics or having a mind.

The claim is that these arguments assume a type of unjustified, wrongful discrimination, ableism, and so people who give this type of argument for abortion are, well, advocating for wrongful discrimination, which is wrong. 

This objection, however, is a bad objection. This type of argument in defense of abortion is not ableist, and I bet this charge is an offensive comparison to people who are genuinely affected by ableism.  

To begin, here are a few definitions of ableism:

• Ableism is the discrimination of and social prejudice against people with disabilities based on the belief that typical abilities are superior;
• Ableism . . is discrimination and social prejudice against people with disabilities and/or people who are perceived to be disabled. Ableism characterizes people who are defined by their disabilities as inferior to the non-disabled;
• Ableism is discrimination or prejudice against individuals with disabilities.

So ableism is discrimination against people, against individuals, who are judged negatively because of their abilities, or because they lack certain abilities. 

Once we review the definitions of ableism, we readily see that embryos and early fetuses cannot be victims of it. This is not because of what abilities they have or lack, however; it's because they are completely without abilities: there is no individual or person there who has or lacks any abilities.

Ableism involves seeing someone and thinking they are less valuable or worthy of respect because of their physical, cognitive or emotional abilities. But with embryos and early fetuses, there is no someone, no conscious individual, who has or lacks any abilities. Ableism requires that there be a someone who is judged negatively, but there is no "someone" when there is an embryo or beginning fetus, so the charge of ableism makes no sense. 

To further make the point, imagine you ask me what my friends Mary and John are like. Suppose I respond with this: 

"Mary is a is a good listener who enjoys ice-skating, watching old movies, crossword puzzles and rock climbing. And she's a person."

"John likes ice cream, is often rather quiet, is really good at math, and likes to read. And he's a conscious, thinking and feeling being." 

It's weird to add on "and she's a person" and "and she's a conscious, thinking, feeling being," because I've already said this by telling you what they are like in these other ways. Only persons and conscious beings have these interests and abilities so it's redundant to point out that these friends are persons and conscious beings: indeed, we were probably even told by that by the word "friend." 

Similarly, only persons or conscious beings have and lack abilities, so when some kind of entity is not a person or conscious being, accusing someone of being ableistic towards that entity makes no sense: again, there's no individual or person to be ableistic towards or about. 

So, arguing that abortion is not wrong because embryos and beginning fetuses are entirely without consciousness or minds is not ableist. The accusation just doesn't fit when there is no subject or person or conscious being: if there's no one like that, there isn't anyone who has or lacks abilities and so the charge of ableism doesn't make sense. 

I suspect that many people who are genuinely affected by ableism would find the suggestion that their experience with ablemism is comparable to the "experience" of fetuses offensive. Here's some important discussion:

Who is Affected by Ableism? Ableism can affect almost anyone whom society stereotypes as not being part of the mainstream. WHO? The hearing impaired; the visually impaired; those who use mobility equipment; those with congenital anomalies; those with speech or motor impairments; those with diabetes, depression, asthma, arthritis, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, migraines, epilepsy, AIDS, hemophilia, etc.

Ableism affects the lived experience of these people: it affects their experienced world, for the worse; it diminishes their self-conception and sense of self-worth; it negatively affects their quality of life. 

The suggestion that embryos and early fetuses are "like" these human beings, in that they both victims of ableism, is not just false, I'd say it's offensive. To compare the experience of someone affected by ableism to the non-experience of a being that's never been conscious or had any experiences is, well, disrespectful to people who are genuinely affected by and experience ableism. To say to someone who experiences ableism something like, for example, "Embryos used in embryo experimentation are discriminated against because of their lack of abilities and that is similar to how you are discriminated against because of your abilities" is not just a false comparison, it's an offensive comparison: it just fails to understand ableism and why it's wrong.

In sum, the appeal to "ableism" in arguing against abortion, is similar to the appeals to "equality," "anti-discrimination" and "human rights" in arguing against abortion and attempts to make opposition to abortion sound like opposition to racism and sexism. These are all attempts to make opposition to abortion sound "progressive" and present concern for embryos and fetuses as part of the "expanding circle" of moral concern. But these "liberal" concerns simply don't apply to pre-conscious beings like embryos and early fetuses and so these attempts fail and mislead. The more people willing to take the time and energy to reflect, notice and understand this, the better. 

All blog posts are here!

Some especially relevant posts:

• Abortion and Soundbites: Why Pro-Choice Arguments Are Harder to Make
• Racism, Slavery and Abortion
• Comment on "If Black lives matter, vote for Trump"
• Abortion "Zingers": What About That??

When does human life begin? Would around 70% of people deny that "human life begins at conception"?

It's common for people who oppose abortion to enthusiastically affirm that "life begins at conception." Speaking more precisely, they claim that "human life begins at conception."

To support their claims, they observe that zygotes, embryos, and fetuses are surely alive, biologically: they came from living eggs and sperm and so are "life." And they are surely biologically human: they have human DNA and are of the human species; these aren't feline or canine fetuses at issue. 

So what they say seems obviously correct to them, and this sometimes leads them to mock people who deny that human life begins at conception, asking things like this:

"How could these pro-choice people deny basic facts from biology and science, that fetuses are engaged in the processes of life and that fetuses are biologically human, that they are not some other species?!" 

This rhetorical question (which is, unfortunately, usually left unanswered) sometimes leads to insults, name-calling, and worse. 

Now, perhaps these types of responses are developed on the basis of interacting with people who claim that "human life does not begin at conception" but give uninformed, naive, or absurd reasons why they think that. Many people don't know much about biology, and so—if they say something to address what the abortion critic says—they just might not know or understand the evidence that the abortion critic appeals to in arguing that what they are calling "human life" does begin at conception. About these people, if they need to learn more about biology, then they really should. (What these abortion critics need to learn, however, will be addressed below). 

But another possibility though is that the person who says "human life does not begin at conception" just has a different idea of what "human life" is or are using a different meaning of that term. So what they aren't thinking about is whether a biologically human organism is engaged in the biological processes of life, but something else. 

What could this something else be? To better understand what they might be thinking or have in mind, we can ask the related question, "When does human life end?" This question will help reveal what they mean by "human life" and what they are thinking when they use this phrase.

I recently did a casual, informal Twitter survey (of random, unknown people) to ask about this. Here was the survey and the results (I ran the same survey on Facebook and got nearly identical results):

An informal #survey.

Adam is 40. He's in a car crash, with *major* brain damage. His body somehow remains alive but he's *completely unconscious* for 10 years, when his body dies.

When did Adam's life end? #ethics #philosophy #bioethics

— Nathan Nobis, PhD (@NathanNobis) February 5, 2021

This informal survey suggests that at least around 70% of people understand "human life" to be something different from merely biologically human life. A human body can be alive, yet that "human life" has ended. 

So when does "human life" end? This survey suggests that many people might be willing to say this:

"Human life" ends when consciousness permanently ends: when the ability to feel, be aware, think, and have any types of experiences ends, "human life" ends. And that can happen prior to the death of the body, or the death of "human life" in that sense. 

This answer at least suggests a view on when "human life" begins: 

Human life begins when consciousness begins: when the ability to feel, be aware, think, and have any types of experiences begins, "human life" begins. And that happens after the beginning of the body. 

Whether this initial 70% would agree that their answers on when "human life" ends suggest these answers on when "human life" begins, I don't know. Whether the 30% would disagree with this, I don't know. Again I haven't done a rigorous study on these matters. 

What matters here is that nearly everyone is familiar with the ambiguity in "human life," despite what any critics of abortion say about this: they tend to think it's just simple and obvious what "human life" is. Philosophers, ethicists, and medical professionals (especially those who engage "end of life" issues) are familiar with the ambiguity of "human life"—meaning, that that phrase can be used to mean different things, or refer to different things—but, really, everyone is aware of this ambiguity: to better notice it though they sometimes have to be asked about it in the right way. 

When the issue is raised with an end of life question, it's clear that there's a distinction between "human life" in the sense of a living biologically human body and "human life" in the sense of someone who is conscious, feeling, aware, and so on. And at least 70% or so of people might affirm that "human life" in the sense that really matters when thinking about ethical issues is that latter sense. Many people are familiar with the concept of "brain death" and how brain death ends a "human life"—even if the body is still alive—but more people need to become familiar with the related concept of "brain birth" and its relevance to abortion.

These people in the 70% group might also affirm that "human life" begins far later in pregnancy (when consciousness begins), or even at birth (if they happen to believe, probably implausibly, that is when consciousness starts), since by "human life" they mean someone who is conscious, feeling, aware, and so on. 

Of course, there's been a living biologically human organism all along, but that's not what they mean by "human life," since, in their view, that's not what's ethically significant: that's not what they really care about. And, they are apt to think that just because something is biologically human, or even a (merely) biologically human organism, that doesn't make it wrong to let it die or even kill it, which obviously has implications for abortion, especially early abortions (and so most abortions). 

Earlier I mentioned that some people need to learn more biology. But people who think that the scientific facts that embryos and fetuses are alive, biologically human and even biologically human organisms and that pretty much means that abortion is wrong "need" to learn some literal logic and ethics (specifically focussing on questions about what makes killing wrong, when it's wrong) to understand that, no, these scientific facts do not entail that abortion is wrong: there are controversial assumptions that are part of that argument that need to be articulated and defended. So their simple "scientific" argument is persuasive to some, but it is a very poor argument, in terms of providing reasons to accept the conclusion, and that fact will likely catch up to this argument's advocates eventually. If they don't care about the fact that they are trying to persuade people with bad arguments, then I guess they don't "need" to rethink this; but if they wish to offer genuinely sound or cogent arguments, rethinking this all is a need. 

So, in conclusion, when people are hostile to folks who deny that human life begins at conception, what's probably going on is this: they simply haven't asked that person what they mean by "human life" and/or they haven't found someone who is knowledgable about these issues to explain what they mean. The insults and ill-will result from people failing to attempt to understand each other. It's a predictable result of not making the effort to find out what people are thinking when they seem to disagree. 

It's also a result of, honestly, people not knowing as much about complex issues as they think they do (and so acting like a "know it all" when you're a "don't know much") and being part of a mob or cult about an issue, as opposed to being someone (and parts of groups) who is willing and able to try to think about issues in, honestly, more fair and balanced ways. About abortion, almost nobody takes classes on these topics; almost nobody reads broadly on these issues; honestly, why would the typical person really know much about the issues—from all sides—so they can explain things accurately? That type of understanding is simply discouraged by most groups and people who are enthusiastic about the issues. 

These are all common problems, about many issues, and they are especially problematic here. What can be done? A lot, but as a start, a good practice is always asking this:

What would people who disagree with me on this issue say about this? How would they explain what they think about this disagreement? Am I representing their views correctly?

And here the goal is to find the best person who disagrees with you: the most informed, the most thoughtful, not someone who knows little but thinks they know a lot. Doing this—and not being a "drive-by critic" or someone, or part of a mob, that offers potshots from a distance, would do a lot of good for contributing to positive discussions, about this issue and many others. Daniel Dennett has other good suggestions for positive engagement. 

How's this sound? And what are other good ideas to improve discussions of controversial issues?

Abortion, Personhood and Space Aliens

The topic of abortion often brings up the question of what it is to be a "person." And discussions of the concept of "personhood" can lead to a discussion of space aliens, believe it or not! Here I explain what the point of discussing space aliens is. 

(TL;DR: the point is that the example of space aliens shows that the concept or idea of "person" is not same as "human being": personhood is a psychological concept; discussing the possibility of space aliens does not suggest that space aliens actually exist). 

First, many people who think that abortion is wrong believe that embryos and fetuses are persons, and argue that since they are persons, they are typically wrong to kill and so abortion is typically wrong. 

There are problems, however, with this simple reasoning. 

A first, somewhat abstract problem is that just because something (or someone) is a person, that doesn't mean they have a right to everything they need to live. So, about abortion, even if fetuses were persons that wouldn't automatically mean they would have a right to their mother's body. This is Judith Thomson's point: the simple argument fails because the right to life isn't as simple as people often assume it is.

The second problem is that embryos and at least beginning fetuses just aren't persons, many thoughtful people argue. Why's that? Well, you need to figure out what persons are, or what it is to be a person.

Folks who haven't studied these issues, or have only interacted with people who they agree with on these issues and so have learned about these topics in contexts that encourage groupthink, often respond this way:

Persons are human beings.

Or, more carefully:

Persons are biologically human organisms. 

And maybe even more carefully, as an attempt at stating necessary and sufficient conditions for being a person:

All persons are biologically human organisms and any possible person would be a biologically human organism: so if something is a biologically human organism, then it's a person, and if something were a person, it'd be a biologically human organism. 

From all these, they can argue that since biologically human fetuses are biologically human, they are persons. 

Now, here's the question we need to ask people who say things like this:

We know that things that are biologically human are biologically human, but what makes them persons? What makes biologically human organisms persons?

Here's an answer:

Biologically human organisms are persons because persons are biologically human organisms. 

This answer though is entirely uninformative: we want to know why a type of thing is or would be a person, what makes (or would make) that type of thing a person, and we are just told that it's that type of thing. We aren't told what makes biologically human organisms are persons or why they are persons. 

This is a fair question though. To engage it, it can be helpful to reflect on our own personhood and think about why we are persons or what makes us persons. And this can lead to an understanding of personhood that implies that at least early fetuses, although biologically human organisms, are not persons. Briefly, this concept of personhood sees persons as psychological beings—beings with minds who are conscious and feeling and the like—and early fetuses are not like that. 

At this point though, critics will want to challenge this assumption also, mentioned above:

if something were a person, it'd be a biologically human organism.

They will point out there there could be friendly, intelligent space aliens who are, in all relevant ways, are just like us—they are persons—even though they aren't biologically human. Again, why would they be persons? Because they are like us in having minds and being conscious and feeling and the like.

Now, in saying there "could be" such space aliens, nobody is saying that such aliens actually exist or are even likely. They are just saying that the concept of being a person is one that isn't confined to human beings: personhood is a concept that's based on psychological or mental characteristics, and so if there were non-human space aliens who were mentally and emotionally like us, they would be persons: e.g., ET was a fictional "personified" being, meaning he had the traits of a person: he was a person. 

Nothing in the concept of "person" prevents this possibility. That we recognize that such beings could be—if they were to exist—our friends and co-workers shows (again) that we recognize that the concept of "person" is the not the same as "human being." 

That's the point of thinking about space aliens in the context of abortion. 

All blog posts are here!

Related: 

• Star Trek: "Human rights. Why, the very name is racist."

Abortion and "Slaying the Dragons"

There's a common move made in discussions of abortion, and this type of thing happens with other controversial issues, that goes like this:

"Those evil, stupid pro-choice people don't even understand that _____. If they did, they'd realize that abortion is wrong!"

"Those anti-choice morons are so dumb that don't even realize that _____. If they did, they'd agree that abortion is wrong!"

The picture that comes to mind for me is that these people think they are "slaying the dragons" in pointing out what they think are obvious facts that people who disagree with them are missing: "Those idiots! How could they be so dumb??"

Now, the problem with this is often that things are more complicated than the "dragon slayer" thinks they are.

Let's begin with a pro-choice example:

"Those anti-choice morons are so dumb that don't even realize that women have a right to their own bodies. If they did, they'd agree that abortion is wrong!"

But, like it or not, there are some complications here:

• Is this right a legal right or a moral right, or both?
• Does this right have any limits, ever?
• Is there any way anyone could wind up with any "right" to someone's body, ever? 
• Even if women have these rights, could there be other (legal or moral) obligations that are not based on rights that would make abortion wrong? 

Some of these questions aren't super-easy to answer: they really require some careful thought. So no "dragon" was "slayed": things are more complicated than the would-be-slayer, and any of their mob, thinks they are.

An example about people who oppose abortion:

"Those evil, stupid pro-choice people don't even understand that fetuses are alive, that fetuses are biologically human, that fetuses are alive and biologically human, and that fetuses are living biologically human organisms. If they did, they'd realize that abortion is wrong!"

Like it or not, thoughtful pro-choice people realize that fetuses are alive, that fetuses are biologically human, that fetuses are alive and biologically human, and that fetuses are living biologically human organisms. Surely some pro-choice don't realize this, and too bad for them: their misunderstandings need to be corrected. (Do they think fetuses are dead, and that dead fetuses are aborted? Do they think fetuses in human beings are dogs or cats or some other species?!)

The problem though is that more developed pro-choice arguments (see here for an introduction to these) accept that fetuses are alive, that fetuses are biologically human, that fetuses are alive and biologically human, and that fetuses are living biologically human organisms. 

Pro-choice thinkers acknowledge all that; they typically just argue that despite all this, at least some fetuses don't have the characteristics that make something have rights or wrong to kill, and/or they argue that having these characteristics does not impose obligations on others: e.g., the right to life is not a right to someone else's body, and that even voluntarily sexual relations don't grant anyone that right. 

So no dragons slayed, again. 

(If a person though thought the initial argument or claim would "slay" the idea, they are apt to try it again, although this time they are responding to a more abstract idea that is new to them, so the chances for a "slaying" from their initial reactions is even less likely now.)

What's the upshot? 

It's a common theme here: it's that abortion, like many issues, is complicated: there's a lot to learn about it and simplistic arguments and simplistic objections likely don't get at the heart of that matter. 

It might be fun for some people to "score points" with people who agree with them by "slaying dragons" like this, but that's not the route to any kind of progress on any issues. 

What's needed is some real understanding and some serious, honest engagement with the issues and arguments, based on the recognition that we might have missed something important in our understandings. "Dragonslayers" need to lay down their swords if they want to be part of that, and they should. 

The Ambiguities of "Life" and "Human": Responding to Steve Jacobs at "Secular Pro-Life"

Steve Jacobs responded at "Secular Pro-Life" to this post of mine that was critical of his dissertation project, and I think his response misses the main issues.

So the issue here is that the question "When does life begin?" is ambiguous: it can mean different things. (The question "When does human life begin? is likewise ambiguous too, as we'll see). 

First, there's biological life, something being engaged in the biological processes that define life in a biological sense.

It is very, very obvious that biologically human zygotes and embryos and fetuses are biologically alive: they came from eggs and sperm which were biologically alive; they are engaged in the processes mentioned on page 1 of a biology textbook.

But this obvious fact that biologically human fetuses are biologically alive isn't very important because of this: just because something is biologically alive, that doesn't mean it's wrong to kill it. E.g., mold and plants are biologically alive, but they aren't wrong to kill. Other counterexamples make the point. (Now, the point is not that human fetuses are comparable to any living thing; the point is to engage the exact premise that completes the reasoning as given). 

So here's the problem: if someone thinks that proving the obvious—that biologically human fetuses (we aren't talking about kitten or puppy fetuses, right?) are biologically alive—proves that abortion is wrong, that is mistaken: it's a bad argument. 

Some people are really excited to "prove" that human fetuses are biologically alive, but they just shouldn't be: nothing interesting follows from that fact (or, to be more accurate, interesting moral conclusions about abortion follow from that fact only when conjoined with this false premise: 'all biologically alive things are wrong to kill' or even 'all biologically alive things are prima facie wrong to kill'.

I think this explains the negative reactions that Jacobs got: people thought, "Oh, he's going to take my answer and use it to argue for conclusions that it really doesn't support." And they were right about that. (Right?).

So what else can "When does life begin?" mean? In particular, what can "When does human life begin?" mean?

You can get at that by thinking about the question "When does a human's life end?"

Most people recognize that this is a complex question because of examples like a permanent coma or permanent vegetative states or major, major brain damage. In these cases, someone's body may be alive, but their brain is dead: so we often think that their life has ended, even though their body is biologically alive.

Why has their life ended (even though their body is biologically alive)? 

Because their consciousness has permanently ended: they exist no more: there is no individual or person there anymore, and nobody who can be harmed anymore. So, while there are different ways to put this, we’d say their “biographical life” ended even though their body remains biologically alive.

So back to the question: when does "life begin" for us, and “life” in the morally significant sense, or "biographically human life"? When consciousness begins. And this is a different answer than the biological answer, in part because it's a different question: it's not just about biology; it's about us and what we really are: although we are very much related to our bodies, we are not our bodies.

So, this problem all arises from asking an ambiguous question and not clarifying the options for what the question might mean: in other words, not engaging in a core task of critical thinking. Had that been done, the answers here, from biologists and anyone else, likely have been quite different, as would have been the tones of their reaction!

Especially related blog posts:

• "When does life begin?" and "Are fetuses human?": Two bad 'scientific' questions to ask about abortion
• Would around 70% of people * deny * that "human life begins at conception"?
• "When does life begin? Well, when does life end?"
• On Saying What You Mean: the "Principle of Charity" and the "Principle of Clarity"
• Does "life" begin at conception? Biological versus "biographical" life
• Are fetuses "human beings"? Biological versus psychological definitions
• Are you part of a cult about abortion, or anything else?

All blog posts are here.

Updates: 

• Updating the question to "when does biologically human life begin?" or even "when does a biologically human organism begin?" doesn't change the discussion: the points above still apply. 
• Further comment: Jacobs write this: 

If a fetus is not a human, then abortion restrictions stop women from having a basic, harmless medical procedure. 

If a fetus is a human, then each abortion kills a human and is a presumptively punishable crime without an affirmative legal defense.

About the second claim, each fetuses is obviously "a human" in the biological sense and abortion kills beings that are biologically human: every thoughtful pro-choice person recognizes that (any who are not are confused). What they deny is that fetuses are "human" in the sense of having what they consider human characteristics, like consciousness, feelings, awareness, and so on, and they think that those types of characteristics are what make killing someone wrong. So this statement suggests a misunderstanding of what people actually think about about these issues.

About the first claim, again, of course fetuses are biologically human, but they are not "human" in the sense of having what they consider human characteristics, like consciousness, feelings, awareness, and so on. But that doesn't automatically mean that abortion is not wrong either: e.g., the most famous and important philosophical argument against abortion, from Don Marquis, denies that fetuses are "human" in this sense. So this claim is false: even if fetuses aren't human in this sense, they could be wrong to kill nevertheless.  

• While these issues about "what we are, in our essence" are abstract, Lynne Rudder Baker's Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge, 2000) is a great discussion of them. Here's part of the introduction to one of her articles on these issues:

 

Another update: see my 'When does “life” begin? When it comes to abortion, it depends on what you mean by "life"' at Salon. 

Another update:

In engaging Jacobs on these issues (on Twitter), it seems very common for him to observe that his survey results were these:

• Many "average" people reported that biologists were the best candidates to determine "when life begins.
• Of course, most biologists report that "life begins" at conception or, more literally, there is a living organism at or soon after conception. 

Now, about the first claim, is this, in general true:

• If "average" people -- people who are untrained and inexperienced on an issue -- report that some group of practitioners are the best people to ask about that issue, then that group of practitioners is indeed the best group to ask. 

This is false. What are great examples to show this?

About the second claim, since many or most of the biologists surveyed are pro-choice, that just shows that they (like many or most people!) are informed enough about the ethics of abortion to understand that just because an embryo is a living organism, from or near conception, that does not mean, or even much suggest, that abortion is wrong or should be illegal. That, of course, is what led to the angry reactions: their biological claims were twisted to try to support an agenda that they, and their biological claims, don't support.